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Current Safety of Flight (SOF) certification standards (both military and civil-
ian) require a qualified pilot (or operator for unmanned systems) in the loop for
operation. The pilot, who controls the vehicle and makes decisions, is ultimately
responsible for the safe operations of the vehicle [1]. Many modern aircraft can,
and are, operated through a set of pilot relief modes (i.e., autopilots) that allow the
aircraft to complete nearly the entire flight without a pilot touching the controls
(which includes landing high performance jet aircraft on the pitching deck of an air-
craft carrier [2]). However, the Pilot in Command (PIC) still has the responsibility
for the aircraft and is expected to operate the vehicle safety under current certifica-
tion standards. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification for unmanned
vehicles only deals with small vehicles (referred to as quad-copters or similar small
drones), and requires the operator to be within line of sight of the vehicle [3]. The
use of unmanned aircraft is expected to increase over the next decade as they have
the capability to operate far beyond the limits of human endurance [4]. Future sys-
tems are expected to allow vehicles to operate autonomously, without an operator in
the loop. They will ultimately require a new process for certifying an autonomous
vehicle to accomplish tasks that are currently reserved for qualified pilots [1, 5–7].
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All modern aircraft have some level of automation, and this automation is thor-
oughly tested during the SOF certification process. In this dissertation, a distinction
has been made between automation (such as a pilot relief mode or autopilot) and
autonomy. For automation, a system functions with little or no human operator in-
volvement. However, the system performance is limited to the specific actions it has
been designed to do. Typically these are well-defined tasks that have predetermined
responses (such as “maintain altitude” or “fly the published approach for the duty
runway”). For autonomy, a system has a set of intelligence-based capabilities that
allow it to respond to situations that were not pre-programmed or anticipated (i.e.,
decision-based responses) prior to system deployment. Autonomous systems have a
degree of self-government and self-directed behavior [8]. This difference can be fur-
ther deconstructed into deterministic behavior (based on known input conditions,
where the vehicle will exhibit a known behavior) and non-deterministic behavior
(the exact behavior of the system cannot be determined based upon the input con-
ditions). As it is impossible for software designers to anticipate every situation a
system will one day find itself it, allowing a system to exhibit non-deterministic
behavior is essential for certification. This research focus on defining a box where a
system will be allowed to exhibit non-deterministic behavior.
For naval aviation, airworthiness certification authority is delegated to Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 4.0 Engineering (4.0P is the branch assigned) [9].
When a new capability (i.e., software, weapon or air frame) is acquired, and before
naval personnel operate it, 4.0P must grant a flight clearance (also referred to as a
SOF certification). The certification of naval aircraft follow an engineering based risk
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mitigation process. Aircraft subsystems, software, components and ultimately the
aircraft itself are certified through an established process. Technical Area Experts
(TAEs) are tasked with reviewing certification evidence (referred to as artifacts)
in their individual technical areas. These reviews are rolled up into a larger flight
clearance which certification officials use to certify the vehicle as a whole. When a
vehicle is certified safe for flight, NAVAIR 4.0P is certifying that when given to a
qualified pilot they can safely complete the desired mission of the aircraft [9].
As NAVAIR 4.0P certifies aircraft to be operated by qualified pilots, it is im-
portant to understand how the process to qualify a pilot differs from the aircraft
SOF certification process. The qualification process for naval aviators (pilots) is con-
sidered to be a trust process. Unlike the civilian sector, military pilots are trusted
by their Commanding Officers (COs) to complete missions critical to national inter-
ests. While each pilot is required to log a minimum amount of flight time, and show
competency in aircraft procedures prior to qualification, a CO will not designate
them as fully qualified until the individual has earned the trust of the CO in their
decision making abilities in off nominal conditions [10].
In order for a naval autonomous aerial system to be certified to complete tasks
currently reserved for qualified pilots, a new process needs to be developed that can
bridge the gap between the engineering focused NAVAIR 4.0P process and the trust
process currently used by COs.
Autonomy offers tremendous advantages for military aviation. But, the largest
advantage will be budgetary. By eliminating the requirement to train aircrew an
immediate cost savings will be achieved [11]. All military acquisition programs are
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governed by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 5000.02T and it divides the
life cycle of a program into several phases. While there will most likely be a larger
expenditure during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase
due to increased test and evaluation required, there is expected to be a dramatic
savings during the Sustainment phase due to the reduced costs of Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) [11]. Long term, the reduced wear and tear on aircraft from the
reduced training requirement will result in aircraft spending more years in service (as
their useful service life measured in flight hours). The reduced budgetary landscape,
coupled with the ever increasing cost of manned platforms, has created a large
appetite for autonomy in the DoD. Once an autonomous system is granted a SOF
certification, it can be used for the dull, dirty and dangerous missions in place of a
manned aircraft.
Anything dealing with fielding a system for the military will need to be vetted
through the DoD acquisition process [11]. The process is designed to ensure that
systems in the acquisition process have the proper checks and balances. In addition,
current DoD regulations limit the design of autonomous weapons system without
allowing the exercise of appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force
[12]. This has limited autonomous research within the DoD to systems/behaviors
that comply with the regulation. The DoD and NASA use Technology Readiness
Levels (TRLs) to describe maturity levels for new technologies during the acquisition
process [11,13,14] (Table 1.1 provides a short summary of the NASA TRL levels as
described by Mankins in his 1995 white paper). Prior to fielding, an autonomous
system it will need to demonstrate it can perform the mission under controlled
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TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic
proof-of-concept
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environ-
ment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and
demonstration
TRL 9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations
Table 1.1: Technology Readiness Levels Summary Used by NASA [14]
conditions (Developmental Test (DT)), and under mission representative conditions
(Operational Test (OT)). A system is considered to be at TRL 7 during DT, and
TRL 8 during OT. A fielded system is considered TRL 9 [13]. However, naval flight
clearance officials have not had the opportunity to evaluate an autonomous system
that qualifies as TRL 8. Yet, before certification officials will approve a process that
will lead to a TRL 9 system, the new process needs to be evaluated for flaws.
1.1 Motivation
The past 15 years has seen a dramatic use of aviation related automation
and autonomy within academic research, yet SOF regulators have not kept pace.
Autonomy has been seen as a new field where science is starting to produce results
close to science fiction. The ability to research new advances via relatively low cost
and easy to program platforms has spurred nearly every university to have some
level of active research in this field of study. Yet, as has been seen with nearly
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every advance to the state of the art, academia is outpacing regulatory authorities.
Despite the fact that researchers continue to develop new algorithms or autonomous
capabilities regulators are reluctant to approve their use for the general public. This
is despite a clear desire from the general public to increase the level of autonomy in
our everyday lives.
The automobile industry is one example of the increasing use of automation
in our everyday lives. Modern automobiles have several capabilities that may be
considered “driver relief modes” or automation. These capabilities include, but are
not limited to: Cruise control, Brake assist, and Hands-free parallel parking. While
self-driving cars have been studied for decades, it was not until the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) grand challenge (2005) that major advances
were seen in the practical application of self-driving cars [15]. Tesla vehicles have had
the hardware and software installed for truly autonomous operation since the 2016
model year. However, to operate the vehicle in autonomous mode the driver has to
be at the controls ready to take over at all times for it to be legally operated [16–18].
What about aviation? Science fiction promised the general public that we
would have robots flying our aircraft. But when will the general public have this
opportunity? Automation has been part of aviation platforms since the beginning
as the first autopilot was used for straight and level flight in 1914. A modern airliner
can complete an entire flight (from takeoff to touchdown) without the pilot making
any control inputs. The pilot is there for regulatory reasons and simply needs to
monitor the aircraft. Academia has shown that we are now at a point where a
computer can make decisions that are normally reserved for pilots. However, there
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currently is not an approved path defined for a SOF certification authority to certify
a computer to exhibit non-deterministic behavior when it is controlling an aircraft.
The first time anything is done is always the hardest. This is especially true
when asking a certification authority to accept risk. There is a large amount of per-
ceived risk in the general public for allowing an aircraft to operate without a qualified
pilot. A large body of evidence, and a solid methodology needs to be assembled for
the risk to be accepted by the risk averse certification agencies. For civilian appli-
cations the FAA would be the certification authority. For naval aviation, NAVAIR
4.0P has the delegated authority for SOF certification.
1.2 Problem Formulation
Before a naval aviation acquisition (i.e., weapon, software, component, or
whole aircraft) can be fielded, a SOF certification must be granted by NAVAIR
4.0P. When certification officials issue a clearance they are certifying that when the
asset is used by a fully qualified pilot they can safety accomplish their assigned mis-
sion. Their process is engineering focused, and is geared to verify what the system
will do under various conditions (to include the actions of the pilot/operator).
The pilot certification process is a trust process. Ultimately when a CO desig-
nates a pilot as being fully qualified they are certifying that they trust the judgment
of that pilot. Naval aviators may find themselves in situations that were not antici-
pated, and if the aviator makes the wrong decision the ramifications may cause loss
of aircraft, loss of life, or even an international incident.
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Autonomous aircraft will not have a pilot in the loop. Therefore, the trust
process currently inherent in certification will be lost. So how do we certify auton-
omy? How do we certify a system to operate without a human in the loop? Who is
responsible if something unexpected happens?
In an attempt to provide valuable lessons learned to naval SOF certification
officials, this research focuses on certifying an autonomous system to make decisions
that are currently reserved for qualified pilots. As there currently is not a need
for this type of certification, an approved method for obtaining one does not exist.
Through close coordination with naval SOF officials, senior naval officers (those
currently responsible for designating a pilot as being fully qualified) and the Test
and Evaluation (T&E) community, we propose and exercise a methodology in the
hopes that the lessons learned from this first attempt will help guide officials as they
eventually develop an approved process.
1.3 Background
There have been several proposed approaches for certification of unmanned or
autonomous systems. A majority of the work deals with small Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs), or theoretical methods for certifying large vehicles. One common
theme is to identity errors in the software early in the design cycle since the later
a defect is found the more resources (both time and money) are required to cor-
rect the issue [8, 19–22]. Many of the approaches involve M&S to determine if the
software is adequate for the system requirements [20, 23–30]. Another common ap-
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proach involves employing formal methods for safety critical software Verification
and Validation (V&V) (e.g., run time verification [31–42] model checking [43–55]
and theorem proving [44, 55–61]). Some papers have detailed methodologies for
V&V for the unmanned see-and-avoid requirement, but only for a two dimensional
problem [62,63]. Other proposals highlight the limitations of programming and sim-
ulating a pilot’s ability to sense and accurately build their Situational Awareness
(SA) during flight [64–70] then make decisions based on changing situations [33,71].
One drawback of these approaches is the limited scope of their work. As an
entire approved methodology does not exist, previous work has been limited to one
or two pieces of the V&V process, and most did not consult aviation certification
officials. One notable exception is the work done by the Formal Methods Group at
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Langley. Currently NASA
is working on, and have published, several papers on obtaining flight clearances for
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to operate within the national airspace [72–74].
Their work focuses on formally defining the specification from the requirements of
operation within the national airspace, and then V&V via theorem provers. This
is designed to give certification officials confirmation that the software will perform
per the requirements. However, their work focuses on an objective standard (such
as maintain 1,000 ft separation), not a judgment task (such as interpret the envi-
ronment and make the best decision). As the current SOF certification process is
designed to approve a system to be utilized by a fully qualified pilot, it has been
hypothesized that before a SOF certification will be granted for an autonomous sys-
tem the system under test needs to demonstrate that is can perform as a qualified
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pilot would [75, 76]. One issue with this plan is the complexity of accomplishing
it. The complexity of autonomous systems results in an inability to test under all
known conditions, difficulties in objectively measuring risk, and an ever-increasing
cost of rework and redesign due to errors found late in the V&V process [8].
Most of the current work to certify autonomy is based off easily definable,
black and white regulations for operating in the public airspace. One example is
collision avoidance, where aircraft are required to maintain a safety bubble around
them to avoid other aircraft. This involves an easily definable and well documented
set of requirements (such as lateral and vertical separation). These requirements
do not involve pilot judgment, and can be accomplished by using data currently
available via onboard systems (such as Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
and Mode C transponders).
We focus on two tasks, or missions, that are currently reserved for qualified
pilots. The first is the the Confined Area Landing/Landing Zone (CAL/LZ) mission
currently being executed by the USN and USMC helicopter communities. The
CAL/LZ mission can be as simple as landing in an open field adjacent to a highway,
or as difficult as landing between buildings in an urban setting. Prior to being
certified as a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC), a candidate is expected to
be able to complete the mission safety. During the mission, a pilot is required to
monitor multiple factors in an ever change environment and make a judgment based
decision as to where to land. The second is the RETROGRADE/SCRAM task
currently carried out by High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) aircrew. A HVAA
is unable to defend itself and is required to maintain a standoff range from threat
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aircraft. When a threat aircraft reaches a defined range, the HVAA will be required
to RETROGRADE (withdraw from station in response to a threat, continue mission
as able). Once the threat is no longer a factor, the vehicle can RESET to its
orbit. During a RETROGRADE, the HVAA platform can continue to complete its
assigned mission. When a threat aircraft reaches a defined range, the HVAA will be
required to SCRAM (egress for defensive or survival reasons). A fully qualified pilot
is expected to take in the information available to them (both from communications
with other assets and onboard systems) to determine when an aircraft reaches one of
these pre-briefed limits. This decision can be considered a judgment decision based
on the fidelity of the information available.
To complete a judgment task, a pilot needs to be able to interpret the available
information in flight and build a mental model of their environment. This mental
model is called Situational Awareness (SA). An understanding of SA as it relates to
aviation is critical to understanding how it will relate to the certification of auton-
omy. One of the most commonly accepted definitions for SA is “the perception of
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension
of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future [77]”. During
flight school, student naval aviators are taught that SA in aviation is being able to
accurately diagnose what is happening around them and predict what will happen
in the immediate future, thus enabling them to perform the assigned mission safely.
Students with high SA are able to “stay ahead of the aircraft”, while students with
low SA tend to seem to be “holding onto the stab” during flight. From their first
flight, aviators learn to use every available resource to develop their SA (e.g., radio
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calls, aircraft instruments, visually scanning outside of the aircraft, onboard radar,
Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensors and seat of the pants feelings). Prior to
obtaining full qualification, a naval aviator will have proven to their CO that they
can develop their SA to an appropriate level that they can safely complete their
assigned mission during off nominal conditions [10]. The measurement of SA has
proven to be an intangible, and largely subjective concept. Pilots quickly learn that
the only way to know exactly the level of their current SA is when they realize that
they have none. When a pilot’s SA is high (i.e., they have an accurate understand-
ing of the environment they are operating in) they can make sound aeronautical
decisions. However, when a pilot’s SA is low (which they may or may not know at
the time) their aeronautical decisions may not be sound. Autonomous vehicles will
use their sensors to build SA of their environment. When properly designed sensors
are operating at 100% the contributions they provide to the vehicle SA should be
adequate to support sound aeronautical decisions. However, at some point of sensor
degradation the vehicle SA will no longer match reality.
1.4 Certification Methodology
This dissertation was prepared in close coordination with naval SOF clearance
officials to determine a path forward for certifying autonomy in naval aircraft. A
method for certifying a vehicle to make decisions when a qualified pilot/operator
is not in the loop does not currently exist. We proposed, and certification officials
concurred, the following methodology as a possible avenue for certifying autonomy
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in the hopes that lessons learned from its exercise will help develop an approved
process before the first autonomous system is acquired by the Navy:
1. Define the requirements (normally reserved for a pilot) to execute autonomous
behavior. These requirements must be developed through coordination with
SOF certification officials, the naval T&E community, and fleet officials who
currently certify pilots as fully qualified. A specification will then be devel-
oped that can be used to verify the requirements have been completely and
accurately specified.
2. Develop the clearance envelope where the system will be allowed to exhibit
non-deterministic behavior (the exact behavior of the system cannot be de-
termined based upon the input conditions). If the system were to encounter
the edge of this envelope it would revert to deterministic behavior (based on
known input conditions, the vehicle will exhibit a known behavior).
3. Analyze the specification to ensure the requirements of the system are met.
4. Develop a protocol/set of control laws with traceability to the verified specifi-
cation. This way formal methods will satisfy the requirements of the system,
as the protocol/control laws will have formally verified properties.
5. Limited M&S of the algorithms/control laws as a risk reduction tool prior to
flight test. This will attempt to show the system will display non-deterministic
behavior only while it is within the clearance envelope.
6. Design the process for flight test. Most conventional flight test techniques
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are designed for a pilot to test an unproven system. In this case, test points
will need to be developed that demonstrate under controlled (DT) and op-
erationally relevant conditions (OT) the system under test can complete the
assigned mission.
7. Execute DT and OT on the autonomous system under test.
8. Full report of the tests conducted on the system under test.
1.5 Contributions
As I am currently a senior naval officer with contacts and established rela-
tionships within the naval acquisitions community (to include T&E Community
Leadership, SOF certification officials, and the NAWCAD center for autonomy) this
research was given many unique opportunities not normally afforded to University
studies. These opportunities included access to senior officials for interviews and
guidance, access to existing data sets within the Navy, and access to DoD approved
M&S environments.
The original contribution to knowledge contained in this dissertation include:
 Proposed methodology for obtaining a naval aviation SOF certification allow-
ing a decision engine to complete a task currently reserved for a qualified pilot.
Then the exercise of the methodology to help build a path forward for cer-
tifying autonomy. Currently the United States Navy (USN) does not have a
path forward for certifying autonomy. This contribution will influence future
certification standards and procedures for this emerging requirement.
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 Definition of the requirements a decision engine must complete if it were to be
approved to complete the CAL/LZ mission autonomously (a task currently re-
served for a qualified pilot). Then use of a formal methods approach to ensure
the actions taken by a developed protocol will satisfy the requirements defined.
This contribution exercised the first four steps of the methodology proposed
in Section 1.4 and provide artifacts to certification officials for a possible SOF
clearance allowing a decision engine to complete a mission currently reserved
for a qualified pilot.
 Development of flight test matrices (one for DT and one for OT) for an au-
tonomous vehicle to complete the CAL/LZ mission. Followed by analysis of
both DT and OT flight test data of an autonomous vehicle completing a task
currently reserved for a qualified pilot (CAL/LZ mission). This contribution
exercised the last three steps of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4 and
provided artifacts to certification officials for a possible SOF clearance allow-
ing a decision engine to complete a mission currently reserved for a qualified
pilot.
 Development of an objective measure for autonomous vehicle SA that ac-
counted for sensor degradation within a Department of Defense (DoD) rec-
ognized M&S environment. The measure specifically evaluated the effects of
sensor degradation on error distance of a fused track of a threat aircraft. We
used Design of Experiments (DOE) to determine the effects of sensor degra-
dation and produce a set of predictive equations for the error distance of the
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fused track. Then used Subject Matter Expert (SME) opinion to define the
point at which (within this scenario) the fused error distance was inadequate
to make a decision currently reserved for a qualified pilot. This contribution
exercised the fifth step of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4 and pro-
vided results that if confirmed during flight test could have lead to a SOF
clearance allowing a decision engine to complete a mission currently reserved
for a qualified pilot.
1.6 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 has been an introduction
to the research. Chapter 2 is a literature review focused on developing a path forward
for certifying a decision engine to complete the CAL/LZ mission in a large rotor-
craft. Chapter 3 details the process of certification from requirements development
to the establishment of a protocol for an autonomous air vehicle to complete the
CAL/LZ mission and will exercise the first four steps of the methodology proposed
in Section 1.4. Chapter 4 presents flight test data, and the analysis of that data,
of an autonomous air vehicle completing the CAL/LZ mission (both developmental
and operational flight test data), and exercises the last three steps of methodology
proposed in Section 1.4. Chapter 5 details the development of an objective mea-
sure for determining adequate SA of an autonomous air vehicle to complete a task
currently reserved for qualified pilots (identifying the range for RETROGRADE or
SCRAM) in an M&S environment, and exercises the fifth step of the methodology
16
proposed in Section 1.4. Chapter 6 summarizes the work, provided a list of original
contributions and provides an outlook for future work related to this topic.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Overview
Certifying an autonomous controller to complete tasks currently reserved for
qualified pilots is on the critical path for autonomous aerial vehicles to be fielded.
Since the dawn of aviation, many of the innovations we currently take for granted
came from the military (some examples include: radar [78], medevac air ambulance
[79], jet engines [80], glow sticks [81], and advanced night vision technology [82]).
For this reason, and due to classification issues, we initially focused our research on
defining a path forward for an autonomous controller to accomplish a task currently
carried out by the USN and USMC helicopter communities: Landing a full size
helicopter autonomously in an unprepared LZ. This literature review is focused on
defining the issues associated with accomplishing that research.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 is a brief review of automation
within tactical naval aviation. Section 2.3 covers the naval certification process (both
aircraft and aviator). Section 2.4 deals with building trust in autonomous systems
leading to certification. Section 2.5 discusses bringing autonomy to military aviation.
Section 2.6 delves into formal methods research. Section 2.7 is a broad overview of
other topics for autonomy in military aviation. Section 2.8 covers the helicopter
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landing mission. Finally, section 2.9 discusses the HAC qualification process in
detail.
2.2 Review of Automation within Tactical Naval Aviation
As previously noted, automation has been part of aviation since its early days.
Pilot relief modes such, as an autopilot, are forms of automation. Unlike helicopters,
most naval tactical aircraft are single piloted with only a single seat. However, some
will have an additional seat for a Naval Flight Officer (NFO). The NFO can assist
in managing aircraft systems but does not have access to flight controls. This single
piloted nature, and the ever increasing workload pilots face, has manifested a need
for increased automated functionality within the aircraft.
As automation is designed to make it easier for a human pilot to complete
tasks, it is only natural that the high levels of automation are installed in carrier
based tactical aircraft. Examples include autopilot/pilot relief modes within the
F/A-18 family of aircraft, the automated carrier landing functionality inherent to
the precision approach and landing System, and the X-47 demonstration program.
2.2.1 Autopilot/Pilot Relief Modes in the F/A-18 Hornet Family of
Aircraft
The F/A-18 Hornet family of aircraft include the F/A-18 A-D (Legacy Hor-
net), F/A-18 E/F (Supper Hornet) and EA-18G (Growler). The Legacy Hornet
began development in the 1970s. It was designed to be a multi role single seat air-
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craft. After the lessons learned in Vietnam developers made numerous provisions
to make the aircraft easier to fly. This gave the pilot more capacity to manage the
various aircraft systems. These provisions are referred to as pilot relief modes. As of
2020, the Super Hornet and Growler are still being produced with pilot relief modes
in mind. Figure 2.1 is an image of a two place EA-1G Growler during transonic
flight test in 2009.
Figure 2.1: EA-18G Growler During Flight Test in 2009 [83]
Pilot relief modes include, but are not limited to: mach hold, calibrated air-
speed hold, altitude hold, heading hold, flight path hold, and flight plan coupling.
During an airways navigation flight from St. Louis to Phoenix, with limited preflight
planning and through the use of the pilot relief modes, a pilot would only need to
make limited flight control inputs. During combat, the judicious use of pilot relief
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modes enables the pilot to spend more of their time focused on the mission and less
actually flying the aircraft.
While the Legacy Hornet has limited direct connections to the flight controls,
the Super Hornet and Growler are completely fly-by-wire. In a fly-by-wire aircraft
all flight control inputs are transmitted to the flight control computer which ulti-
mately makes the decision on what flight control surfaces to actuate. All members
of the Hornet family are extremely software dependent. Each new software patch,
or update, requires rigorous regression testing. This testing is done through M&S,
in various laboratories with hardware in the loop, and ultimately through flight test.
As the V&V community begins looking at methods for V&V of autonomous systems
there needs to be a new way of certifying these systems. While some testing will
still be completed via current procedures, new methods will need to be developed
and employed.
2.2.2 Automated Landing of Tactical Jets on Aircraft Carriers
Automated landing is not a new concept for naval aviation. All USN CVNs,
LHDs, and LHAs are equipped with the Precision Approach Landing System (PALS)
(also referred to as the Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS)). PALS enables
aircraft to “couple” with the ship and allow a qualified pilot to automatically (with
no control inputs) land their aircraft. During an ACLS approach the pilot has the
responsibility to guard the controls and take control if there is a perceived or actual
malfunction. For CVN aviation, pilots are not allowed to use the this mode (except
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in extremes) unless they are an experienced fleet aviator having completed at least
one six month deployment aboard ship. This is the risk mitigation step leadership
put in place for safety. A new pilot may not know when an approach is unsafe, and
therefore not take control from the automated system during a malfunction.
Understanding the certification of the PALS capability may give insight on
future automation or autonomy certification. Unlike software and hardware certifi-
cation on aircraft (which only require certification on initial development or modi-
fication), the PALS system is required to be re-certified every 24 months on a CVN
and 46 months on a LHA or LHD [84]. A PALS certification effort demonstrates,
through PALS certification tests, that the system can assist pilots of qualified air-
craft to accomplish safe manual and automatic approaches (if capable) to touchdown
above the established weather minimums and within the determined operational en-
velope [84].
A full certification of a CVN PALS may be required for several reasons. Some
of them include but are not limited to: a new aircraft to be controlled (such as
the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter), PALS equipment move/upgrade, or following ship
overhaul. Full certification is an extensive proposition, requiring multiple weeks in
port and over a week at sea for the V&V process [85].
The Carrier Suitability Department at VX-23, in conjunction with the Naval
Air Traffic Management Systems Program Office (PMA-213) manage the certifica-
tion of all PALS onboard ship or at equipped Naval Air Stations. Full certification
of a PALS onboard a CVN is administered via a test plan. While each certification
may be covered by an individual test plan, they are all similar in level of effort to
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the master PALS test plan. As of December 2017, the governing test plan for PALS
certification was 127 pages. It lists the attributes being examined as well as how
the various tests will be conducted. When any part of the certification plan changes
(such as equipment, supporting flight clearances or test personnel) an amendment
is required prior to actual flight test. This document is designed to standardize the
evaluation and is used as a risk mitigation tool for certification officials [86]. For a
full certification, 30-40 flight hours are anticipated. A one page test matrix (Figure
2.2) is further detailed by a 48 page Detailed Method of Test (DMOT).
Figure 2.2: Test Matrix for CVN PALS Certification [86]
The DMOT details the particulars of the test conditions and gives evaluation
metrics for certification. While several metrics are evaluated, the hook touchdown
point is the main test metric examined for PALS certification. A Nimitz class carrier
has four arresting wires (number 1-4 from aft of the ship to forward) spaced about
50 ft apart. The ideal hook touchdown point is halfway between the 2 and the 3
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wire. See Figure 2.3 for a pictorial of the ideal touchdown point.
Figure 2.3: Graphical Depiction of the Ideal Hook Touch Down Point for PALS
Approach on a Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier [87]
When an aircraft approaches the flight deck, it is required to maintain constant
angle of attack (AOA). This AOA is designed so that the arresting hook and the main
landing gear touch down at the same time. In addition, proper AOA puts the hook
at an optimum angle to properly engage the arresting wire. To accomplish this the
systems onboard the CVN must be set for the actual aircraft type on approach. This
delta between the “Beacon Flight Path” and the “Hook Flight Path”, as depicted
for an F/A-18 in Figure 2.4, will not be the same for all types of aircraft using the
system and the ACLS must be matched to the aircraft on approach.
Figure 2.4: Graphical Depiction of the Difference Between the Beacon and Hook
Flight Path on PALS Approach [86]
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The objective of PALS is to put the arresting hook of an aircraft in a position
to safely engage one of the arresting wires onboard the aircraft carrier. The main
certification metric is the achievement of a 95% confidence interval that the mean
hook touchdown point is within 15 ft of the desired touch down point [86]. Figure
2.5 is included for reference to an established metric used by naval certification
officials for automation onboard CVNs. Test engineers use it for evaluation of the
performance of the system under test.
The discussion of how Naval certification officials V&V PALS onboard aircraft
carriers is included as an example of how the use of a metric for automation certifica-
tion. Provided the system is set up properly (uses established norms for equipment
and environmental conditions), and the CVN passes its bi-annual certification, pi-
lots can use the system to land their aircraft onboard a CVN with no pilot input.
As the military begins grappling with ways to certify autonomy this may serve as a
possible path towards certification.
2.2.3 X-47 CVN Demonstrator
Obi-Wan Kenobi was a wise Jedi. He had numerous quotes, but the one that
is most relevant to this body or research was “Flying is for Droids” [88]. The X-47
demonstrator (Figure 2.6) program had a limited goal. Demonstrate that a UAV
could operate in the CVN environment, to include arrested landing and catapult
launches. Unfortunately a majority of the technical achievements of the program are
protected under propriety agreements with its designers. Through several interviews
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Figure 2.5: Extract From the DMOT Portion of the PALS Certification Test Plan
Detailing the Requirements [86]
with members of the flight test team, we were able to construct the issues related to
certifying the X-47 for flight in the national airways systems and operations around
a CVN.
The X-47 was designed with limited utility. It had a simple mission: Demon-
strate that an unmanned aircraft could operate in the carrier environment. To
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Figure 2.6: First Landing of a Large Fixed Wing Drone on Board an Aircraft Carrier,
10 July 2013 [89]
accomplish this mission, the test team used simplicity for airworthiness certifica-
tion. They programmed the X-47 to exhibit deterministic behavior. All emergency
procedures (for hardware or software failures) were hard coded into the system. A
human was always in the loop, or able to override the actions of the onboard com-
puter system. In cases where the system lost link with its controllers it would either
perform a preplanned, and airspace cleared, approached back to one of three select
airports or it would ditch in the ocean.
In the end, the deterministic behavior exhibited by the X-47 was able to achieve
limited certification by the Navy and the FAA to accomplish the demonstration tasks
for which it was developed. As part of their ongoing research and IRAD investment,
Northrop Grumman (prime contractor for the X-47 demonstrator) have continued
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work on the problem of launching and recovering a large UAV from a CVN. As
part of their IRAD investment they have started working on the V&V problem.
They have proposed breaking the problem down to a number of steps, V&V the
subcomponents of the model, then V&V the entire model. Their approach may
work, however it faces the same questions and concerns as other currently proposed
V&V techniques for autonomous systems [46].
For the purposes of this research, deterministic behavior shall be defined as
“based on a known input condition, the vehicle shall perform a known behavior.”
This can be thought of as basic “if, then, else behavior” and to some extent all
unmanned vehicles will be programmed with this behavior. However, how to we
push the outside of this envelope? In this research, we examine how to certify a
system that exhibits limited non-deterministic behavior. Test assets will be given
an envelope in which it can make its own decisions. Determining how certification
officials will accept the risk associated with this is on the critical path for certifying
autonomy.
2.3 Naval Certification Processes
2.3.1 Naval Aviation Aircraft Certification Process
Currently the US military uses the T&E community for V&V of new capa-
bilities. The military branch which will eventually field the capability are tasked
the airworthiness certification for the new capability. As this research focuses on
naval aviation, this discussion will focus on the practices and policies which govern
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naval aircraft. NAVAIR 4.0P, located on NAS Patuxent River, is the ultimate flight
clearance authority for naval aircraft and naval aviation systems. The governing in-
struction of naval aircraft certification is the NAVAIR Airworthiness and Cybersafe
Process Manual (NAVAIR Manual M-13034-1) [9].
There are two types of flight test currently employed when a capability is
added to a naval aircraft, Developmental Test (DT) and Operational Test (OT).
DT is performed by trained test pilots. A trained military test pilot is defined as a
graduate of the USNTPS (NAS Patuxent River, Maryland), USAFTPS (Edwards
AFB, California), Empire Test Pilot School (Boscombe Down, England), or Ecole de
Personnel Navigant D’Essais et de Reception (EPNER, located in Estres France).
TPS teaches future test pilots classical test techniques to evaluate experimental
aircraft and new capacities to already fielded aircraft.
DT test points are normally controlled, and designed to determine if the ca-
pability meets individual specifications and requirements. An example of a develop-
mental test requirement might be: “The aircraft will achieve a speed of 1.4 Mach at
10,000 ft MSL during a level acceleration.” This requirement has a clear condition
(1.4 Mach at 10,000 ft MSL), and a clear method to achieve it (level acceleration).
Once a new capability (full aircraft, new software load, or weapon) has successfully
demonstrated that it meets the required DT specifications it may transition to OT.
The purpose of OT is to ensure that the new capability is suitable for the
mission it is expected to complete. An OT pilot is a fleet experienced aviator. They
typically have been in the service for approximately seven years, and have complete
a fleet tour (deployable squadron). For a new capability to be deemed suitable
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(and pass OT) it must be able to perform the mission in a fleet representative
environment. An example of an OT requirement may include: “The aircraft must
be able to integrate into a multi-plane strike verses a remote target in a contested
environment.” Modern OT differs from DT in several ways beyond simply the
training required for its aircrew. DT is designed to ensure the capability matches
the requirements levied by the government. OT is designed to ensure that the
military can use the capability to complete its mission. It is possible for a capability
to successfully pass DT, but fail OT. This is one of the reasons the DoD only requires
OT.
Following T&E, and the successfully demonstration of the capability, NAVAIR
4.0P will issue an airworthiness certification for the new capability. However, this
paradigm is based on a number of assumptions. NAVAIR issues the certification
for the hardware and software onboard the aircraft. This certification assumes that
there is a qualified human (either pilot for manned aircraft or controller for UASs)
making the actual decisions on how the system will be employed.
2.3.2 Naval Aviator Certification Process
The certification of aviators (pilots in the USN) is the responsibility of the
Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) (commanded by a one or two star admiral)
and that of Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) (commanded by a three star ad-
miral). To be fully qualified, a pilot must pass a number of preliminary certification
standards before they are able to formally take the safety of flight responsibilities
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and sign as the Pilot in Command (PIC) of a naval aircraft.
While the PIC of a single seat tactical jet can sign for their aircraft fairly early
in training, it is not until they are designated as a section (two aircraft operating
together) leader that they are considered to be fully qualified. Typically a new
section leader will have completed a CNAF approved tactical flight syllabus, log a
prerequisite number of flight hours in model, and earned their CO’s trust in their
judgment during unpredictable situations. It is standard for a pilot to achieve this
qualification by two and a half years in their fleet squadron. Failure to achieve this
qualification in the specified time may result in a board of review on the aviators
flight status.
Unlike tactical jet aircraft, most military helicopters typically have two seats.
A helicopter pilot is considered fully qualified once they are designated a Helicopter
Aircraft Commander (HAC). Prior to being designated as a HAC, the pilot is re-
quired to successfully complete numerous schools and will have demonstrated to
numerous evaluators they are proficient. Like tactical jet pilots, they must complete
a number of prerequisites demonstrating their skills in the cockpit. However, unlike
tactical jet pilots, to be fully qualified they must pass a “HAC Board” which is led
by the squadron leadership to test their judgment under pressure in a variety of
situations.
Regardless of the track an aviator takes to become fully qualified, the outcome
is the same. They must complete an extensive syllabus that convinces leadership
to trust their judgment. Once a naval aviator is considered fully qualified, they are
trusted to make decisions based on their past experiences. The CO has trust in
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the individuals ability to build their SA during off nominal conditions, and make
sound aeronautical decisions based off that SA. It is only at this time that leadership
(typically a squadron CO) will designate them as fully qualified.
How can these process be transitioned for certifying autonomy? How can
certification officials be expected to allow a system that does not possess a learning
capability to make decisions that a pilot currently make? If it does have some level
of machine learning ability, how can certification officials continue to trust that it
was perform within given parameters once the software evolves?
2.3.3 NAVAIR 4.0P Certification Process
Currently, when an aircraft is certified safe for flight (when operated within
established limits, it will not break down or cause a danger to the general public) it
is assumed that they will be operated by a qualified pilot (or operator in the case of
large UAVs such as Global Hawk or Predator). Academia, and now industry, have
developed software and hardware solutions that are capable of making decisions
based on information provided by its sensors (such as where to land) and exhibit
non-deterministic behavior.
How do we certify a decision engine (the computer acting as the PIC) to safely
accomplish tasks currently reserved for a qualified pilot? For a large autonomous
rotorcraft these tasks will include takeoff, path planning, obstacle avoidance and
landing spot selection. While academia, industry, and the military have proposed
advances in the field, and paths forward, policy makers have not acted. A majority
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of this work relies heavily on modeling and simulation in the V&V process [8, 23,
25, 90–92]. Most of the presented methods did not directly involve the certification
authority in their work. Military certification officials are normally considered risk
adverse. Unless the method for certification gives the official enough justification
that adequate risk mitigation has been taken, they are reluctant to certify it safe
for flight. Most of the methods proposed are M&S based. While M&S provides
insight into the performance of a system, M&S alone will not mitigate the risk for
certification officials.
However, the main reason that certification officials have not acted is because
a truly mature autonomous system has not advanced to a point where it would
require certification. Therefore, there has not been added pressure for officials to
accept the risk. As we have seen in the past, the civilian certification officials (FAA)
will not act until there is an overwhelming demand from the general public (this
was seen when they shifted the pilot retirement age from 60 to 65 for pilots). The
steps will need to be small, with limited scope. But once enough of them are taken,
we should be able to certify a system of sensors and software to accomplish tasks
(and eventually entire missions) currently reserved for a qualified pilot.
Currently the FAA is regulating UAS (other than model aircraft) via Part
107. For certification to operate a UAS must have a qualified operator within visual
line of sight (an onboard camera cannot satisfy the see-and-avoid). At all times the
small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough for the remote operator to see it
unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. Part 107 only deals with UASs
under 55 pounds. As of January 2020 there was not a FAA regulation for larger
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UASs. In addition to a number of other stipulations in the regulation, there does
not exist a path for certification for a UAS that does not have a remote “pilot in
command” [1].
For naval aviation, airworthiness certification authority is delegated to NAVAIR
4.0 Engineering (4.0P is the branch assigned). When a new aviation related capabil-
ity (software, weapon or airframe) is acquired, and before naval personnel operate
it, 4.0P must grant a flight clearance (also referred to as a safety of flight certi-
fication). They have established processes where Technical Area Experts (TAEs),
who have been given the authority in their subject fields, review relevant artifacts
prior to approving their portion of a flight clearance. Artifacts can be something as
simple as a SME opinion, or as complicated as detailed engineering analysis. Often
an artifact is a large body of data characterizing the performance of a system. In
the end, artifacts exist to quantify the system and allow the certification official to
determine the risk they will be accepting.
Following initial conversations with NAVAIR 4.0P leadership, we began discus-
sions with naval airworthiness authorities for possible avenues of granting a flight
clearance for an autonomous controller (the decision engine) of a large rotorcraft
(H-1 or similar sized helicopter) to complete a task that is currently reserved for
fully qualified pilots. For a large portion of this dissertation, the flight clearance
will be focus on accomplishing a mission relevant task: Landing in an CAL/LZ.
Initial discussions developed the following list of TAEs that would be required for






 Avionics Systems Engineering
 Core Avionics
 Human Systems Interaction
 Class Desk
This research will add to the body of knowledge for how to develop artifacts
the various TAEs will require prior to issuing a flight clearance for a naval aircraft
to operate autonomously. There are several different types of artifacts that TAEs
may use. In this research, various methods of artifact development will be used
in an attempt to determine a viable method for autonomous certification. Prior to
accepting the risk associated with this first of its kind flight clearance, the TAEs will
require a large number of artifacts to mitigate identified risk areas. Ultimately each
TAE will have to sign off on their SME area prior to a safety of flight certification.
For the respective TAEs to certify their subject area, several challenges will
need to be overcome. In the words of the former chief engineer of the USAF, “It
is possible to develop systems having high levels of autonomy, but it is the lack
of suitable V&V methods that prevents all but relatively low levels of autonomy
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from being certified for use.” [93] The AFRL funded a study asking a question
regarding the state of possible processes for certification of UASs which employ
machine learning or autonomous functionality through some sort of evidence based
licensure process. These categories were [94]:
 Formal Methods
 Requirements and Metrics
 Normative Oracle Generation
 CoActive Design
 Implications of Learning Autonomous Systems
 M&S Considerations for Licensure of Autonomous Systems
All or some of these categories will be required for the individual TAEs to
accept the risk associated with certifying the autonomous functionality described.
Further work has been done in this research area by The Autonomy Commu-
nity of Interest Test and Evaluation, Verification and Validation (TEVV) Working
Group. The TEVV working group was made up a collation of the willing. Mem-
bership included all of the US armed services major research facilities and T&E
organizations. In 2015 this working group published vital definitions, challenges,
and gaps for V&V of autonomous systems [8]. The challenges associated with V&V






The gaps identified by the TEVV working group included:
 Lack of Verifiable Autonomous System Requirements
 Lack of Modeling, Design, and Interface Standards
 Lack of Autonomy T&E Capabilities
 Lack of Human Operator Reliance to Compensate for Brittleness
 Lack of Run Time V&V During Deployed Autonomy .
2.4 How to Build Trust in Autonomous Systems Leading to Certifi-
cation
Trust is vital for certification. When a military commander certifies a pilot
as fully qualified they are bestowing their trust on that pilot. Following qualifica-
tion, the pilot is expected to use his judgment to make decisions based on their
experiences. When dealing with autonomy, trust is not inherent and certification
is not business as usual. For commanders to trust that an autonomous system will
perform as a pilot would will require methods and metrics different than what they
are accustomed to.
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The Defense Science Board identified trust as an integral requirement for the
use of autonomous systems by the DoD. “The decision for DoD to deploy au-
tonomous system must be based both on trust that they will perform effectively
in their intended use and that such use will not result in high-regret, unintended
consequences. Without such trust, autonomous systems will not be adopted except
in extreme cases such as mission that cannot otherwise be performed. Further, inap-
propriate calibration of trust assessments – whether over-trust or under-trust during
design, development, or operations will lead to misapplication of these systems. It
is therefore important for DoD to focus on critical trust issues and the assurance of
appropriate levels of trust [91].”
Autonomy is a new concept for the DoD. When employing military systems
in the field, someone is ultimately responsible for the actions of that system. This
may include the actual military member employing the technology or the individual
that certified it for use. Having a system that exhibits non-deterministic behavior
inherent in autonomy is a new concept for certification officials. Trust needs to be
built prior to the use of autonomy within the DoD.
The robots from the classic Jetsons cartoon and the machines that ran civi-
lization in the science fiction classic Metropolis are examples of how science fiction
has influenced the general public as to the capability of autonomous systems. While
we may not have a robotic maid, we now have vacuum cleaners like the Roomba
that automatically clean our floors. The American public is in love with our au-
tomobiles. Nearly every family has at least one car. Science fiction promised us
self-driving cars, but as of October 2020 a truly autonomous car was not certified
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for operation on our nation’s roads.
While all Tesla models since 2016 possess the hardware and software required
to operate in Autopilot Mode, they are not certified to operate without a qualified
driver at the wheel. The driver is required to be ready to take over if the system
puts the vehicle in a dangerous situation. This method lead to millions of miles of
casualty free diving. However, on 7 May 2016, a 2015 Tesla Model S was involved
in a fatal collision in Florida. The vehicle was operating in Autopilot Mode, and the
automatic emergency braking system did not provide any warning or breaking, and
the Tesla driver did not apply any braking or control inputs. The incident was an
example of a human putting too much trust in the functionality of their vehicle. In
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report, the DoT did not find
any fault with the vehicle. When operating in Autopilot Mode the driver must be
ready to take over for the vehicle at any time. While these vehicles use autonomy
(the vehicle senses its environment and makes decisions for how it will proceed)
the manufacturer, and certification officials, put the ultimate responsibility of the
vehicles actions on the driver not the vehicle itself [16].
How do we built trust in autonomy which can lead to eventual certification?
The automotive world has a simple plan (despite recent mishaps): Demonstrate how
self-diving cars can perform just as safely as human drivers. This method is still
ongoing. But is there a better way, a way that may be used for military systems?
In 2015, researchers from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign pub-
lished a paper in Human Factors titled Trust in Automation: Integrating Empirical
Evidence on Factors that Influence Trust. The paper itself was a survey of 101
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separate papers which involved humans working with automated systems to achieve
goals with some level of trust. In it, Hoff and Bashir [95] developed a three-layered
framework for conceptualizing trust variability (Figure 2.7). The three layers were
dispositional, situational, and learned. These three layers can be used when refer-
encing the use of automation and autonomy in naval aviation certification.
Figure 2.7: Three-Layered Framework for Conceptualizing Trust Variability as Pre-
sented in Reference [95]
Dispositional trust is a relatively stable quantity which is influenced by cul-
ture, age, gender, and personality traits. When it comes to trusting autonomy in
naval aviation it can be assumed that the amount is dispositional trust certification
officials may have depends on the influencing factors. It can be assumed that current
certification officials, who are not accustomed to autonomy and are nearing the end
of their careers, will have less dispositional trust in autonomy than the academic
research community based on their experiences as a certification official and within
their day to day lives.
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Within their research, situational trust dealt with both the benefits and risks
of using automation depending on the situation. Naval aviation has already accepted
situational trust for automation. An example of this is the PALS program discussed
in references [2,86]. If the pilot was having difficulty landing an aircraft, leadership
can direct them to couple their aircraft with the CVN’s system to land.
Learned trust deals with how the certification official interaction has changed
over time as they deal with the new technology. In the beginning they may have
one opinion, but after seeing the automated or autonomous function perform over
time their level of learned trust will adjust depending on the results.
While some level of trust is required for certification officials to accept risk,
there is not a clearly defined method for how we build trust in military systems.
The current V&V techniques are designed for systems with a qualified pilot or
operator. To achieve a level of trust, V&V techniques used for certifying autonomy
must be sufficient that the certification officials will have trust in the actions of the
decision engines controlling the vehicle, and trust that the system will not pose an
unnecessary risk to mission completion.
For a system to operate autonomously, it will need to sense the environment
it is currently operating in. Upon sensing the environment, it will then need to
properly classify the input its onboard sensors give it. Once it has interpreted the
environment, and built its own SA, it will need to perform appropriate actions based
on the unpredictable environments it will find itself in. This is a similar process
that a fully qualified pilot is expected to perform once leadership has bestowed
trust on their actions. One issue with using sensors to build the SA for a UAV
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is the vast amount of data the needs to be filtered through. Using automation to
process onboard imagery is not a new concept. From December 2013 to January
2015 a CubeSat was flown with multiple onboard sensors. An autonomous onboard
processing was used to determine what images would be passed back to the ground
station for further processing [64].
While trust is required for certification officials to accept risk, there is not a
clearly defined method for how we build that trust in autonomous military systems.
The V&V techniques used for certifying autonomy must be sufficient that the cer-
tification officials will have trust in the actions of the decision engines controlling
military aircraft.
2.5 Bringing Autonomy to Military Aviation
It is clear that future military platforms will rely on ever increasing levels of
automation and eventually autonomy. To facilitate this, military leadership has
taken steps to define investment strategies for implementing autonomy. In a 2011
memo, the Secretary of Defense designated autonomy as one of seven priority invest-
ment areas. Shortly thereafter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and
Engineering, (ASD(R&E)), established four working groups to help define the com-
munities of interest. The Autonomy Community of Interest TEVV Working Group
was made up a collation of the willing. Membership included all of the services
major research facilities and test and evaluation organizations. In 2015 this working
group published vital definitions, challenges, gaps and goals (or vital investment
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requirements) for validation and verification of autonomous systems [8].
 Challenges: State-Space Explosion; Unpredictable Environments; Emergent
Behavior; Human-Machine Communication
 Gaps: Lack of Verifiable Autonomous System Requirements; Lack of Mod-
eling, Design, and Interface Standards; Lack of Autonomy T&E Capabilities;
Lack of Human Operator Reliance to Compensate for Brittleness; Lack of Run
Time V&V during Deployed Autonomy Operations; and Lack of Evidence Re-
use for V&V
 Goals: Methods and Tools assisting in Requirements Development and Analy-
sis; Evidence-Based Design and Implementation; Cumulative Evidence through
RDT&E, DT & OT; Run Time Behavior Prediction and Recovery; and As-
surance Arguments for Autonomous Systems
While these areas have been identified as needing resources and extensive
research, as of 2020 they have not been completely solved/mitigated.
2.5.1 Challenges
As the V&V community begin to grapple with how to certify and test au-
tonomous functionality and systems, the state space issue continues to cause issues.
Current systems are fielded with a number of test conditions met during V&V pro-
cess. It is believed that once you put a human operator, or pilot, in the loop they
could take the input offered and make a proper decision. This limited the state
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space required for V&V during T&E. There is an infinite trade space for the V&V
community to analyze if we want to ensure autonomous functionality.
In 2015, when examining the technology investment strategy, the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development published the following:
“The notion that autonomous systems can be fully tested is becoming increasingly
infeasible as high levels of self-governing systems become a reality... the standard
practice of testing all possible states and all ranges of inputs to the system becomes
an unachievable goal. Existing TEVV methods are, by themselves insufficient for
TEVV of autonomous systems, therefore fundamental change is needed in how we
validate and verify these systems [8].” While the Under Secretary’s TEVV Working
Group helped to frame the problem, a solution has yet to be identified.
For tactical UAVs performing missions with limited to no contact with human
controllers, it is extremely difficult to determine what actions the UAV will take
under various conditions. The mission parameters and inputs will vary depending
on the stage of the mission and environment. Moses, Chipalkatty and Platt proposed
a belief space hierarchical planning tool to help solve the optimization problem of
the immense state space conditions and actions the UAV may take [65]. Their
research dealt with UAVs completing a mission relevant task. They demonstrated
that completing such a task was more difficult than just going from point A to point
B, the UAV had to make mission relevant decisions. They hypnotized reducing the
vast state space that this problem presented to smaller subsets of the overall state
space. While their approaches do reduce the state space required for ultimate V&V,
it is insufficient alone for this research.
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Traditional V&V approaches are not appropriate for large software intensive
systems where emergent behavior may be considered. The traditional V&V ap-
proach, (model the pieces, model the whole, assemble the pieces into the whole and
then test the whole) has difficulty with large complex systems. When these systems
become so complex it is difficult to model the interactions between the subsystems.
Once you add in the effects of the environment and other outside inputs, traditional
V&V approaches cannot replicate the possible permutations [21].
One of the current buzz words in the DoD is Cyber. As UASs continue to in-
crease in use and fill vital nodes in the military command and control infrastructure,
ensuring the security of these systems against malicious cyber attacks is essential to
national interests [96]. Kwon, Yantiek and Hwang developed an algorithm that can
detect stealthy cyber-attacks effecting the controls domain of a UAS. The algorithm
was designed to work in real time and to make safety critical adjustments [96].
The challenges are not limited to those that have been identified. Ultimately
the community needs to identify solutions or mitigation strategies prior to au-
tonomous functionality being certified for DoD use.
2.5.2 Gaps
The gaps identified by the TEVV working group (lack of verifiable autonomous
system requirements; lack of modeling, design, and interface standards; lack of
autonomy T&E capabilities; lack of human operator reliance to compensate for
brittleness; lack of run time V&V during deployed autonomy operations; and lack
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of evidence re-use for V&V), make it seem as if there is little hope in certifying
autonomy. Yet, research has continued to close these gaps.
Health monitoring may be a way to address some of the gaps that have been
identified. The inner loop of the control system is where non-deterministic condi-
tions can exist for certifiable systems. The boundary conditions are monitored by
the outer loop, or run time monitoring, once the inner loop reaches a predefined
boundary condition its behavior becomes deterministic. “System health manage-
ment is an important feature of autonomy, enhancing consistency checks, overall
system robustness and even some degree of self-awareness. Seemingly unrelated,
debugging and analysis of such complex systems is another challenge during devel-
opment that should not be underrated.” Torens, Adolf, Faymonville and Schirmer
proposed that “the so-called run time monitoring or relevant properties are system
requirements is a viable technique to support both aforementioned concepts [35].”
While trying to identity possible methods for certifying autonomous behavior,
health monitoring may have a place. One method that has been identified is to
define a bubble where the system can operate (outer loop). As long as the systems
performance stays within the bubble it can exhibit non-deterministic behavior (inner
loop) [37]. When its behavior reaches the edges of the bubble it would exhibit a
known behavior. We feel, and naval certification officials agree, that this method
offers the extreme promise for certifying autonomy in the near future.
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2.5.3 Goals
For a UAS system to operate autonomously, or perform as a pilot would, it
needs to be able to complete some basic functions. In the end, these systems will
need to accurately sense its environment, build its own SA, and make aeronautical
decisions based on current SA. Each time these subtasks are accomplished, the V&V
community will be closer to finding a way to certify non-deterministic behavior.
The idea of starting small for certifying various levels of autonomy within
UASs is not new. Researchers are the AFRL have investigated certifying aircraft
with an adaptive controls via Run Time Assurance (RTA) architecture. The USAF
defines airworthiness as the “verified and documented capability of an air system
configuration to safely attain, sustain, and terminate flight in accordance with the
approved aircraft usage and operating limits [97].” Their approach highlights the
fact that certifying autonomous systems is difficult due to the inability to predict
the behavior in a given flight condition. By adding a switching mechanism that
takes the new autonomous behavior out of the loop once a fault is detected, they
feel that certification may be achieved [98].
SA development is one of the key skills of any successful pilot. A pilot builds
their SA through their senses. For a UAS to be truly autonomous they must have the
ability to build their own SA of the environment they operate in. As vision is one of
the most important sources of SA for a pilot, so it is for the TALOS controller of the
AACUS H-1 used in this research (see section 2.7.8). When mapping the landing
area it uses LiDAR to build a 3D image that it can process to determine a safe
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landing spot. Using LiDAR for 3D mapping is not unique to AACUS. Researchers
as Cal Poly Pomona outfitted a small fixed wing UAV with LiDAR and attempted
to build a 3D image from its output. They were successful. Figure 2.8 shows the
test area, and Figure 2.9 shows the post processed 3D image of the test area [66].
Figure 2.8: Parado Airfield in Chino Hills, CA, Testing Area (“Google Earth” Image)
Used in Reference [66]
There has been numerous academic research done on vision based navigation
for UAVs. Agrawal, Ratnoo and Ghose proposed a method for guiding UAVs in
an unfamiliar urban environment using image segmentation. “Using the segmented
image, the proposed method first identifies the passage between the obstacles, the de-
cision making chooses the closest free passage and obstacle avoidance, and passage-
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Figure 2.9: Post Processed 3D Map of the Test Area Used in Reference [66]
following guidance law steer the UAV through the passage. Analytical results show
a faster obstacle avoidance for the proposed segmentation strategy as compared to
existing optical flow-based methods [67].”
Optical flow has often been considered for use in UAV navigation. There have
been several academic papers written on the advantages of using it. Through a grant
from NASA Chao et al. focused on experimental validation of navigation informa-
tion obtained in wide-field optical flow, using UAV flight test data. They determined
that “optical flow information contains accurate enough navigation information that
could be used for UAV applications [68].”
Linear controllers are relatively easy for UASs. It is easy to predict the various
functions that a control needs to accomplish under predictable linear conditions. The
issue comes when you have a requirement for a non-linear controller. Traditionally
aircraft have had a well-trained non-linear controller (a qualified pilot) as the state
of the art moves toward autonomous flight vehicles, we need to find a way for the
vehicle to be its own non-linear controller. Novak and Bhandari, from Cal Poly
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Pomona, demonstrated the ability to train a neural network to be a non-linear
controller of a small RC UAV [75].
2.5.4 Software Development and its Implications on Certification of
Autonomy within Naval Aviation
The systems design concept is prevalent in all DoD acquisition systems. To
simplify the various steps of the process, the classic V model is often used. The
left side of the V can be considered the coding or development phase. While the
right side can be considered the certification side. The TEVV working group used
the V diagram to describe the various steps in the V&V problem as well as their
interrelationships (Figure 2.10 & 2.11 [8]).
Figure 2.10: Classic V Development Cycle [8]
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Figure 2.11: Autonomy TEVV Process Model, Integrated with the Traditional [8]
In a comprehensive review of current V&V strategy of autonomous systems
Fisher, Dennis and Webster detailed how systems are currently analyzed based on
the varying levels of autonomy and the systems direct interaction with the environ-
ment. They summarized three categories of autonomy:
 Agent (high level reasoning)
 Control (the decision engine that would make decisions)
 Hardware (the part of the system that interacts with the real world)
Their summary can be found in Figure 2.12 [24]. Their summaries are valid
based on current use of autonomy (in areas where direct control of robots is not pos-
sible, or dangerous). However, it is lacking the element of accountability required
for military systems. An example would be the current application of autonomous
systems in toxic environments. If a system made an incorrect decision, the greatest
risk would most likely be limited to the loss of the system. In military UAS appli-
cations, a qualified pilot, or operator, is trusted to control a vehicle where an error
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may lead to an international incident.
Figure 2.12: Typical Hybrid Autonomous System Architecture – with Suitable Anal-
ysis Techniques Noted in Reference [24]
In recent years the development cycle for new avionics systems has been com-
pressed. This compression has necessitated new ways in which we perform V&V of
new software. Abraham was able to summarize the use of the V model for the vari-
ous steps in V&V. A V model is often used in systems engineering. Figure 2.13 is a
software development V Model. It begins at the top left with system requirements,
then high level design followed by detailed design. Once a detailed design is decided
upon, the coding stage can begin. The next step is unit testing and integration
testing. Providing a software can pass all of these steps it is considered verified and
validated. However, the earlier an issue can be identified the less resources (both
time and expense) will be required to correct the defect. To do this Abraham rec-
ommends using software based models for V&V during all phases of development
to include the left side of the V model [20]. This technique will be vital for V&V of
military systems. The resources devoted to V&V and T&E are limited, and have a
tendency of being reduced during execution. The earlier a defect can be found the
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better.
Figure 2.13: V-Model as Described in Reference [20]
Modern civilian aircraft (such as the Boeing 787) are extremely software de-
pendent. In an attempt to standardize V&V in these aircraft the FAA approved AC
20-115C on 19 Jul 2013, making DO-178C a recognized “acceptable means, but not
the only means, for showing compliance with the applicable airworthiness regula-
tions for the software aspects of airborne systems and equipment certification [3].”
DO-178C outlines approaches to have tractability in the V&V process that maps
requirements to systems performance. This tractability requirement is similar to
the artifacts that naval flight clearance authorities will require prior to certifying
autonomous naval aviation systems.
The last 60 years has seen an explosion in the amount of software installed in
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military aircraft [21] (see Figure 2.14). As the military moves toward automation
taking over tasks currently reserved for pilots, the amount of software functionality
will increase.
Figure 2.14: Increasing Aircraft Functionality Provided by Software [21]
In 2016 Eiemann and Allan demonstrated how to use various software tools
(e.g. Simulink/Targetlink) to be in compliance with DO-178C whose development
phases, including the required verification steps, are shown in a simplified form in
Figure 2.15 [26].
Emergent behaviors are a difficult problem for the V&V community. As these
behaviors are unpredictable by definition. There is limited ability to reproduce the
behavior and what may have led to it [99]. “Thus, a potential means of dealing with
such a V&V challenge is oriented more towards tolerance during operation than
detection during development. The concept of resilience, as applied to systems and
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Figure 2.15: Important Development Phases According to DO-178C, Including the
Necessary Verification Steps (Architecture Design and Verification have Been Omit-
ted) [26]
software, is exactly that: Designing systems and software to detect the unexpected
during run time, Adapt or adjust as necessary, and continue functioning (albeit
potentially in a degraded mode) [21].”
For policy authorities to actually authorize software, or a decision engine,
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to control critical portions of an UAV there will be extreme scrutiny on how the
software was developed and how the requirements definition was architected. In
2014 Walker, Shan and Liu pointed out that “software framework is constantly
being designed form scratch over and over again, and there is little to no discussion
regarding how it was actually designed [28].” This is not helpful when numerous
UASs are currently being developed for integration into the national airspace system
without a standard for which they are to be certified to. Without a standard for
software development, certification officials will have a difficult risk decision. There
needs to be a standard for how flight critical software is designed and coded.
When dealing with complex software, it is extremely difficult to determine the
best way to test to ensure it is functioning properly. This is especially true when
dealing with unproven software that will be responsible for taking actions that are
currently reserved for aircrew in the autonomous system. NASA has long been
a front runner in defining leading edge technologies for aviation. When designing
their Trick Simulation Toolkit the identified “Understanding of the requirements of
testable software, test automation tools, and adoption of the Test Driven Develop-
ment Process [100]” as items that dramatically improved the testing toolkit.
When it comes to certifying new software for aircraft, the use of M&S is key for
reducing the cost and scope of flight test. In order for this reduction to take place it
is vital for the system requesting certification to show that when hardware is in the
loop, it performs the same as it did when it was simply a simulation. Otherwise, the
simulation model will be invalid. An example of this was complete by researchers at
San Jose State University. In 2015 they showed that you can use MATLAB based
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software for low cost COTS programming of a UAS dedicated for autonomous flight
testing and control system design [101].
2.6 Formal Methods Relation to Naval Aviation Automation
In the words of the former chief engineer of the USAF: It is possible to de-
velop systems having high levels of autonomy, but it is the lack of suitable V&V
methods that prevents all but relatively low levels of autonomy from being certi-
fied for use [93]. The AFRL funded a study asking a question regarding the state
of possible processes for certification of UASs which employ machine learning or
autonomous functionality through some sort of evidence based licensure process.
These categories were: Formal Methods; Requirements and Metrics; Normative Or-
acle Generation; CoActive Design; Implications of Learning Autonomous systems;
and M&S considerations for licensure of autonomous systems [94]. In the near fu-
ture certification officials will be asked to certify autonomous systems. Until the
V&V community can develop solutions to these issues, officials will be reluctant to
accept the risk these new advances offer.
Some certification authorities are requiring all possible states of an autonomous
system to be tested to verify how the system will function. The sheer volume of
these conditions make this resource prohibitive (both in time and financial cost). It
is also a well-documented fact that the earlier in a systems development a defect
can be identified the fewer amount of resources will be required to fix the defect.
Gross et al. identified these factors and proposed using formal methods applied to
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identify issues early in a systems design [19].
While formal methods is a broad topic, three of the most promising techniques
for its use in certifying autonomous systems are with autonomous systems are:
Model Checking; Theorem Proving and Run Time Verification. As part of his doc-
toral research from Carnegie Mellon University, Berezin summarized model checking
and theorem proving in relation to the verification of software intensive systems [44].
Kane’s doctorial research (also form Carnegie Mellon University) summarized run
time monitoring for safety critical embedded systems [32].
2.6.1 Model Checking
Model checking is an automatic technique that can only be performed on finite
state systems, many are expressed via finite state transition diagrams. It involves
developing simplified models (in mathematical terms) which captures the essential
features of the system (not the entire system). The specifications (derived from the
requirements of the system) which it is to be verified against is normally expressed
in terms of logical statements. Following the simplification of the system, and the
definition of the specification, a software tool is used to perform an exhaustive
exploration of the state space. This is one of the limitations of this formal method
with respect to certification of an UAV making decisions normally reserved for a
pilot or operator. Depending on the degree of the simplification, officials will most
likely be reluctant to rely on this verification technique based on the amount of risk
this will necessitate during certification. The advantages of model checking are: In
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contrast to theorem proving, model checking is completely automatic and fast; It
can be used to check a partial specification and can provide useful information about
the correctness of the system even if the system has not been completely captured
within the model.
An extensive overview of model checking can be found in Baler and Katoen’s
book Principals of Model Checking. [31]. In their book, they point out that model
checking is an automated technique that can can be used to ensure system is free
from errors. As systems have become more complicated, model checking methods
have advanced to a state where they can be considered mature and used as a valid
technique for verification and debugging purposes [31].
Bakera et al. presented a game based model checking technique for safety
critical actions of the ExoMars Rover. Their work focused on the actions that
the rover would take, and the various branches the actions would led to. Model
checking is used to decide whether an abstraction of a reactive system satisfies a
requirement. They used model checking via a parity game based approach to show
a remote/autonomous system (such as a Mars Rover) would not get into situations
where it lacked the programming to recover. They showed that during the game
based model checking, both winning and losing situations would reveal meaningful
information to designers. Generally speaking, the paper covered an interesting use
of model checking. The model the authors proposed included the rover, the martian
environment, and the actions the rover would take. It is unclear how precise the
model itself was. We can see that using model checking to ensure safety critical
actions is a viable method. However, if the model itself is not verified (tough to do
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in this case as there probably is not enough information to completely characterize
the environment of the rover) the use of a model checking would not effectively
provide enough data for the clearance officials to accept the risk of its use. The
use of a “Game-Based” approach is an interesting idea, and would make it easier to
analyze the results of the model checker [47].
Webster et al. presented a “proof-of-concept approach to the generation of
certification evidence for autonomous unmanned aircraft based on a combination of
formal verification and flight simulation.” Their work was is an attempt to help in
the certification of UAVs to operate in the national airspace system. As with all
model checking, the model is a mathematical representation of the system and its
interaction with the environment. The purpose of the model checker is to ensure
that under all situations the model will not violate a safety critical requirement.
Their work sued the Java PathFinder (JPF) tool developed at NASA Ames Research
Center. JPF allows for both deterministic and non-deterministic behaviors (required
for the uncertainty of autonomous functionality). As with all models, the better the
information used to create the model the better the model. The more detailed the
model, the better the results (and the higher the cost in resources). In general
their approach is simple... code the actions a pilot would take and the environment
interactions into a model. Check the model for possible safety critical interactions.
Once the model checking is complete, perform M&S to reduce the risk of flight test
which will eventually lead to a flight clearance. While this appears to be a good
approach, the fidelity of the information that is used to build the model is the key
to its correctness, and eventually the utility of the output of model checking [5].
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Sirigineedi et al. points out that if the system contains discrete-events it can
be modeled by a finite state graph it will be suitable for formal verification by model
checking. Essentially, break the system down to a simplified set of logic statements.
The model checking tool can then go through all of the situations to verity it will
meet the specification (developed form requirements of the system). Their paper is
an overview of model checking procedures. Again, the robustness of the model is
the key to its utility. The more simplified it is (easier it is to develop) the less utility
it will have for certification officials [48].
Webser et al. presented a paper in 2012, that was a precursor to their 2014
Journal article. They presented a method for model checking quantitative require-
ments (such as the actions pilots would take). They pointed out that any evidence
gained from model checking would need to come from a verified tool to be of any
use to certification officials [45].
Humphrey explored using model checking for the verification of the VIP escort
mission. The mission was simplified, and all points could be defined. This is an
ideal use of model checking, there is limited “branching” to behaviors that cannot
be anticipated. One limitation was the lack of dynamic events (such as a reroute
during the middle of the escort) within his simplified model [49].
Verzino, et al. had a different use for model checkers. As with other ap-
proaches, they broke down the requirements to mathematical basis and then ran
the various permutations of the system. Yet, unlike other approaches they did not
reject a failed state. It was those failed states that drove further simulation. This is
an excellent approach, as when the model checker found an issue it did not revert
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to a failed state (the model itself may be failed). M&S can then be used to analyze
these potential failed states to see a more detailed response [50].
Humphrey and Patzek break with past uses of model checkers. In the past
the checker would be used to find faults with the system and how it is designed to
comply with a specification. In their work they proposed using the checker to see
if the system could complete a requirement or task. They exercised their proposal
within the ISR domain. The paradigm resembles the Observe, Orient, Decide, and
Act (OODA) loop common in military pilot training [51].
Torens and Adolf point out that safety is a primary concern in the aerospace
industry. This includes the software that is used in aviation systems. The metrics
associated with software development can be found in DO-178C. Their work actually
breaks down how formal methods, and model checking in particular, complies with
DO-178C [52].
Hansen et al. had a solution for one of the drawbacks of model checking (when
the system is to complex for the traditional formal methods approach). Statistical
model checking is a useful tool for evaluating software systems operating in stochas-
tic environments. They also used sampling to reduce the simulation requirements
in areas of limited failure rates [53].
Knowing the mode the aircraft is operating is vital to the action taken by
the aircrew. If there is a confusion, incorrect fight control inputs may be input
and lead to a mishap. Flight deck mode confusion detection has been a recurring
problem studied by the research community for the last few years. Nandiganahalli,
Lee and Hwang’s 2017 paper broke down an actual incident into a stochastic linear
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hybrid system model that can input into a model checker to ensure it meet the
requirements [54].
2.6.2 Theorem Provers
Ghorbal et al. advocated using theorem proving in addition to classical V&V
techniques for software intensive systems. As software takes over critical tasks in
modern aircraft, there needs to be assurances that is will not violate safety critical
boundaries. While theorem provers offer the ability to verity a system will not violate
a safety critical boundary, this paper details several challenges of using theorem
provers for aviation systems [102]:
 Uncertainty (difficult to predict the all situations the system will eventually
operate when you take uncertainty into account)
 Proof automation (unable to fully automate the process)
 Numerical issues (computers cannot effectively perform real number compu-
tations
 They are truncated to fit the finite representation
 Scalability (looks at small pieces, rarely at the whole system)
Coutieu et al. used Coq (a theorem prover similar named for its developer
Thireey Coquand) to show a behavior is possible for an undefined number of au-
tonomous robots. To simplify the decision space they made a number of assump-
tions. Their work is adequate for theoretical research, but it has limited utility
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for real world systems. Some of the challenges addressed by Ghorbal et al. are
highlighted in this work [103].
Jiang et al. point out that model checking and theorem proving are similar as
the both are based on decomposing the system and then applying a number of rules
to system for the verification process. They offer several contribution that blend
model checkers and theorem provers. This work is still fairly theoretical, and needs
to be matured before it can be adequately used for certification. It does not address
how it will deal with the disadvantages of both methods as they combine [59].
Asokan et al. presented a method for automating how they used the PVS
theorem prover. One of the issues when dealing with theorem provers is the fact that
the programming language it uses for theorem is specific to the prover. This research
pointed out the need for theorem provers for safety critical software functions [60].
A technical report from MIT provided an excellent overview of model checkers
and theorem provers. In the conclusion of the paper it points out: Because theorem
provers and model checkers each provide complementary benefits in terms of au-
tomation and scalability, it is likely that this trend will follow and the model checks
will continue to be useful on systems of manageable size while theorem proves will
be used on large systems [55].
Sutcliffe et al. echoed many of the points that have been discussed in other
papers. Since aviation software is completing more and more safety critical tasks,
certification officials need to be assured that the software will comply with safety
considerations. Their paper described and evaluated a semantic derivation certi-
fication approach to proof checking, the evaluation of which is the papers main
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contribution. They highlighted a number of safety obligations that the software
would need to comply with for aeronautical certification. Their method was able
to verity 129 out of the 131 proofs identified, and provided traceability required by
certification officials [56].
Goodloe, Gunter, and Stehr work is not aviation related, it is theorem proving
related. They came up with similar conclusions to those that have been known in
the aviation software development community. The sooner you find an issue, the
easier it is to fix (and the less resources it takes to fix the issue). Their work was
focused in wireless network protocols. There work deals with using theorem proofers
to develop the protocols. They showed that by doing this, there will be less of a
need to fix the protocols that are developed as they will have less defects [58].
The NASA Langley formal methods group is one of the leading government
research centers focused on certification autonomy in aeronautics and astronautics.
They have been at the forefront of software certification to enable autonomous
systems to complete tasks currently reserved for pilots. For certification officials
to approve this they will need a way to certify that the systems will not violate
safety critical boundaries. One of the areas NASA is focused on is path planning.
In a paper focused on their Airborne Coordinated Conflict Resolution and Detection
(ACCoRD) framework program, they detailed the conflict detection algorithm for
two aircraft flying polynomial trajectories. The algorithm used was derived from
theorems that were proved in PVS. This shows a method to build algorithms based
on verified theorems [104].
The NASA Langley formal methods group is working on (and have published)
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several articles on obtaining flight clearances for UASs to operate within the national
airspace. Their use of “Theorem Provers”, or “Proof Assistants” has led to the
definition of a “well clear” volume for UAS operation. This is being used to help
certify UASs for the “see and avoid” requirement [72–74,105]. This work, and several
others, highlight the use of proof assistants to verity the requirements placed on the
software. The algorithms that are developed for the system contain steps from the
verified theorems [57].
Muñoz presented the work the NASA Langley formal methods group has been
researching for UAVs certification for operations withing the national airspace sys-
tem. In the lecture he covered the formal methods approach used by NASA for
verifying the algorithms used for eventual certification. He also pointed out the
challenges that PVS (theorem prover) has when dealing with cyber physical sys-
tems. These challenges will be similar to the ones we faced in our research [61].
In an attempt to provide evidence that a UAS can operate in the national
airspace, Narkawicz and Muñoz used a formally verified conflict detection algorithm
to establish how a vehicle would react when operating on a non-linear trajectory.
This work was just another example of the NASA Langley Formal Methods Group
attempt to move the certification of autonomy forward for the well clear requirement
[105].
Narkawicz, Muñoz and Dutle published a paper where the use of onboard
systems (such as TCAS) to help determine the actions of a UAS when operating in
congested airspace. They presented a formally verified approach for coordination of
aircraft maneuvers to avoid collision [74].
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2.6.3 Run Time Assurance
One possible method for certifying an autonomous system to perform tasks
currently reserved for qualified pilots was detailed by researchers supporting the
USAF. Gross and her team examined the use of run time assurance and formal
methods analysis for non-linear system control.
Figure 2.16: Run Time Assurance Architecture as Described in Reference [36]
Schierman et al. proposed, and demonstrated through M&S, that a run time
monitor can be used for UAVs to protect the vehicle from unsafe situations. They
pointed out that as systems become ever more reliant on software it is reaching
the limit of current V&V techniques. They refer to it as a safety wrapper. While
operating within the safety wrapper the primary controller controls the actions of the
vehicle. Once it reaches the wrapper, the fail-safe or backup controller takes over.
Their approach is basically a band aid for the lack of V&V capabilities possessed
by certification officials [37].
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Lichter et al. presented the use of a run time monitor in flight test. As an
overview of their approach, the Run-time Observation-based Margin Estimation
(ROME) software toll was tested onboard the NASA Langley’s AirStar Test bed.
The ROME tool is designed to reduce the risk for flight test of advanced control
laws. By having a software tool that can counter unsafe actions in flight test is an
impressive risk mitigation tool [38].
Rabideau et al. approach was geared toward space operations (as it was pre-
sented at the SpaceOps conference). Space platforms have limited computation
ability, and may have limited interaction with earth based resources. Their pa-
per dealt with using a run time monitor to help prioritize the limited autonomous
computing power. Their algorithm is designed against typical spacecraft operations
scenarios [39].
A paper from Oakland University (Rochester, Michigan) demonstrated run
time monitor research can be used to develop, manipulate and test changes at the
task and parameter level. In addition to the changes the monitor could make to
the system, it provided feedback to the designers on numerous parameters via a
graphical interface. While not a traditional run time monitor in the formal methods
arena, their approach enabled them to monitor the system during changes to the
software during test. Their approach was ideal for any developmental flight test [40].
Aiello et al. point out a fact that is well known. Control research has made
dramatic increases in autonomy, but V&V techniques have failed to keep pace.
Traditional techniques are based on proving the entire state space for what the
system will do. Their research dove tails with ours, as we propose to demonstrate
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what an autonomous system will not do. They recommended a run time monitor
to prevent systems from violating a clearance envelope. Their approach is similar
to the safety wrapper they previously published. Their work details that a run time
monitor can provide risk mitigation for new control laws during flight test [41].
Wong et al. presented the use of run time monitors for advanced propulsion
systems. The theme of current V&V techniques used for certification can be con-
sidered inadequate for new software and hardware combinations. It allows the new
system to operate until it hits a limit (or anomalous behavior) considered safety
critical. At that time it would revert to a simpler certified system [42].
Researchers at AFIT (along with some outside researchers) detailed how using
a run time monitor can be used for satellite control. They detail that emergent
behaviors cannot be verified at this time. But if used within a safety container
(similar to the wrapper previously discussed) they can be used, providing there is
a certified control method at the limits of the container. They then used formal
methods (model checking) to show the run time monitor would provide the safety
limits. The main limitation of their approach is the simplification assumptions taken
in the analysis [34].
Huang et al. presented a different run time monitor. It used machine learning
to monitor the output of aviation software. As most approaches to formally verify
software are at the sub component level, the interactions of the complex systems
are not always properly analyzed. The approach in this research developed an
algorithm that was tested in M&S to see if it could meet the standards of aviation
reliability. The paper details a limit of formal methods currently used in the field,
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the interactions of the complex systems creates bugs that are not always accounted
for [106].
Avram et al. research was in support of the UAV mission within the USAF.
They proposed using a run time monitor that can account for failures within a
quadrotor during nonlinear adaptive control testing. Their algorithms would shift
the control from an uncertified nonlinear to a certified linear controller when faults
were detected. This is an example of the use of a run time controller switching from
uncertified to a certified system when safety limits are reached [43].
Dillsaver et al. research was focused on using an uncertified controller within
a clearance envelope. If the controller reaches a threshold of safety or unanticipated
behavior it would shift to a certified controller. Their focus was an attempt to use
adaptive controllers and stay compliant with military standards for certification.
They also performed flight test using quadrotors [107].
2.7 Other Topics for Autonomy in Military Aviation
2.7.1 Requirements and metrics
“Intelligent control designs based on artificial intelligence and machine learning
promise superior performance over traditional control techniques; however, the lack
of transparency in intelligent control systems and the opportunity for emergent
behaviors limits where these system may be applied. Run Time Assurance (RTA)
is a proposed methodology to allow intelligent (unverified) controllers to perform
within a predetermined envelope of acceptable behavior. Rather than depending
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entirely on offline verification, RTA provides an online verification approach. Based
on the simplex architecture, RTA architectures use a decision module to monitor
control systems performance and switch control form an unverified controller to a
verified controller if the unverified control violates acceptable behavior ranges or in
forced to operate outside of predetermined conditions [34].”
Sankararaman and Krishnakumar described decision making frameworks for
UAVs under uncertainty. The idea behind their research was to allow the system to
remain in a safe condition as it encounters uncertain conditions (see Figure 2.17).
Their paper presented “a computational framework for decision making under un-
certainty, to facilitate the autonomous, safe operation of small drone-like unmanned
aerial vehicles. This predictive framework was based on the identification risk-factors
that affect the safe operation of such vehicles, and predicts the occurrence of events
related to such risk-factors during the operation of the vehicle. By analyzing various
risk-factors, the framework classified possible trajectories into four categories [108]”:
 Nominal and Safe
 Off Nominal But Safe
 Unsafe and Abort the Mission
 Unsafe and Ditch the Vehicle
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Figure 2.17: Goal of Decision-Making: Identify Safe Trajectory [108]
2.7.2 Normative Oracle Generation
Cowlagi and Sperry examined simplified UAV guidance control based on a
cost function. They described “classical planning problems”, have the UAV pass
multiple points, in an effort to illustrate that there may be multiple methods for the
UAV to autonomously visit all of the waypoints assigned. They then developed an
algorithm that was able to determine which unique path offered the lowest cost to
complete [71].
While midair collisions are rare for manned aircraft, they still occure. Jenie,
Kampen, Ellerbroek and Hoekstra used monte carlo simulations to illustrate the
conflict detection and resolution system programmed into UAVs while operating
together can enable them to de-conflict from each other. Their simulation was
done for the most stressing case (2D, in a heavy traffic area) in order to force the
maximum number of conflict resolution conditions [62].
“Planning and information gathering algorithms are typically based on nor-
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mative models for reasoning under uncertainty: An autonomous agent seeks actions
that maximize some expected utility, given models of uncertainty and specification
of cost for some set of tasks/subtasks. This approach can lead to extremely sophis-
tication non-deterministic behaviors through hierarchical reasoning, and provides
a flexible means for coping with imperfect information. However autonomous rea-
soning ultimately depends on several key pieces of knowledge that subject to their
own uncertainties which could potentially be mitigated by interaction with human
collaborates. Of particular interest are uncertainties in: (i) world models (i.e. im-
perfect knowledge of possible outcomes that may develop in a particular operating
environment): (ii) capability of an autonomous agent; (iii) information sources (e.g.
sensor data for own state or task/world state, intelligence reports, ect.). . . Yet
these approaches to analyzing and certifying autonomy require considerable offline
computational effort to exhaustively root out failure modes or exceptional scenarios
that are not anticipated or easily understood by system designs are end users. They
are also very sensitive to changes in system architecture, mission requirement or
uncertainty specifications [109].”
2.7.3 Coactive Design
Ashokkumar and York discussed the use of controllers for unmanned vehicles in
combat. While it may be ideal for these vehicles to be controlled by human operators
on the ground, combat conditions and the amount of unmanned vehicles in use will
most likely make this condition unattainable. This will lead to the requirement for
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some form of autonomy to be employed by the UAVs. Researchers at the USAFA
recommended using a controller that can perform the needed autonomous functions
to be based off a nonlinear model of the UAVs. Their controller was designed
based on the linearized model of the nonlinear aircraft whose Jacobian matrices are
evaluated for a trim (or equilibrium) point [110].
Humphreys, Gobb, Jacques and Reeger are researchers associated with the
AFIT. In recent years the idea of having some form of autonomy in tactical fixed
wing platforms has taken hold among the leadership of the DoD. The most likely first
step in this is the idea of a “Loyal Wingman”. The rough concept of employment
for a “Loyal Wingman” would be through Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-
T). in MUM-T a fighter sized UAV would be paired with a manned fighter. The
manned fighter would give missions to his attached UAV to complete autonomously
prior to returning to its manned wingman. Through simulation AFIT researchers
showed that “the optimal control problem and multiple scenarios are established for
a static, deterministic threat environment, additionally, a dynamic and measure-
ment update model are established for raking and successfully avoiding dynamic,
non-deterministic threats. A first set of results demonstrates a loyal wingman and
dynamic route re-planned algorithm in the midst of op-up stationary threats and a
changing mission rendezvous requirements [92].”
Modern aircraft are extremely complicated. The amount of information avail-
able to pilots would baffle aircrew of fifty years ago. In some cases the amount of
information is overwhelming. The abundance of inputs available to aircrew has lead
to increasing level so automation of onboard aircraft systems. “The automation
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system has been introduced into the cockpit to help the pilots with the operational
accuracy and efficacy. However, the automation-centric design has lead to a new
safety concern called human-automation interaction issue: Where the expectations
of the pilot run contrary to the behavior of the automation systems. The detection of
this dysfunctional interaction between the pilot and the automation system becomes
important and challenging since it may cause severe aviation accidents [111].”
NASA has done extensive research on the unmanned V&V process. In January
2017 Brat described the current progress they have made for V&V of flight critical
systems. “In this paper, we have described parts of the work done by NASA to
address the high cost associated with current V&V processes in civil aviation. We
have described many tools that can be applied at early phases of the lifecycle, thus
enabling to catch errors closer to where there have been introduced. We believe
that a systematic application of our tools will enable industry to reduce their cost
by avoiding catching errors late in the process (at testing or even acceptance testing),
which yields additional re-design or recoding costs [112].”
2.7.4 Implication of Learning Autonomous Systems
In an effort to lead turn the impending need for certification of autonomous
aircraft which employ machine learning, the AFRL has been struggling with how
to certify these aircraft once they are delivered by industry to the military. In 2016
AFRL received the final report from the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) for
Project AK-2-3944 “Pedigree-Based Training and Licensure of Autonomous Sys-
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tems”. In the report IDA identified several deficiencies in using traditional test
approaches for autonomous systems which employ machine learning. They iden-
tified that unlike current approaches, constant monitoring of the performance of
the system is required throughout the lifecycle of the system, not just during initial
developmental and operational testing. IDA also identified several Science and Tech-
nology (S&T) investment opportunities that may overcome the shortcomings [113].
“A key requirement for the current generation of artificial decision-makers is that
they should adapt well to changes in unexpected situations [23].” They looked at
the possibility to tweak the parameters of an AI so that it can be used as a training
tool in simulation for training pilots in “dogfighting”.
In a 2015 paper, Junell, Ban Kampen, Visser and Chu found “The fields of
automation and machine learning are largely benefiting from the rapid development
and availability of computing power everywhere and any time [114].” However, as
with most technical reports, they did not focus on the certification question. If you
remove a human from the equation, who bears the responsibility of the actions of a
system using machine learning.
Emergent behaviors are the future in UAS control. Someday droids similar
to those in the Star Wars franchise will pilot aircraft that carry out combat mis-
sions or ferry personnel from point A to point B. Yet, there is a need for studying
these emergent behaviors and showing that they can be successful. In 2014, Junell,
van Kampen, de Visse and Chu studied using “a reinforcement learning task for a
quadrotor in an unknown environment. By learning form interactions with the en-
vironment, this learning approach works towards more adaptive and robust control
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laws for autonomous MAVs... This work is just one step toward more autonomous
quadrotor flight. Further research will look into challenges of working in the contin-
uous domain, onboard reward or state recognition, adaptive learning for changing
environments and use of learning algorithms for improvement of inner loop control
for multiple platforms [115].”
2.7.5 Modeling and Simulation Considerations
It is clear that simulation will be key for certifying autonomous systems. The
number of actual test points required to validate every possible flight condition is
cost prohibitive. Yet, for certification authorities to accept the simulated data in
place of actual flight test, the models have to be validated. Tobian and Tishler
examined stitching together multiple facets of the flight envelope of a business jet to
simulate a continuous model of the flight envelope. They then had qualified pilots
fly the simulation and validate it was an accurate example of the aircraft [25]. This
method, while limited in its application, may be an appropriate method to gather
data for eventual certification via a simulated environment.
The key to a valid aircraft dynamic model is to have the correct aerodynamic
coefficients, stability and control derivatives and various constants associated with
the governing aerodynamic equations. However, there are many times that this is
not possible during aircraft development. After an aircraft is fielded these values
can be inferred through various flight test data. Kamal, Bayoumy and Elshabka
described a process of obtaining these variables to tune the simulated model of an
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RC aircraft [116]. Yet, these fight test data points may be catastrophic. In 1993 an
S-3 Viking crashed during one of these test events. The Viking’s mission was to use
rudder doublets to help excite dynamic modes. However, these doublets ended up
exceeding the structural limits of the aircraft and it crashed, both test pilots ejected
safely [117].
The words of Box echo today in the M&S world: “All models are wrong but
some are useful. Now it would be very remarkable if any system existing in the
real world could be exactly represented by any simple model. However, cunningly
chosen parsimonious models often do provide remarkably useful approximations.
For example, the law PV = RT relating pressure P, volume V and temperature T of
an ideal gas via a constant R is not exactly true for any real gas, but it frequently
provides a useful approximation and furthermore its structure is informative since
it springs from a physical view of the behavior of gas molecules [118].” For such a
model there is no need to ask the question “Is the model true?”. If “truth” is to
be the “whole truth” the answer must be “No”. The only question of interest is “Is
the model illuminating and useful?” [118]. Box was a famous mathematician and
statistician, some of his many of his quotes are still used today.
“Due to the rapid rate of increased in product complexity and need to shorten
delivery times, the Model-Based Development (MBD) process has been adopted to
help manage the complexity of these systems while making product development
more efficient. Adopting MBD has resulted in toolchains that allow for efficient
rapid controls prototyping, automatic code generation, and advanced validation and
verification techniques, such as Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL). Requirements trace-
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ability is necessary for the MDB process and grows more complex when considering
the many artifacts that need to be handled for V&V testing. With the compli-
ance requirements of DO-178C and ISO26262, it is even more critical to tract the
development and testing process [90].” While discussing MDB, it is important to
consider who is responsible for each step of V&V. Figure 2.18 details the Systems
“V” with responsibilities.
Figure 2.18: V-Cycle Stages for MBD-Based V&V [22]
NASA has studied V&V of controls based on simulations. “With the dramatic
growth of model-based control paradigm, tools and methods are needed to demon-
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strate the complains of this class of control systems with design and safety require-
ments, also in accordance with specific certification processes, such as the process
prescribed by DO-178C. An ongoing project funded by NASA is being carried out
to develop advanced techniques of the V&V of model-based control systems. This
V&V framework is based on a series of structured steps, first decomposing mission
goals into system functional and logic specifications, then applying time-dependent
multi-valued logic tools such as DFM and Markov-CCMT and their formal induc-
tive/deductive logic analysis to demonstrate the correctness of system specifications
(design validation step) and the correspondence of actual system behavior to such
specs (system verification step). The V&V framework also fits within a GSN safety
case architecture, whereby safety goals are successfully decomposed into risk sce-
narios, which can be prioritized using risk informed criteria, and for which design
coverage can be shown by means of the evidence provided by the DFM and Markov-
CCMT logic analyses [63].” See Figures 2.19 and 2.20.
Figure 2.19: Two-Stage V&V Process [63]
When attempting to validate a model, it is necessary to first build a model
that is robust enough that it is a nearly accurate representation of the actual en-
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Figure 2.20: MBCS V&V Framework Process Flow and Elements [63]
vironment. Berger and Tischler, along with their team, developed a model of the
Calspan variable stability Learjet by stitching together multiple smaller models that
consisted of various trim conditions. The final model was validated by comparing
its performance against actual flight data [27].
2.7.6 FAA See and Avoid Research for Autonomy
For a vehicle to operate in the national airspace, the FAA requires that they
have the ability to detect and avoid other aircraft. The requirements for a UAS to
complete this task are more stringent that required by manned aircraft. “To safely
avoid another aircraft, an unmanned aircraft must detect the intruder aircraft with
ample time and distance to allow the ownership to track the intruder, perform
risk assessment, plan an avoidance path, and execute the maneuver [119].” While
this definition may seem easy to accomplish by a pilot, the ability to quantify the
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requirements mathematically, and prove that an unmanned system can fulfill them
is a daunting task. Figure 2.21 was developed by Wikle et al. in an attempt to
define the see and avoid requirements for UASs to operate in the national airspace
system.
2.7.7 Naval See and Avoid Certification
The RQ-21A Blackjack and the RQ-7B Shadow UAS are the first examples of
a military UAV to be given access to the national airspace system under extremely
limited circumstances. The main issue has been see and avoid. Allowing an aircraft
to operate in uncontrolled airspace has always been dependent upon the individual
pilots accepting see and avoid responsibilities. This is difficult when there is not
a pilot on board. The Blackjack and Shadow UASs have the requirement to fly
through uncontrolled airspace after they are launched form MCAS Cheery Point
until they are able to reach restricted airspace.
For see and avoid NAVAIR 4.1 (Systems Engineering and Technical Support
Services) was the flight clearance authority for a ground based sense and avoid
system [120]. The idea behind the system was for it to monitor all traffic that could
affect the Blackjack or Shadow UASs. Depending on the traffic, it would issue a Go
or No Go for launch. The FAA authorized this system to fulfill the see and avoid
requirement normally accomplished by a qualified pilot for the limited conditions
required for the UASs short flight form MCAS Cherry Point to the restricted area.
As of May 2018, this is the only known case where the FAA has allowed a military
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Figure 2.21: The Total Minimum Detection Range, dMDR, Needed and a Represen-
tation of the CPA [119]
UAS to operate in the National Airspace System without extensive risk mitigation
steps, where technology has been used to accomplish a task normally reserved for
a qualified pilot. Of note, while NAVAIR 4.0P certified the Blackjack and Shadow
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UASs, NAVAIR 4.1 was the certifying official for the see and avoid task. This may
lead to an alternative certification path for autonomous functionality in the future.
2.7.8 AACUS
As a possible test bed for our research, NAVAIR has offered partial use of the
AACUS autonomy demonstrator as a test bed. The intent was to demonstrate that
various levels of autonomy are currently possible.
AAUCS is based on a simple architecture. A number of sensors (visual, Li-
RAR, and IR) are combined to build SA. multiple computers were added to the
cargo area to serve as the decision engine (this is the TALOS decision engine) for
an autonomous UH-1. The decision engine then decides where the aircraft will fly
and makes inputs to the flight controls to complete the mission.
As a viable method for certifying a naval aircraft to fly without a pilot (or
operator in the case of UAVs) in the loop does not exist, the prime contractor used
an experimental certificate from the FAA to certify AACUS for fight. The FAA did
not have any concern with TALOS as the safety pilot would be responsible for safety
of flight. The FAA confirmed that the flight control inputs were within the limits
of the aircraft, and mandated a pilot would be at the controls ready to take over at
a moments notice (similar to the currently certification of “driver relief modes” for
cars such as Teslas).
The use of hardware in the loop is critical for validation of controllers such as
TALOS on AACUS. When putting a controller on a known system, it is a necessary
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to show flight clearance officials that the software will perform as designed when
installed. “Hardware-in-Loop Simulations (HILS) are an integral part in the vali-
dation of any system under development, more-so, in case of Aerial Vehicles since
flight testing of the vehicles is not always possible [29].”
The TALOS system is the decision engine behind the AACUS optionally
manned UH-1. The various algorithms which control the actions of flight controls
are programmed into it. Hardware in the loop testing was critical to the system
moving into the flight test phase. TALOS takes in the various sensor inputs, builds
SA on what is happening around it, and manipulates the flight controls to accom-
plish its assigned mission. It basically performs the roll of a qualified pilot. The
purpose if this research is to propose a valid approach to naval flight clearance offi-
cials that a decision engine such as TALOS can perform behaviors that are currently
reserved for qualified pilots. Chapter 4 covers the AACUS system, and flight test of
AACUS, in more detail.
Farinella, Lay and Dhandari examined collision avoidance and path planning
for small autonomous UASs. Their research focused on methods to operate au-
tonomously and safety in obstacle rich environments using “Predictive Rapidly
Exploring Random Tree (RRT) algorithm to safety navigate around multiple ob-
stacles or other aircraft. The RRT algorithm guarantees a collision-free path, and
maneuvers UAS’s around randomly generated dynamic obstacles in a simulated en-
vironment to the specified goal waypoint [121].” Their algorithm “assumed the
availability of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) sensors and
secondary sensors such as scanning LiDAR for collision detection [121].” They
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showed, in a simulated environment, that having theses sensors coupled with the
Predicative RRT algorithm guaranteed collision free autonomous navigation in a
dynamic 2D environment [121].
The TALOS/AACUS uses RRT* as a path planning method. The system
uses its sensors to build its SA on its surroundings, then uses RRT* to determine
the path towards its flight objectives. RRT* is a rapidly exploding random tree
algorithm that can generate an optimum path through the tree network. The level
of optimization depends on the amount of nodes used its network. The drawback to
RRT* is that the optimum path is difficult to define real time as the number of nodes
increases. Lee, Lee and Shim developed a receding horizon based RRT* algorithm
that limits the number of nodes and enables the near optimum path to be computed
real time. They demonstrated this using a six DOF quadrotor model within Simulink
and simulated is motion through a maze. “We developed a real-time path planning
method based on the RH-RRT* algorithm. In order to overcome the disadvantage
of RRT*, for which the computation time sows according to the number of odes,
our algorithm continuously performs node removal and updates the biased random
sample to a point in the receding horizon area for effective sampling [122].” Figure
2.22 is a graphical presentation of the RRT and RRT* algorithms in use to define a
path around obstacles [122].
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Figure 2.22: RRT and RRT* Path Planning. Image (a) is an Example of RRT,
Which has been Widely used for Path Planning of Autonomous Robotic Path Plan-
ning. Image(b) is a Midpoint of the RRT* Algorithm Where it is Defining a More
Optimal Path Through the Obstacles. Image (c) is the Final Product Where the
RRT* Algorithm has Defined the Optimal Path Around the Obstacles [122]
2.8 Helicopter Landing Mission Overview
The landing mission is a difficult regardless of aircraft type. For an autonomous
system to select the proper location there are several issues that need to be con-
sidered. During flight loss of power, catastrophic system failures and unforeseen
circumstances can necessitate an aircraft making a forced landing. This was seen
when US Airways Flight 1549 was ditched in the Hutson River after multiple bird
strikes caused both engines to fail at an altitude that negated any possibility of
reaching a prepared runway [123]. Pilots are trained to constantly be on the look-
out for landing locations in case an emergency landing is necessary. In 2016 a
Technical Note was published describing this problem for forced lands of current
UASs. The Note recommended that the community develop algorithms that can
determine the best place to land in case of an emergency [33].
The idea of using laser based sensors as a UAS landing sensor is not new.
In 2014 a team from the University of Kansas (Lawrence) conducted a number of
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experiments to determine in a laser altimeter could be used under varying ground
condition (different colors, roughness, climate of landing surface). They pointed
put that almost 70% of UAV crashes take place during the landing phase of flight.
Having a reliable sensor across a number of variables would be beneficial to the UAS
community [124].
When attempting to land a UAS in an unprepared environment there must
be some allocation for safety. One of the safety concerns is that there are not any
moving objects in the landing zone (such as trucks or tanks). Numerous UAV based
vision sensors have solved this problem. One example is the use of synthetic basis
(SYA) feature descriptor to perform frame-to-frame feature matching to identify if
an object moves from one frame to the next [69].
NASA is preparing to return to the Moon. However, this time they intend
to land large vehicles that may not be manned. During the Apollo missions, the
Commander had the ability to control the descent, and pick a safe landing site. If
next generation of lunar delivery vehicles are to be autonomous, they would need
a way to choose a safe landing site. In the spring of 2014, NASA demonstrated a
“Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) and LiDAR-based sensing system au-
tonomously scanned a lunar-like hazard field from an autonomous, rocket-propelled,
free-flying lander on a lunar-like approach trajectory, then correctly identified a safe
site, and subsequently provided closed-loop precision guidance for landing on that
safe site [70].” The AACUS system uses LiDAR to find hazards and TALOS to
determine a safe landing zone through a similar approach.
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2.8.1 Confined Area Landing (CAL)/Landing Zone (LZ)
Every naval aviator (pilot) utalizes a NAVAIR approved pilot’s checklist when
they fly. Helicopter pilots are no exception. The SH-60 community uses the A1-
H60RA-NFM-500 checklist [125]. This pocket checklist (PCL) contains emergency
procedures, normal procedures and briefing materials. Prior to attempting landing
at a CAL/LZ the PCL contains a number of items the crew needs to brief for safety.
They include:
 Location (MGRS/lat-long): Helps to properly identify the CAL/LZ and be
input into internal systems.
 Depiction (chart/drawing/photo): Helps the crew prepare for what they can
expect to see when they reach the unprepared CAL/LZ.
 Site Evaluation: Allows the crew to determine if the location is suitable and
what the hazards they may expect to find once they arrive at the location.
 Orientation: Magnetic Heading: On which heading will be optional for the
approach to the CAL/LZ
Landing Point: After studying the site, the crew can determine the optimum
landing site.
 Markers (panels/smoke): What visual cues can the crew use to determine low
level winds (vital for helicopter operations).
 Waveoff Procedures:
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Waveoff Criteria: What could happen that would necessitate a waveoff
General Heading: What is the optional path for a waveoff, power available
and obstacle avoidance are consideration in this decision
Obstacles: As the aircraft starts descending into a CAL/LZ it is likely that
he pilot will not have visual on obstacles, he relies on this crew chief(s) to
visually clear the helicopter and relay the current status verbally to the pilot.
This verbal que helps the pilot maintain SA on the approach.
Effects of wind/dust/snow/debris: These effects can have a dramatic effect on
the safety of flight of the vehicle it is critical that the crew brief the contin-
gencies.
Reentry Procedures: If a waveoff is executed, a reentry procedure needs to be
discussed.
2.8.2 SWEEP
Landing in an unprepared LZ is a difficult mission for qualified HACs. The
last 15 years has seen several fatal mishaps where naval aviators have made decisions
that lead to unsuccessful landing attempts. The CNAF, established a procedure for
pilots to complete when attempting a landing in such a location. The procedure is
abbreviated as SWEEP (Size/Slope, Wind, Elevation, Escape Route, Power) [125].
Sweep is also detailed in Section 3.2.1 and 4.1):
 Size: The S in SWEEP has two meanings, the first is size of the LZ. The HAC
must be able to define the size of the LZ from altitude (nominally 200 ft Above
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Ground Level (AGL)). This includes obstacles and actual area and orientation
available for the vehicle to touch down in. An obstacle within the LZ may not
negate the suitability of the LZ. Rotor wash may blow some items out of the
way during landing (such as tumbleweeds). A HAC uses their experience and
judgment to identify which objects may pose a threat. West coast helicopter
pilots normally train in the desert of eastern San Diego. The biggest threat
to defining a LZ are tall bushes that can cause the vehicle to tip over if they
are under the aircraft on landing. A confined area, such as an urban setting,
offer still other issues dealing with the actual dimensions of the LZ. Buildings
and fences confine the available space to land in. HACs are expected to be
able to visually identify the LZ and determine the suitability for landing. All
helicopters differ in size.
 Slope: The S in SWEEP also stands for Slope. Most prepared LZs are flat
and clear of any obstacle. When a helicopter touches down on a flat surface
both skids, or landing gear, touchdown at nearly the same time. The greater
the slope the more of a risk the vehicle may tip over on landing/touchdown
due to dynamic rollover. The risk comes when only one of the two main
touchdown points makes contact with a surface and becomes a pivot point
for the vehicle. Standard operating procedures list a limit for slope based on
vehicle configuration and environmental conditions. HACs are expected to
evaluate the slope for suitability from altitude, and continually evaluate the
LZ through touchdown.
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 Wind: The W in SWEEP stands for wind. Unlike their fixed wing counter-
parts, helicopters normally do not land with a forward velocity that dominates
the local wind during landing. A fixed wing aircraft may be able to withstand
crosswinds of 30+ kts due to its forward velocity of 100+ kts. A helicopter
may have crosswind limits of 5-10 kts while landing. A HAC is expected to
evaluate the landing area before approach and continuously during approach
to ensure the aircraft can complete a safe landing. In a CAL/LZ, when an
aircraft gets near the ground the wind has a tendency to shift greatly due to
local conditions. These shifts may be difficult for the HAC to anticipate from
altitude. The HAC is expected to abort a landing if an unsafe wind condition
is present.
 Elevation: The first E in SWEEP stands for elevation. Tactical helicopters
are historically under powered due to their weight. The closer to sea level the
better the performance of the engines on the aircraft. As altitude increases the
performance of the engines is reduced. The USN trains selected naval aviators
at the mountain training school in Fallon, Nevada. There pilots learn how to
control their aircraft when its performance is limited due to elevation. A HAC
is expected to be able to accurately evaluate the vehicles performance based
on the altitude of the LZ. They are also expected to abort the landing if an
unsafe condition exists.
 Escape Route: The second E in SWEEP stands for escape route. When
evaluating an unprepared LZ, HACs are expected to be able to find a way
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out (if one exists). The way out is used as an escape route when aborting
a landing/approach. This route may be used when an unexpected unsafe
condition develops. One example would be if the LZ becomes fouled by an
interloper (such as a moving vehicle or wild life). On this step of the SWEEP
procedure the HAC must select their escape route if a safe landing can no
longer be executed. If any escape route does not exist, some low priority
missions will be aborted as the extra risk associated with the mission is not
acceptable based on the priority level.
 Power: The P in SWEEP stands for power. As with all aspects of vertical
lift aviation, power is the most critical part of aircraft performance. The
two main expressions are HIGE (Hover In Ground Effect) and HOGE (Hover
Out of Ground Effect). These values define the power margin available to
the pilot on the day in question and are constantly evaluated during flight as
conditions change. Environmental factors, such as temperature and density
altitude, combined with mechanical factors (the actual performance of the
engines installed on the vehicle), define the power available to the pilot for
use. A HAC is expected to be able to evaluate the power they have available
for approach to determine suitability.
2.9 Helicopter Aircraft Command (HAC) Qualification
The purpose of this research is to determine a path forward for certifying a
decision engine to act as a qualified pilot. For the helicopter community, this equates
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to being designated as a HAC. To accomplish this, the current HAC qualification
process must be understood. Following graduation from the Helicopter Replacement
Air Group (RAG) a pilot will be assigned to a fleet squadron for approximately 36
months. During this time they will be expected to qualify as a second pilot, complete
a HAC syllabus, complete the prerequisite flight experience in model, pass a HAC
oral board, and ultimately earn their COs trust in their decision making process
before they are considered a fully qualified HAC.
2.9.1 Helicopter Second Pilot
Prior to being designated a HAC, a pilot must complete demonstrate profi-
ciency in a number of areas relating to their aircraft. The following are excerpt from
CNAF M-3710.7 [10].
Helicopter Second Pilot: In addition to being a designated helicopter pilot, a
helicopter second pilot shall:
A: Have pilot hours in class and model as required by the command officer or
higher authority and demonstrate satisfactory proficiency in the following:
 Ground Handling
 Flight technique in normal and emergency procedures for flight including au-
torotation and the use of flotation gear, if applicable
 Navigation (all types applicable to unit mission and model aircraft)
 Tactical employment of the aircraft and associated equipment in all tasks of
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the unit mission
 Night tactical operations and operational instrument flying within the capa-
bility of the model
B: Possess a current instrument rating
C: Demonstrate knowledge through oral and/or written examination on the
following
 Model aircraft and all associated equipment.
 Operational performance in all flight maneuvers.
 Weight and balance.
 Appropriate NATOPS manual.
 Survival and first-aid.
 Applicable technical orders and notes, OPNAV instruction, FAR, ICAO pro-
cedures, SCATANA plans, and NAVAIRSYSCOM instructions and technical
directives.
 Search and rescue procedures.
 Communication




 Local and area flight rules.
 Fleet and type tactical instructions and doctrine.
 Applicable portions of NWPs, FXPs, JANAPs, ACPs, and ATPs.
 Recognition applicable to unit missions.
D: Satisfactorily complete a NATOPS evaluation in model
2.9.2 HAC Syllabus
Prior to sitting their HAC board, a HAC candidate is expected to complete
a number of syllabus events. These events range from simple navigation flights,
to complicated training flights detailed by the Air Combat Weapons and Tactics
Syllabus. Like their tactical jet counterparts, naval helicopter pilots are expected
to complete a number of tactical events prior to being authorized to serve as an
aircraft commander (HAC).
2.9.3 HAC Requirements
CNAF M-3710.7 states [10]: Requirements listed below are to be met by pi-
lots qualifying in multiplied rotary-wing aircraft. COs are qualifying authorities, or
higher authority, shall prescribe proficiency standards, detailed factors, and specific
minimums based on this chapter, class and model aircraft, and the unit mission.
Within each classification, the weight and emphasis on the factors enumerated must
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be determine by the activity. Waivers of minimums may be granted by the appropri-
ate immediate superior in command commensurate with demonstrated ability and
only when deemed necessary to accomplishment of the unit mission.
To be qualified as a helicopter aircraft commander, the NATOPS manual shall
establish the designation for the particular model, and an individual shall:
 Have completed the requirements for and possess to an advanced degree the
knowledge, proficiency, and capabilities of a second pilot.
 Have a minimum of 500 total flight hours.
 Have 150 flight hours in rotary-wing aircraft.
 Have pilot hours in class and model required by the CO or higher authority and
demonstrate the proficiency and judgment required to ensure the successful
accomplishment of all tasks of the unit mission.
 Demonstrate ability to command and train the officers and enlisted members
of the flight crew.
 Demonstrate the qualities of leadership required to conduct advanced base or
detached unit operations as officer in charge when such duty is required as
part of the units mission or method of operation.
2.9.4 HAC Oral Board
The naval HAC oral board can vary drastically depending on the individual
squadron (as squadron leadership changes every 15 months), and the squadrons
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mission is not consistent across the USN. The primary researcher had the oppor-
tunity to sit on three HAC boards as an observer to get a better understanding
of their composition and goals. The boards were for candidates from two different
squadrons: HSC-14 and HSM-73.
The various boards were similar in nature, the XO (second in command) was
typically the senior member. With the exception of one junior officer (normally a
LT, O-3, who serves as the squadron NATOPS or Pilot Training Officer) the other
4-5 members were field grade officers (LCDR, O-4) and heads of departments in the
squadron (Safety, Maintenance, Operations, Tactics). The typical rank of the HAC
candidate was O-2 (LTJG). The idea of the board membership being significantly
senior to the candidate is designed to put the candidate under stress. A typical
board length was two hours.
The junior officer on the board was normally the NATOPS or Pilot Training
officer. Their questions were geared to test the candidate’s basic knowledge of the
limitations and standards of operations of the helicopter. The answers require rote
memory, and no critical thinking. A sample question would be “what is the oil
pressure limitations at max continuous N2?” Or, “What is the required number of
rescue swimmers required for overwater SAR?”
The department head board (field grade officers) members questions were all
geared toward scenario based questions. They were designed to test the candidate’s
critical thinking in situations they may be placed in once they are a qualified HAC.
The scenarios were varied depending on the personal experience of the board member
and the primary mission of the squadron. For the HSC squadron, the questions were
98
geared more towards logistics and SAR. The HSM squadron boards tended to focus
on mission critical decisions. In both cases, the senior board member needed to be
convinced the HAC candidate had a grasp of the situation, the capabilities of their
aircraft, and they had the ability to think outside of the box. Providing the senior
member was confident in the candidate’s performance, they would recommend the
HAC qualification to the CO (who has the ultimate decision to qualify the candidate
as a HAC).
2.9.5 Commanders Trust
To qualify a candidate as a HAC, the CO is placing trust in the pilots’ judg-
ment. Any pilot can follow directions, or complete a simple mission when everything
goes as planned. The question is how they will respond when things don’t go as
planned. By designating a pilot as a HAC to CO is putting their stamp of approval
on the pilots ability to cope with the unexpected. The CO of HSM-71 had an in-
teresting scenario for HAC candidates. It places the HAC with is a situation where
there is not right answer. He gives a scenario where the HAC is asked to perform a
one way mission, with no guarantee of safe recovery at the end.
The COs and XOs of HSC-14 and HSC-73 were intrigued by the possibility
of certifying an unmanned helicopter. They felt that it was possible to program a
vehicle to perform simple tasks, but were hesitant in believing it could perform as a
fleet qualified HAC under unplanned situations. They agreed that it is the future,
but were glad they would not be tasked with certifying a decision engine to act as
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the HAC in their respective squadrons at the time of our interview.
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Chapter 3: Requirements Definition
The last 15 years has seen a large uptick in the use of unmanned aircraft.
However, current Safety of Flight (SOF) clearances for unmanned aircraft require
a qualified operator who can make decisions and ultimately bears the responsibly
for the safe operations of the vehicle. The future of aviation is unmanned, and
ultimately autonomous. Yet, a clear path for certifying an autonomous vehicle to
make decisions currently reserved for qualified pilots does not exist. This chapter
presents a preliminary approach for certifying an autonomous controller to select an
appropriate landing site for a large rotorcraft in an unprepared landing zone, and
focuses on the first four steps of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4.
In an attempt to provide a path forward for certifying autonomy in aviation,
this chapter provides a limited approach for providing evidence that can be used
for certifying an autonomous controller to exhibit non-deterministic behavior when
selecting a LZ autonomously during the unprepared CAL/LZ mission. This mission
(the task of selecting and continuously evaluating a landing spot during the approach
and landing phase of flight) is currently carried out by the USN and USMC helicopter
communities [125]. Prior to certification, TAEs need to be provided certification
evidence that the system can complete tasks currently reserved for pilots [9]. This
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chapter will decompose the tasks currently completed by a pilot during the CAL/LZ
mission to their basic requirements. To develop these requirements, we consulted
(over several interview sessions) multiple senior naval officers (those that currently
certify a pilot as a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC)), and followed several
junior aviators during the qualification process. Through our conversations and
observations we gained insight as to what was expected of a fully qualified HAC
during the mission. Ultimately we propose a clearance envelope where the system
can exhibit non-deterministic behavior. This means the actions of the system cannot
be exactly predicted by evaluating the systems parameters, and the system is clear
to make decisions currently reserved for qualified pilots providing it does not reach
one of the limits of the clearance envelope. For the CAL/LZ mission, this implies
that the autonomous controller can pick its landing spot providing it does not violate
restrictions put in place. If the system were to reach one of these limits, it would
revert to pre-determined behavior. We examine the correctness of the specification
in an effort to show that a path forward exists in which formal verification could
be used to certify autonomous systems to complete tasks currently reserved for
qualified pilots [36]. We used Prototype Verification System (PVS) (a theorem
proving tool) to examine a high level specification for correctness. Then the analyzed
specification was used to develop a protocol for the actions the autonomous controller
would take when selecting, and controlling the aircraft during the CAL/LZ mission.
The protocol was then evaluated against a sample set of possible LZ conditions to
ensure that only a LZ that met all of the requirements of the specification would
be allowed to be selected by the autonomous controller (eliminate corner cases).
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Software developers can use the protocol as a guideline for developing the specific
code that will control the aircraft. We also presented the protocol to the same senior
naval officers that helped develop the requirements for the specification to ensure
that it met their criteria for qualification of HACs. All four naval officers agreed
that, provided the assumptions were valid, the protocol was adequate for modeling
the behavior of a fully qualified HAC in the CAL/LZ mission. The evaluation can
be used by certification officials as evidence for the ultimate certification of the
system [9].
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 is a summary of the qual-
ification process for naval aircraft and naval aircrew (more detailed information is
available in section 2.3). Section 3.2 defines the requirements a decision engine
would be required to complete when completing an unprepared landing and devel-
ops a specification to meet those requirements. Section 3.3 provided a analysis of
the specification to demonstrate how a process can be used to show the specification
meets the requirements of the system. Section 3.4 proposes a protocol that soft-
ware designers can use when developing the control laws of the autonomous vehicle.
Section 3.5 summaries the chapter.
The contributions of this chapter include:
 Definition of the requirement a decision engine must complete if it were to be
approved to complete the CAL/LZ mission autonomously (a task currently
reserved for a qualified pilot).
 Development of a state machine specification which follows the various states
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required for an autonomous vehicle to complete the CAL/LZ mission.
 Analysis of the above specification to ensure it meets the requirements for
a decision engine to be certified to complete a task currently reserved for
qualified pilots (CAL/LZ mission).
 Development of a protocol that software designers can use for programming
a decision engine to complete a task currently reserved for qualified pilots
(CAL/LZ mission).
3.1 Naval Aviation Certification Processes
3.1.1 Current Certification Process for Naval Aircraft/Systems
Currently, when an aircraft is certified safe for flight (when operated safely,
they will not break down or cause a danger to the general public) it is assumed that
they will be operated by a qualified pilot (or operator in the case of large UAVs
such as Global Hawk or Predator). As an example of a currently fielded system, the
USN currently operates the MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV. NAVAIR has certified the large
rotorcraft to fly without a qualified HAC on board. However, an Air Vehicle Oper-
ator (AVO) is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the vehicle. During
pre-flight mission planning the AVO programs the vehicle to complete parts of the
mission without operator input (similar to an autopilot). In the event of loss link,
the system will fly to a pre-planned point, and land. The system does not perform
any evaluation of the landing point, it simply executes a pre-planned route to a LZ
104
and auto-lands [126].
NAVAIR 4.0P has established processes where TAEs, who have been given the
authority in their subject fields, review relevant artifacts prior to approving their
portion of a flight clearance. Artifacts can range from SME opinion to detailed
engineering analysis. Often an artifact is a data set characterizing the performance of
a system. In the end, artifacts exist to quantify the system and allow the certification
official to determine the risk they will be accepting.
For the respective TAEs to certify autonomy in their subject area, several
challenges will need to be overcome. In the words of the former chief engineer of
the USAF: “It is possible to develop systems having high levels of autonomy, but
it is the lack of suitable V&V methods that prevents all but relatively low levels
of autonomy from being certified for use [93].” The AFRL funded a study asking
a question regarding the state of possible processes for certification of UASs which
employ machine learning or autonomous functionality through some sort of evidence
based licensure process. The report summarized several categories that may lead to
the certification of UASs. These categories were:
 Formal Methods
 Requirements and Metrics
 Normative Oracle Generation
 CoActive Design
 Implications of Learning Autonomous Systems
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 M&S Considerations for Licensure of Autonomous systems [94]
All or some of these categories will be required for the individual TAEs to accept
the risk associated with certifying the autonomous functionality.
3.1.2 Current Certification Process for Helicopter Aircraft Comman-
der (HAC)
The overarching purpose of the research presented in this chapter is to deter-
mine a path forward for certifying a decision engine to act as a HAC in the USN
or USMC. To accomplish this, the current HAC qualification process must be un-
derstood. This process is formally established, but full qualification depends on a
subjective decision of a CO (typically an O-5 or O-6) [10]. Following graduation
from the helicopter RAG a pilot will be assigned to a fleet squadron for approxi-
mately 36 months. During this time they will be expected to qualify as a second
pilot, complete a HAC syllabus, complete the prerequisite flight experience in model
(such as a H-60 or H-1), pass a HAC oral board, and ultimately earn their CO’s
trust in their decision making process before they are considered a fully qualified
HAC [10].
To qualify a candidate as a HAC, the CO is placing trust in the pilot’s judg-
ment. Any pilot can follow directions, or complete a simple mission when everything
goes as planned. The question is how they will respond when things do not go as
planned. By designating a pilot as a HAC the CO is putting their stamp of approval
on the pilot’s ability to cope with the unexpected.
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3.2 Requirements Definition and The Specification
Prior to SOF certification, officials require data to justify such a flight clear-
ance [9]. This data is referred to as certification evidence. This chapter describes
the development of certification evidence for SOF certification of a well-defined task:
Autonomous landing of a helicopter in an unprepared landing zone. An unprepared
landing zone is a location that is not certified for rotorcraft operations (not an aero-
drome or helipad). We use the unprepared Confined Area Landing/Landing Zone
(CAL/LZ) mission currently carried out by USN and USMC helicopters communi-
ties as a running example [125]. This mission can be as simple as landing in an open
field adjacent to a highway, or as difficult as landing between buildings in an urban
setting. The process for choosing a landing spot is complicated, and prior to being
certified as a HAC a candidate is expected to be able to accurately complete this
task [10].
Since the dawn of aviation, many of the innovations we currently take for
granted came from the military (some examples include: radar [78], medevac air
ambulance [79], jet engines [80], glow sticks [81], and advanced night vision tech-
nology [82]). Many military applications can transition easily to the civilian sector,
as their functionality is similar. For this reason, we chose a military application
that can be easily translated into a civilian sector for this research. The evidence
generated can be use for certification of future autonomous vehicles.
For naval aviation, airworthiness certification authority is delegated to Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 4.0 Engineering (4.0P is the branch assigned)
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[9]. When a new capability (i.e., software, weapon or air frame) is acquired, and
before naval personnel operate it, 4.0P must grant a flight clearance (also referred
to as a SOF certification). The certification process for naval aircraft is a risk
mitigation process. Aircraft subsystems, software, components and ultimately the
aircraft itself are certified through an established process. Technical Area Experts
(TAEs) are tasked with reviewing certification evidence (referred to as artifacts) in
their individual technical areas. These reviews are rolled up in to a larger flight
clearance which certification officials uses to certify the vehicle as a whole. When a
vehicle is certified safe for flight, NAVAIR 4.0P is certifying that when given to a
qualified pilot they can safely complete the desired mission of the aircraft [9].
3.2.1 Development of the Basic Requirements
The first step in a path for a flight clearance of an autonomous system to
complete tasks currently reserved for a qualified pilot is to define the requirements
the decision engine must complete. Landing in an unprepared LZ is a difficult
mission for qualified HACs. The last 15 years has seen several fatal mishaps where
naval aviators have made decisions that lead to unsuccessful landing attempts. The
Chief of Naval Air Forces (CNAF), established a procedure for pilots to complete
when attempting a landing in such a location. The procedure is abbreviated as
SWEEP (Size/Slope, Wind, Elevation, Escape Route, Power) [125]. Several syllabus
flights are dedicated to mastering this task, and these flights must be passed before
a pilot can be designated a HAC. These flights consist of 17 events totaling 36 flight
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hours. The experience gained by completing the syllabus events, in addition to
the experience the HAC candidate obtains during other events, is used to train the
judgment of the aviator prior to their CO designating them as a HAC [10].
If a decision engine were to be allowed to make the decision on where to land,
it would need to demonstrate the ability to complete the SWEEP procedure. This
work attempts to translate the judgment used to complete the SWEEP checklist into
a decision engine, then allow the decision engine to select a landing point (provided
SWEEP is valid). Any protocol used to control its action must prove that it can
accurately complete the procedure, every time, before it is certified. It is important
to understand each part of SWEEP as detailed in Section 2.8.2.
This chapter proposes a clearance envelope where the decision engine can
exhibit non-deterministic behavior. If the vehicle reaches one of the edges it would
abort the approach and proceed to a predetermined point. The question is how
to define the edges. Using SWEEP as an outline, a protocol can be developed
based on a specification for keeping a vehicle within the clearance envelope. We
then systematically examined the specification in an effort to ensure it satisfies the
requirements defined above. This will serve as an artifact for flight clearance officials
to accept the risk of allowing a decision engine to make a decision (landing) normally
reserved for a qualified HAC.
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3.2.2 Specification
For the limited purpose of defining a specification for the landing of a large
rotorcraft in a CAL/LZ using guidance and control from an onboard decision engine,
we elected to use a state machine specification [127] (Figure 3.1). The state machine
specification follows the various states required for the vehicle to transition from the
initial (or reset) point and being safe on deck. Table 3.1 details the various events
which happen as the specification transfers from state to another.
The transition states can be summarized as follows:
 A. “Initial/Reset” State: At this point the decision engine is at the start
of the loop. Following a fuel check (to determine if the current state is above
a pre-determined bingo fuel (fuel required to return to a safe landing field)) it
will begin the process of selecting a LZ and evaluating it against the SWEEP
checklist. If the vehicle is below the pre-determined bingo fuel the decision
engine reverts to the “Return to Base” (“RTB”) state, and returns to base for
more fuel before it attempts the find a valid LZ.
 B. “Conduct SWEEP Checks to Determine if Selected LZ is a Valid
LZ” State: In this state, the decision engine selects a possible LZ and eval-
uates the SWEEP checks. If the selected LZ has a valid SWEEP check, the
decision engine can then proceed to state C (“Build Ingress Route”). If not,
the decision engine retrogrades to state A (“Initial/Reset”).
 C. “Build Ingress Route” State: In this state, the decision engine builds
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an ingress route from the start point to a HOGE point. Providing it can be
completed with the remaining fuel onboard, avoid obstructions/traffic, and
remain within the performance envelope of the vehicle, the ingress route is
considered valid and the decision engine can proceed to state D (“Monitor
Ingress”). If not, the decision engine retrogrades to state A (“Initial/Reset”).
 D. “Monitor Ingress” State. In this state, the decision engine monitors
the LZ and the performance parameters of the vehicle to ensure that SWEEP
remains valid while the vehicle is transitioning from the start point to the
HOGE point. Once the vehicle reaches the HOGE point, the decision engine
shifts to state E (“HOGE Over Spot to LZ Transition”). If SWEEP were to
become invalid prior to the vehicle reaching the HOGE point, the vehicle would
execute the escape route, return to the initial/reset point and retrogrades to
state A (“Initial/Reset”).
 E. “HOGE Over Spot to LZ Transition” State. In this state, the de-
cision engine monitors the LZ and the performance parameters of the vehicle
to ensure that SWEEP remains valid from HOGE to touchdown. If SWEEP
remains valid, the vehicle will complete the mission (land safely). If SWEEP
were to become invalid prior to touchdown, the vehicle would execute the
escape route, return to the initial/reset point and retrograde to state A (“Ini-
tial/Reset”).
This state machine specification can be considered a top level. Each of the
events described in Table 3.1 have conditions and assumptions built into them. Some
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Figure 3.1: State Machine Specification Which Details the Decision Process for a
Unmanned System to Make a Decision Currently Reserved for a Qualified Pilot
ID From State Events To State
1 A Above Bingo Fuel B
6 A Below Bingo Fuel G
2 B SWEEP Valid for LZ C
3 C Ingress Route Exists for Selected LZ D
4 D SWEEP Remains Valid During Ingress E
5 E SWEEP Remains Valid from HOGE to Safe on Deck F
7 B SWEEP Invalid for Selected LZ A
8 C Ingress Route Does Not Exist For Selected LZ A
9 D SWEEP Becomes Invalid During Ingresss A
10 E SWEEP Becomes Invalid from HOGE to Safe on Deck A
Table 3.1: Event Description for the State Machine Specification Which Details the
Decision Process for a Unmanned System to Make a Decision Currently Reserved
for a Qualified Pilot
examples of the assumptions are the environmental conditions (weather, atmospheric
conditions) and vehicle limitations (actual limits of the air vehicle). These conditions
and assumptions must be valid for Figure 3.1 to be a valid flight clearance artifact.
Top level assumptions become lower level requirements.
As the specification in Figure 3.1 represents a subset of the overall functionality
of the aircraft it has one defined start point (“Initial/Reset” state). From there the
decision engine executes the evaluation of possible landing locations until it either
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completes a safe landing (“Safe on Deck” state) or is forced to abandon the task
due to fuel constraints (“RTB” state).
3.3 Analysis of the Specification
In this section we begin with the state machine specification as it relates
to controlling the unmanned system in its decision process. We show consistency
and completeness via an operational procedure table. We then break down the
various processes within the specification into propositions that must be held valid
for the specification to be valid. The propositions will then be tracked and analyzed
by a theory proving software package to complete the analysis of the specification
detailing the decision process for a unmanned system to make a decision currently
reserved for a qualified pilot.
Formal methods has been used for aircraft software verification and ultimately
certification of aerospace software [36]. The power of formal methods lies in pro-
viding precise and unambiguous descriptions and mechanisms that facilitate the
development of safety-critical systems in a more robust fashion [128]. By first de-
veloping a specification that tracks the various states for landing, then completing
the formal methods activities (analyze specification for consistency/completeness,
prove the behavior will satisfy the requirements (with assumptions), prove that a
more detailed design implements a more abstract one [129]), TAEs can use the re-
sults as artifacts for certifying an autonomous controller to complete the CAL/LZ
mission. The analysis in this section uses PVS, a theorem proving tool, to examine
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a high-level specification for an autonomous system in an attempt to certify that
the system can complete tasks currently reserved for qualified pilots. This analysis
is not a formal verification of the software, but rather a preliminary example of a
path toward formal verification of such systems.
3.3.1 Operational Procedure Table
An Operational Procedure Table was used to begin the analysis of the spec-
ification (Figure 3.2). The variables along the top row represent the requirements
for each associated landing segment (of flight) task (left column) required for the
CAL/LZ mission. Each variable has its own assumptions (which would translate to
requirements at lower levels). Each task is performed sequentially (top to bottom).
Each variable is unknown until the associated segment is complete (changing the
variable to a 1 or a 0). A common underlying assumption for all the variables is that
the situational awareness provided by the vehicle’s sensors to the decision engine
is adequate for the current conditions (not degraded to an unsatisfactory level by
weather or malfunction).
The following are the variables and their underlying assumptions:
 Above Bingo Fuel: The vehicle is above the amount of fuel required to return
to a safe landing area. Assumes the fuel management system is functioning
properly and the decision engine is able to accurately measure the value.
 Suitable LZ (Size/Slope): The decision engine is able to choose a LZ that
is suitable for the vehicle. Assumes the LZ requirements are programmed
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Figure 3.2: Operational Procedure Table Converting the State Machine Specification
Into the Various Tasks Required for an Unmanned System to Make a Decision
Currently Reserved for a Qualified Pilot
properly (size, and slope) and can properly classify obstructions as threat or
no threat.
 Winds Within Limits: The decision engine is able to compare the current
wind conditions to the programmed limits for the vehicle. Assumes the wind
limits are programmed properly (head and cross wind).
 Valid Elevation Data: The decision engine is able to determine its current
Mean Sea Level (MSL) altitude from its internal systems (some combination
of Global Positioning System (GPS), Inertial Navigation System (INS) and
internal pitot static system).
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 Valid Escape Route: The decision engine has developed an escape route
which will return the vehicle to the start point and remain within safety limits.
Assumes the safety limits are developed and defined within the programming
of the decision engine.
 Favorable Power Margin: The decision engine has defined the power mar-
gin (power required/power available) to be adequate for the LZ. Assumes the
margin has been defined and programmed into the decision engine.
 Valid Ingress Route: The decision engine is able to build an ingress route
which will keep the vehicle free from collision and within the flight limits of the
vehicle. Assumes the limits of the vehicle are programmed into the decision
engine.
 SWEEP Valid on Ingress to HOGE Point: The decision engine is able to
continuously monitor the LZ during the approach to its HOGE point. Should
the status of SWEEP change to invalid, the vehicle would need to abort the
approach, execute the escape route, and transition to the reset point.
 SWEEP Valid from HOGE to Land: The decision engine is able to con-
tinuously monitor the LZ during its landing through touchdown. Should the
status of SWEEP change to invalid, the vehicle would need to abort the land-
ing, execute the escape route, and transition to the reset point.
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3.3.2 Consistency and Completeness
The operational procedure table (which contains cell values (1, 0, U or N/A)
of each requirement) was used to help define consistency and completeness. The
table shows consistency by the fact that no two columns are operational for any
combination of values for the variables as no two columns have the same cell values
(at most one outcome assigned under each possible scenario). The table shows com-
pleteness by the fact that for all values of variables only one column is operational
as all possible combinations of the variables are listed within the table, and no two
columns are equal (some outcome assigned to every possible scenario) [130].
3.3.3 Theorem Proving Model
To prove that the system will complete the task, and show what the system
will not do, the top level requirements outlined in Figure 3.2 were separated into
three propositions (each of which having supporting propositions (e.g. Proposition
1.1 and Proposition 1.2 and Proposition 1.3 imply Proposition 1.0 is true)) which
must remain true for the overall model of a successful landing to be valid. These
propositions alone would not satisfy formally verifying the specification. That would
require detailed formal analysis of the specification. This analysis would include
validating all of the assumptions underneath the top level specification presented
in this research. Which in turn would require more explicit definitions than the
booleans presented and is beyond the scope of this research.
Proposition 1.0: The LZ is suitable for landing (all of the supporting proposi-
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tions are true).
Proposition 1.1: The size of the LZ is adequate for the vehicle.
Proposition 1.2: The slope of the LZ is adequate for the vehicle.
Proposition 1.3: The LZ is clear of obstructions.
Proposition 2.0: The conditions for landing are suitable (all of the supporting
propositions are true).
Proposition 2.1: The altitude of the LZ is within the envelope of the vehicle.
Proposition 2.2: The local wind conditions are within the envelope of the
vehicle.
Proposition 2.3: The power margin is within acceptable parameters (nominally
+10%).
Proposition 2.4: The decision engine can define a valid ingress route.
Proposition 2.5: The decision engine can define a valid egress/abort route.
Proposition 3.0: The approach and landing can be completed while maintain-
ing suitable conditions (all of the supporting propositions are true).
Proposition 3.1: SWEEP can remain valid during the approach phase of the
vehicle (from start to HOGE).
Proposition 3.2: SWEEP can remain valid during from HOGE to landing.
3.3.4 PVS Model
After establishing the top level propositions, we translated them into the the-
orem proving software package, PVS. PVS is a computer program that contains a
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theorem prover (symbolic engine that implements the deductive rules of a logic sys-
tem). It allows the use of precise statements of logic such as lemmas and theorems.
Proofs of logic formulas can be mechanically proven using the PVS theorem prover,
which guarantees that every proof step is correct and that all possible cases of a
proof are covered. Similar to the work performed by Narkawicz and Muñoz [105],
all propositions presented were mechanically checked in PVS for logical correctness.
PVS has been used by NASA and other organizations for documentation of
requirements for autonomous behavior for FAA certification [72]. The PVS speci-
fication (Figure 3.3) is broken down into three sections (similar to the three main
propositions). The first deals with the physical size of the LZ (Proposition 1.0).
The second deal with the environmental conditions of the LZ (Proposition 2.0).
The third with SWEEP remaining valid during approach to landing (Proposition
3.0). Using theorem proving software provides a repeatable, traceable, model of the
system’s behavior which satisfies the specification. Figure 3.3 is a PVS top level
specification that illustrates the requirements for completing the initial SWEEP
checks by a decision engine. While this model is not sufficient for formally verifying
the specification, we use the model to illustrate how documenting the requirements
through a formal process can provide TAEs with artifacts. These artifacts can be
additional risk mitigation measures during the certification process for allowing an
autonomous system to complete a task currently reserved for qualified pilots.
PVS offers the ability to analyze the propositions listed in Section 3.3.3 within
the interactive proving environment. While using the interactive environment, Lem-
mas can be defined from sections of a PVS specification. An example of this would
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Figure 3.3: PVS Specification for SWEEP Checks to Landing Detailing the Deci-
sion Process for a Unmanned System to Make a Decision Currently Reserved for a
Qualified Pilot
be an evaluation of the environmental condition of the LZ (wind and elevation). If
either were outside of the defined parameters of a valid LZ, the selected LZ would
be unsuitable due to conditions. An example of this Lemma in PVS can be found
in Figure 3.4. For further details on the functionality and utility of PVS, we refer
the reader to reference [131].
Theorem provers provide an analytical framework that can completely define
the environment the vehicle will be operating in. While the model that is defined is a
simplified model of the real world, it is robust enough that flight certification officials
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Figure 3.4: LEMMA 3 deals with the Environmental Conditions of the LZ: If the
Elevation or the Winds are out of Limits the LZ is not Valid Due to Bad Conditions
can use it to justify what the decision engine will not allow the vehicle to do. Thus,
allowing the officials to approve the decision engine to exhibit non-deterministic
behavior provided the behavior remains within the limits of its clearance envelope.
For theorem provers, assumptions at a top level become requirements at lower
levels. The specification outlined in Figure 3.3 has a number of requirements embed-
ded in the assumptions and can be broken up into three categories: LZ Suitability,
Environmental Conditions, Status During Movement. Providing all three are sat-
isfied the specification would be valid and verified, and thus provide certification
officials evidence of what the system would not do. Therefore it can be used to
prove the specified behavior will satisfy the requirements, given the assumptions.
For the PVS model to be a valid artifact for certification officials, it must be
representative of actual conditions a vehicle would be faced with. To accomplish
this the assumptions built into the top level must be valid. These assumptions are
what would define the real world situation. Weather and atmospheric conditions
are built into the various states of the model as assumptions. Aircraft procedures
and mechanics (such as aircraft size and operational limitations) are also built into
the assumptions. Provided the assumptions are valid, a more detailed design im-
plementation is implemented by a more abstract one (the PVS model in Figure
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3.3).
Figure 3.5 depicts the results of the PVS model against 11 separate hypothet-
ical LZs. Of the 11 LZs only one is acceptable for landing. LZ 1 is an ideal LZ, as
all 10 supporting propositions remain true. LZ 2 through 11 all have one supporting
proposition that is false. The PVS specification shows that the final 10 LZs are not
acceptable for landing.
Figure 3.5: Depiction of 11 Hypothetical LZs Against the Propositions Listed in
Section 3.3.3 and Later Detailed in the PVS Model
3.4 Protocol
We used the analyzed specification as a baseline for the requirements the
decision engine will need to fulfill in executing the CAL/LZ mission. By translating
the state machine specification into a flow chart protocol, software designers can
develop code based on the analyzed specification. The protocol has been broken
into several steps that mirror what a qualified pilot would do while completing the
CAL/LZ mission. The protocol translates the propositions into assessments. These
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steps can be traced directly to the supporting propositions presented in Section
3.3.3:
 Size Assessment: Proposition 1.1
 Slope Assessment: Proposition 1.2
 Obstruction Assessment: Proposition 1.3
 Wind Assessment: Proposition 2.2
 Power Margin Assessment: Proposition 2.3
 Elevation Assessment: Proposition 2.1
 Ingress Assessment: Proposition 2.4
 Escape Route Assessment: Proposition 2.5
 Sweep Valid Ingress to HOGE: Proposition 3.1
 Sweep Valid HOGE to touchdown: Proposition 3.2
The protocol depicted in Figure 3.6 satisfies the specification. It serves as an
artifact for flight clearance officials when certifying a decision engine to make the
decision on where to land a large rotorcraft (a task normally reserved for a fully
qualified HAC). The various steps of the protocol can be completed autonomously
using current day technology. Size, slope and obstruction assessment can be ac-
complished via LiDAR and EO/IR vision systems under challenging environmental
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condition to include degraded visual environments. Wind assessment can be ac-
complished by comparing the rotorcraft ground track against the current control
inputs of the vehicle [132]. Onboard health monitoring systems can be programmed
to assess the vehicles performance under all known operating conditions (to include
degraded modes possible during a malfunction or emergency situation). The per-
formance characterization can be used during elevation, ingress and escape route
assessment.
As stated in earlier sections, this research focused on defining an envelope
where the system can exhibit non-deterministic behavior. In the event that the LZ
under evaluation does not pass all eight assessments (or SWEEP becomes invalid
prior to touchdown) the system would return to the hold/start point and evaluate
other possible LZs, in an attempt to find a valid LZ, until it no longer has enough
fuel to complete the mission. Provided the LZ in question is within the limits
established by the protocol (which defines the envelope where a system can exhibit
non-deterministic behavior) it can land autonomously. This can be demonstrated
by the system attempting to execute a landing on an empty football field, at sea
level, in calm winds conditions. Assuming there were no stands or benches adjacent
to the field SWEEP would easily be valid between the 15 yard lines (the goal posts
would obstruct from approximately the 15 yard line back to the end of each end
zone). When executing the landing, the input conditions cannot guarantee the
system would choose one landing spot on the field (as there will be multiple that
satisfy the protocol). Under our methodology, the system would be certified to
choose its landing point autonomously (cleared to land anywhere on the field that
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satisfy SWEEP). This would allow the system to exhibit non-deterministic behavior
provided SWEEP is valid.
Figure 3.6: Protocol Which Meets the Requirements of the Specification Detailing
the Decision Process for a Unmanned System to Make a Decision Currently Reserved
for a Qualified Pilot
3.4.1 Evidence Leading to a Naval Flight Clearance
When assessing various LZs the protocol performs eight assessments, each
with a binary outcome. These eight binary outcomes translates into 256 possible
combinations for each evaluated LZs. A LZ may be large enough for the vehicle
in question (so the first value would be a 1), or it may not be large enough (so
the first value would be a 0). Of the 256 possibilities, only a LZ that passes all of
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the assessments (Size, Slope, Obstruction, Wind, Power Margin, Elevation, Ingress,
Escape Route) is considered to be a valid LZ which the decision engine can select for
landing. The assessments can be linked directly to SWEEP (and the specification)
and a limited H-60 clearance envelope:
 Assessment 1, Size: Assume H-60, requires a 1.5 rotor arch (75 ft diameter
circle)
 Assessment 2, Slope: Assume a limited H-60 slope envelope (5 degrees
forward/aft, 2 degrees port/starboard)
 Assessment 3, Obstruction: Within the circle defined in assessment 1, no
obstructions that would hinder a safe landing
 Assessment 4, Wind: Assume limited H-60 wind envelope, requires between
2 and 20 kts of head wind and less than 5 kts of crosswind.
 Assessment 5, Power Margin: A positive 10% power margin can be main-
tained through approach to landing.
 Assessment 6, Elevation: The LZ elevation is within the operating envelope
of the vehicle (below 3,000 ft MSL).
 Assessment 7, Ingress: A valid ingress route exists from the start point to
the HOGE point.
 Assessment 8, Escape Route: A valid escape route exists along the ingress
route (to the HOGE point) that returns the vehicle to the reset point.
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Assessment Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Outcome 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Outcome 128 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Outcome 216 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Outcome 240 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Outcome 256 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.2: Depiction of 5 of the 256 Possible Outcomes of the 8 Protocol Assessments
The results of the eight assessments can be displayed as a binary output. A
subset of the 256 possible outcomes of the eight assessments are detailed in Table
3.2. All 256 possible outcomes can be found in Table A.1. If a LZ fails all eight
assessments its output would be 00000000 (Outcome 1 in Table 3.2). If it only fails
the wind (Assessment 4) its output would be 11101111 (Outcome 240 in Table 3.2).
If it only fails the size assessment (Assessment 1) its output would be 01111111
(Outcome 128 in Table 3.2). If it only fails the obstruction and power margin
assessments (Assessment 3 and 5) its output would be 11010111 (Outcome 216 in
Table 3.2). Only an LZ that passes all eight assessments with an output of 11111111
(Outcome 256 in Table 3.2) would be valid for an attempted landing. After the
decision engine chooses a LZ, it would then continuously assess SWEEP until it is
safe on deck. While Table 3.2 may seem a trivial contribution, it is in fact considered
an artifact that a TAE would use when accepting risk during the flight clearance
process [9].
While analytically this appears to be a valid protocol for allowing a decision
engine to make the decision currently reserved for HACs consistently, the question
remains how can certification officials, within NAVAIR 4.0P, negate the current
approved process (CNAF process for naval aviation) where a CO determines they
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have adequate trust in the HAC prior to full qualification? As a first step, we
propose current senior officers become involved early in the process. These officers
need to have, or have had, the authority to designate naval aviators as HACs. This
is crucial for this effort as it can be used as an additional risk mitigation step to
have qualified officers involved in the process.
The protocol (and related artifacts) were also shown to four naval Comman-
ders, all of which have been granted the authority by the CNAF for determining
when a naval aviator can be qualified as a HAC. All agreed that assuming the as-
sumptions were valid, the assessments provided would be sufficient to qualify the
decision engine to complete the task of landing in a CAL/LZ (a task which currently
requires a HAC) safely.
Currently all flight clearances for naval aircraft and subsystems are processed
by the airworthiness process using approved V&V techniques/metrics detailed in
NAVAIR Manual M-13034.1 [9]. While the evidence presented in this chapter is
not currently detailed in that manual, they have been submitted to flight clearance
officials for consideration in the next revision of the naval airworthiness process.
This may lead to a new process for clearing autonomous behavior under limited
circumstances.
3.5 Chapter Summary
To facilitate a flight clearance for a software intensive system, a clear definition
of the requirements needs to be agreed upon prior to software development. This
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chapter presented artifacts for a SOF certification in support of an autonomous
controller that is designed to complete the unprepared CAL/LZ mission in a large
rotorcraft. The actual path towards this certification does not currently exist.
This chapter was a first step towards a methodology for clearing autonomous
behavior to complete the CAL/LZ mission. We defined the requirements normally
reserved for a pilot to execute a safe landing on an unprepared CAL/LZ. These
requirements were developed through coordination with SOF clearance officials, the
naval test and evaluation community, and fleet officials who currently certify pilots
as fully qualified. A specification was developed. We then systematically examined
the specification in an effort to ensure it satisfies the requirements. Finally we
translated the analyzed specification into a protocol and evaluated it against all
possible combinations of the conditions of a LZ. The protocol can then be used by
software designers when developing the decision engine of the autonomous vehicle.
All of the artifacts developed in this chapter can be used as certification evidence
for a SOF clearance of autonomous behavior.
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Chapter 4: Flight Test of an Autonomous System
Current Safety of Flight (SOF) clearances for unmanned aircraft require a
qualified operator who can make decisions and ultimately bear the responsibility
for the safe operations of the vehicle. The future of aviation is unmanned, and
ultimately autonomous. Yet, a method for certifying an autonomous vehicle to
make decisions currently reserved for qualified pilots does not exist. Before we can
field autonomous systems, a process needs to be approved to certify them. This
chapter analyzes flight test data (both developmental and operational) of an au-
tonomous decision engine selecting an appropriate landing site for a large rotorcraft
in an unprepared landing zone. In particular, this chapter focuses on using legacy
T&E methods to determine their suitability for obtaining a SOF clearance for a
system that possesses autonomous functionality, and focuses on the last three steps
of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4. We show that the autonomous system
under test was able to complete a mission currently reserved for qualified pilots
under controlled conditions. However, when confronted with conditions that were
not anticipated (or programmed), the software lacked the judgment a pilot uses to
complete a mission under off-nominal conditions.
Many military applications can and have transitioned easily to the civilian
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sector (e.g. Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) [78], medevac air ambulance
[79], jet engines [80], glow sticks [81], and advanced night vision technology [82]).
Therefore, we choose to examine a safety of flight certification for the unprepared
(i.e., not an aerodrome or helipad) Confined Area Landing/Landing Zone (CAL/LZ)
mission currently carried out the USN and USMC helicopter communities [125]. In
an attempt to provide a path forward for certifying autonomy in aviation, this
chapter provides insight into the final portion of the certification process: Flight
Test (both developmental and operational). We examine flight test data of an
autonomous controller as installed on a FAA certified (experimental certification)
UH-1 attempting to accomplish the unprepared CAL/LZ mission to determine if
the current process can lead to a safety of flight clearance of autonomous behavior.
We examined data through the lens of a Developmental Test (DT) program, which
is used to determine if the vehicle can satisfy the requirements of the contract
for which it was acquired (normally a set of objective measures). Following the
DT evaluation, we examined data through the lens of an Operational Test (OT)
program, which is used to determine if the vehicle is suitable for the mission for which
it was designated under mission representative conditions (normally a subjective
opinion of the OT team). Both DT and OT are designed to examine the possible
corners of the operational envelope or the edge cases in the software verification [133].
Prior to certification of an autonomous system to complete the CAL/LZ mis-
sion, officials need to be provided certification evidence that the system can com-
plete tasks currently reserved for fully qualified Helicopter Aircraft Commanders
(HACs) [9]. As a truly autonomous system has never been subjected to formal
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flight test to support a safety of flight certification, exercising the existing process
to evaluate a single mission set will provide significant lessons learned as we tran-
sition to more autonomous functionality within aviation. We demonstrate that the
autonomous system under test was able to perform the CAL/LZ mission under
controlled conditions. However, when confronted with conditions that were not an-
ticipated or programmed (e.g., obstacle types that were not anticipated; compound
malfunctions on the vehicle; or changing environmental conditions), its software
lacked the judgment a pilot uses to complete a mission under off nominal condi-
tions.
This chapter focuses on flight test of an autonomous system to complete the
CAL/LZ mission to determine if it is suitable for a safety of flight certification.
This will help build trust in autonomy, as without trust certification officials will
be reluctant to grant a safety of flight certification [95]. A simplified version of the
steps leading to a safety of flight clearance for an autonomous system to complete
the CAL/LZ mission is presented in Figure 4.1. While the flow chart may appear to
be a workflow diagram, it is actually a simplified version of the critical path leading
to a safety of flight certification. The first step is to determine the requirements the
system must complete to accomplish the mission for which it was acquired. Step two
involves awarding a contract to a vendor to develop a system that can complete the
mission requirements. The vendor will then need to validate the software (ensure
the software meets the requirements from the contract), and perform Modeling and
Simulation (M&S) as a risk mitigation step prior to flight test. DT will then be
performed to ensure the system has completed the requirements of the contract.
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Finally OT will be performed to ensure the system can complete the mission under
mission representative conditions. Once the system under test has accomplished all
the steps, it will be granted a safety of flight clearance. This chapter focus on Steps
5 and 6 of the simplified safety of flight certification process outlined in figure 4.1.
The contributions of this chapter include:
 Development of flight test matrix (one for DT and one for OT) for an au-
tonomous vehicle to complete the CAL/LZ mission.
 Analysis of both DT and OT flight test data of an autonomous vehicle com-
pleting a task currently reserved for a qualified pilot (CAL/LZ mission).
Figure 4.1: Simplified Flowchart Detailing the Steps Leading to a Safety of Flight
Clearance for an Autonomous System to Accomplish the CAL/LZ Mission. This
Chapter Focuses on Steps 5 and 6
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 will discuss certifying the
CAL/LZ mission, the flight test process, and the system under test (to include a brief
overview of the available flight test data). In Section 4.2 DT methods and results
are summarized for the system under test. In Section 4.3 OT methods and results
are summarized, and a system suitability for the mission is provided. In Section 4.4,
we decompose the results of the flight test data for lessons learned regarding flight
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test of autonomous systems for SOF certification. In Section 4.5, we summarize
our finding as they relate to certifying autonomous systems to complete missions
currently reserved for qualified pilots.
4.0.1 Current Methods for Flight Certification
Currently, a formalized, or approved, process does not exist for naval aircraft,
or aviation systems, that exhibit autonomous behavior (i.e, a system that is able to
respond to situations that were not pre-programmed) as there has never been a re-
quirement for one to be developed. Parallel paths are being taken around the world
and by other organizations to achieve this goal [134]. However, this chapter focuses
on the achievement of a safety of flight clearance for a naval autonomous system.
Several possible approaches have been proposed, but none have been vetted through
the military, or civilian, flight clearance authorities [43,92,110]. The decision space
for certifying a vehicle to complete all tasks assigned is extremely complex, which is
why this work focused on fight test in support of a SOF clearance of an autonomous
controller completing a specific mission: To execute a safe landing of a large rotor-
craft (capable of transporting passengers) within an unprepared CAL/LZ. This will
enable an exercise of the flight test process for just one mission normally reserved
for fully qualified HAC (other missions/tasks would include power line avoidance,
see-and-avoid, formation flying, and visual navigation), thus limiting the complexity
and scope of flight test.
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4.1 Certifying Autonomy for the CAL/LZ Mission
When certification officials grant a safety of flight clearance, they are certifying
that if the system were used by a qualified pilot it will be safe and can complete
the mission that it was designed for [9]. However, the process of certifying a pilot
is a trust process. When certifying a pilot, the commanding officer is putting his
or her stamp of approval on a pilot, and they are designating that they trust their
judgment when unplanned events occur [10]. By eliminating the pilot from the
equation, certification officials need to be able to justify a safety of flight clearance
without the benefit of a human in the loop when off nominal condition occur. For
the purposes of tractability, we narrow the scope of the problem to a particular flight
envelope (i.e., a box) in which the decision engine can exhibit autonomous behavior.
This approach will allow certification officials to grant a safety of flight clearance
providing the decision engine would not violate one of the limits of the box. We
used the Size, Slope, Wing, Elevation, Escape Route, Power (SWEEP) procedure
executed by qualified HACs in the USN and USMC [125] (detailed in Section 2.8.2)
to define the box for the proposed flight clearance of an autonomous system.
We define a suitable landing as one that satisfies the SWEEP checks performed
by qualified HACs. While not all of the steps were specifically programmed into
the Tactical Aerial Logistics System (TALOS) (the decision engine that controls
AACUS), it is important to understand each component of SWEEP as it relates
to the system under test (AACUS/TALOS). In Reference [76] we describe how
the SWEEP checklist can be used to define a clearance envelope where a system
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can be allowed to exhibit autonomous behavior. This can be considered run-time
verification, as once the system under test were to reach a edge of the clearance
envelop it would revert to known behavior. The components of SWEEP, as it
relates to AACUS, are described below:
 Size: TALOS used Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) to build a 3D image
to help determine a landing point free from obstructions and large enough for
the vehicle. It was programmed to use a 10 meter diameter as a clear zone for
landing. That diameter needed to be an additional 10 meters clear of obstacles
(a total of 20 meters from obstructions).
 Slope: While TALOS did not specifically determine the slope of a LZ, it used
a rough approximation (similar to what a pilot would do) to determine if the
slope of the LZ posed an unsafe condition. The slope limits allowed by the
controller were more restrictive than the actual limits of the test vehicle.
 Wind: TALOS was programmed to continuously evaluate the wind based on
the control inputs and the deviations in the ground track (Global Positioning
System (GPS) based). This is a standard technique for the test and evaluation
of helicopters. On approach it will continue to update its local wind model
until it reached 50 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). It then used that wind speed
and direction for approach. Prior to landing, the system would maneuver
the nose of the aircraft into the wind to minimize crosswind, and maximize
headwind.
 Elevation: Elevation had a negligible effect on the available flight test data,
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and was not evaluated. The system under test did not possess a health moni-
toring system for elevation data. While not evaluated during the test period,
the elevation will have a dramatic impact on power available. Providing the
data was accurate, it will be a variable for the power portion of the SWEEP
checks.
 Escape Route: TALOS used the situational awareness obtained by process-
ing the sensor data available to build an escape route. While none of the LZs
evaluated required a complicated escape route, one was displayed to the safety
pilot and flight test engineer for each approach. During approach, TALOS
would monitor the LZ to ensure SWEEP remains valid. If SWEEP became
invalid, TALOS will initiate a wave off and fly the escape route back to a hold
point.
 Power: All of the evaluated test LZs and aircraft configurations accommo-
dated a power margin greater than five percent (a nominal safety buffer the
AACUS/TALOS test team put in place). While not evaluated during this test
period, it would be a simple limit to place on an autonomous controller.
4.1.1 Flight Test Overview
Flight test is performed on a naval system prior to granting a safety of flight
clearance. It is important to understand the purpose of the two types of flight test
(DT and OT) as they pertain to granting a flight clearance. The FAA, NASA, and
each of the three branches of the United States military have an airworthiness certi-
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fication process for aircraft. For naval aviation, airworthiness certification authority
is delegated to the Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR). When a new capability
(i.e., software, weapon or air frame) is acquired, and before naval personnel operate
it, NAVAIR must grant a flight clearance (also referred to as a safety of flight cer-
tification). Aircraft subsystems, software, components and ultimately the aircraft
itself are certified through an established risk mitigation process, the final portion
of the process is flight test [9]. Flight test can be further broken down to either
DT and OT. The qualification process for naval aviators (pilots) is considered to
be a trust process. Unlike the civilian sector, military pilots are trusted by their
commanding officers to complete missions critical to national interests. While each
pilot is required to log a minimum amount of flight time, and show competency in
aircraft procedures prior to qualification, a commanding officer will not designate
them as fully qualified until the individual has earned the trust of the commanding
officer in their decision making abilities in off nominal conditions [10].
The purpose of DT is to ensure that the system under test can meet the
requirements for which it was acquired under (normally a contract). DT is performed
by trained test pilots, graduates of an internationally recognized Test Pilot School
(TPS). DT points (individual data points required to characterize the system under
test during test) are controlled, and designed to determine if the capability meets
the individual specifications/requirements from the contract and must be flown by
trained test pilots. An example of a developmental test requirement might be “the
aircraft will achieve a level accelerated speed of 300 kts at 10,000 ft MSL”. This
requirement has a clear condition (300 kts at 10,000 ft MSL), and a clear method to
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achieve the specification (level acceleration). DT also offers an iterative approach
to expanding a safety of flight clearance (envelope) by providing data to compare
to other types of analysis (such as M&S or wind tunnel data). DT is considered a
black or white evaluation of an aircraft against the contract specifications. The test
points for DT are typically objective. Once a new capability (i.e., full aircraft, new
software, or weapon) has successfully demonstrated that it meets the required DT
requirements it can transition to OT.
The purpose of OT is to ensure that the new capability is suitable for the
mission it is expected to complete. For a new capability to be deemed suitable
(and pass OT) it must be able to perform the mission under mission representative
conditions, by fleet representative aircrew. An example of an OT requirement may
include “the aircraft must be able to integrate into a multi-plane strike verses a
remote target in a contested environment.” Modern OT differs from DT in several
ways beyond simply the training required for its aircrew. DT is designed to ensure
the capability matches the requirements of the contract. OT is designed to ensure
that the end user can use the capability to complete its designated mission. It is
possible for a capability to successfully pass DT, but fail during OT. This is one
of the reasons that United States federal law only requires OT [11]. Unlike the
objective evaluation of DT, OT is mainly a subjective evaluation of the system
under test’s suitability for the mission it is designated for.
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4.1.2 System Under Test (AACUS/TALOS) Overview
To evaluate current certification methods for the possible safety of flight certi-
fication of autonomy, we required a system that possessed autonomous functionality.
In 2017 Aurora Flight Sciences (AFS) developed the TALOS decision engine for the
AACUS program under an Office of Naval Research (ONR) contract [132]. AFS in-
stalled TALOS on a modified UH-1 which flew under a FAA experimental certificate.
The FAA granted the safety of flight clearance for the vehicle with the stipulation
that any time the vehicle flew (autonomously or not) a HAC was required to be
on board. All flight test data presented in this research was flown by the same
experimental test pilot. TALOS used the data available from the onboard sensors
combined with the onboard processing power and data buses to build SA of the
environment the decision engine would be operating in. The safety pilot (who was
a trained experimental test pilot and fully qualified HAC) was required to monitor
the systems decisions while the vehicle completed its mission autonomously, and
was ultimately responsible for safety of flight.
AACUS/TALOS was designed to execute the Marine resupply mission. We
used the available data to analyze the systems performance during the CAL/LZ
mission (a submission of the resupply mission). While AFS has published papers
within the flight test community, their work focused on how the system was designed,
operated and tested [135,136], not on how the flight test results can be used for safety
of flight certification of autonomy. Similar work was done by the United States Army
in modifying a Black Hawk for field navigation and landing site selection [137].
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However the flight test data available from AFS is diverse enough that it can be
evaluated under current Department of Defense (DoD) processes [11] for a potential
flight clearance of the autonomous controller to complete the CAL/LZ mission.
During the test program the safety pilot monitored the system under test while it
performed autonomous flight. By utilizing a safety pilot, AFS and ONR were able
to examine autonomous functionality despite the lack of certification standards for
autonomous vehicles. The 21 flight test events occurred between 11 December 2017
and 23 May 2018. These events were chosen based on the fact that the software
controlling TALOS had reached a maturity point where future modifications did not
have an effect on how it chose its LZ. The test events also concentrated on the actual
landing portion of the demonstration and not the other aspects of the contract. The
flights can be broken down to DT and OT like conditions.
The flights supporting the AACUS/TALOS final demo, rehearsals and follow
on technology maturation assessment (December 2017 through January 2018) can
be seen as DT events. The data set, consisting of six flights concentrated on the
system requirements from the contract and the test points were scripted as such.
The LZs were located on Quantico Marine Corps Base in Virginia, and were designed
to demonstrate the autonomous functionality of AACUS/TALOS. During the DT
period, all of the flights were choreographed by the test team to demonstrate the
systems ability to satisfy the requirements of the ONR demonstration contract.
The follow on events supporting a large scale field training exercise at Twenty-
nine Palms (USMC base in California) can be seen as OT events. During operations
in California, 15 flights were flown in the spring of 2018 in preparation for, and in
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support of, an Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) with actual Marines [135]. The
USMC uses Twentynine Palms to simulate real life conditions Marines may find
once deployed. The LZs were chosen by actual Marines, to support conditions that
can be considered as mission representative. During the OT period, all of the test
flights were designed to evaluate the system’s capability to complete the assigned
task under mission representative conditions.
4.2 Developmental Flight Test of AACUS/TALOS
In this section we further discuss the aspects of DT (Step 5 from Figure 4.1).
The evaluation of the objective requirements from the contract are covered in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. The various test points that will be tracked during the DT period, as
well as how the system under test will be characterized, is outlined in Section 4.2.2.
A summary of the DT program is provided in Section 4.2.3. Furthermore, in order
for a system to pass DT and move onto OT, a positive DT/OT Transition Recom-
mendation (to include the documentation of any deficiencies found during DT) is
required. We provide a notional positive recommendation for the system under test
in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Requirements of AACUS/TALOS for the Autonomous CAL/LZ
Mission
For an autonomous system to obtain a safety of flight certification for the
CAL/LZ mission, it will need to demonstrate that it can accurately complete SWEEP
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checks. As the only parts of SWEEP that were programmed into TALOS were size
(to include obstacle detection), slope, wind and escape route, the DT fight test data
will evaluate those requirements (elevation and power margin were not evaluated
during this test program).
 LZ Size: The contract set the requirement for a 10 meter radius (UH-1 rotor
arc is 24 ft, 1.6 in), this radius must be an additional 10 meters from any
obstacle. The system was required to scan the possible LZ from altitude
(approximately 200 ft AGL) and determine if the LZ is large enough for the
vehicle. A human pilot uses experience to judge the size of a LZ, but using
onboard sensors has the potential of being more exact.
 LZ Slope: The contract set the requirement for less than approximately three
degrees of slope (actual UH-1 limit is six degrees). The system was required to
scan the possible LZ from altitude (approximately 200 ft AGL) and determine
if the LZ is within limits. Slope is the most difficult parameter for a pilot
to determine from altitude. Often, on approach, a HAC will abort a landing
when the slope was not as anticipated from altitude.
 Obstacle Detection: The contract requirement was for the system to detect
and avoid an obstacle the size of an 18 in pelican case (depicted in Figure
4.2). If a helicopter were to land on an obstacle the risk of dynamic rollover
is real. Similar to excessive slope, a dangerous situation can develop if only
one skid were to touch down during a normal landing. During the CAL/LZ
mission a crew chief actively looks out the side of the helicopter clearing the LZ
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for the pilots from when the aircraft is over its landing spot through landing.
The system was required to scan the possible LZ from altitude (approximately
200 ft AGL) and determine if the LZ is clear of obstacles. The system under
test was required to continuously monitor the touch down point for possibly
obstructions during approach through touchdown.
 Wind: The system under test was able to continuously evaluate the local wind
conditions by comparing the ground track of the vehicle against the control
inputs. As this is a standard technique for developmental test of helicopters
it is not part of this research. As the vehicle begin its approach to landing it
stopped evaluating the winds at 50 ft AGL. It then used that wind direction
and magnitude to determine if the winds were within limits. Prior to landing,
the system would maneuver the nose of the aircraft into the relative wind to
limit cross wind and maximize headwind.
 Escape Route: The system under test was required to scan the area around
the LZ and determine a safe route to a hold point prior to starting its approach
for landing. AACUS/TALOS utilized RRT* [121, 122] and the information
available through its sensors to build the escape route. If the LZ were to
become fouled (something moves into the previously cleared space) or SWEEP
were no longer valid during approach (such as an obstacle were to be detected
during approach) the system would wave off and fly the escape route to a hold
point. In the field, a ground vehicle or wildlife may foul the LZ. Or, once the
sensor package was closer to the landing zone it may detect a condition that
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violates the requirements for a valid LZ.
Figure 4.2: Photo of a Marine Carrying a 24x20x16 in Pelican Case During the
AACUS ONR Final Demonstration [138]
4.2.2 Developmental Flight Test Matrix
When preparing for a flight test program, military T&E leadership develop a
list of specific test points required to accomplish a test program. Typically these
test points are laid out in a easy to follow test matrix. As developmental flight
test is resource intensive, leadership will develop test points that are designed to
evaluate the edge cases of the system under test. These edge cases typically define
the edges of the envelope that will be in a safety of flight certification. These edge
cases are typically first identified during risk mitigation M&S prior to flight test
(Step 4 from Figure 4.1). The test matrix offers the flight test community a simple
to understand status of the test program, and a method to annotate flight test
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results. To pass DT, the system under test will need to accomplish a minimum
of 25 autonomous landings (nominal value we selected for this research), with no
safety of flight issues. During the landings, the system must demonstrate that it
can select a LZ that is not obstructed and has a slope that meets the requirements
of the test program. In addition, the system must demonstrate it can identify an
18 in pelican case in a possible LZ. Finally, during approach to landing, the system
must be able to identify an interloper if it were to enter the LZ, abort the landing,
and fly to the escape route to the hold point. The flight test matrix, in addition to
daily flight reports prepared after each flight, are used by the flight test community
to characterize the system under test when they evaluate the systems compliance
with the requirements of the contract for which it was acquired. Using the CAL/LZ
mission as the foundation for evaluation, the flight test community can help inform
certification officials decisions for certifying autonomous behavior. The test matrix
for this evaluation can be found in Table 4.1. The columns for Table 4.1 can be
described as such:
 Flight Number - Date: Specifies the flight test number and date of flight.
 Size: Tracks the system’s ability to select a LZ that meets the minimum size
requirement. During DT this was evaluated by placing obstacles (the test
team used pelican cases described in Section 4.2.1) in known locations in the
test LZ area to determine if the system can accurately choose a valid landing
point (both by the safety pilot in real time and by post flight analysis). Figure
4.3 depicts two LZs. Both photos were taken from the pilot’s perspective in
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a UH-1, 200 ft AGL over Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River. The left
image does not meet the requirements of the contract, the right does.
Figure 4.3: Pilots Perspective of Two LZs Taken From a UH-1 at 200 ft AGL Over
the Turf Training Area of NAS Patuxent River [139]
 Obstruction: Tracks the systems ability to select a LZ that meets the obstacle
clearance threshold (no obstacles larger than an 18 in pelican case). During
DT this was by examining the selected LZ to determine that the LZ was not
obstructed (both by the safety pilot real time and by post flight analysis). This
and the first column of the test matrix will be accomplished by placing test
pelican cases around a known location to test the systems ability to choose a
valid LZ. Figure 4.4 depicts two LZs that is are obstructed by vehicles.
 Slope: Tracks the systems ability to select a LZ that met the maximum slope
requirement. During DT this will be evaluated by examining the selected LZ
to verify that it meet the slope requirement (both by the safety pilot real time
and by post flight analysis). Figure 4.5 depicts a LZ at NAS Patuxent River
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Figure 4.4: Pilots Perspective of Two LZs that Would have Been Valid if the Vehicles
Were not Present, Taken from a UH-1 at 200 ft AGL Over the Turf Training Area
of NAS Patuxent River [139]
used by the DT community for slope landing evaluation. The photo was taken
from the pilot’s perspective in a UH-1 200 ft AGL over NAS Patuxent River.
The three surveyed LZs have different slopes that test pilots use during flight
test.
 Fouled LZ: Tracks the system’s ability to sense an interloper that fouls the
LZ during approach. During DT this will be evaluated by driving a golf cart
into the LZ while the system was on approach to landing. Upon sensing the
LZ is fouled the system will execute the escape route (which is displayed to
the safety pilot prior to approach) and return to the hold point.
 # Landings and # Aborted: Tracks safe autonomous landings and aborted
approaches by the safety pilot for violation of requirements. To successfully
pass DT we stipulated that the system must complete 25 autonomous landings
and have zero approaches aborted by the safety pilot for a violation of the
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Figure 4.5: Pilots Perspective of Surveyed LZ Used for Slope Landing Evaluation
Taken from a UH-1 at 200 ft AGL Over the Turf Training Area of NAS Patuxent
River [140]
requirements.
Each DT flight was recorded via the test matrix. The results were evaluated to
determine if the system should be recommended for OT, as OT requires substantial
investment in resources (both time and money). A system that does not receive a
positive recommendation for OT from DT typically does not proceed to the next
step until mitigation measures are put in place. Ultimately, the test matrix is used
to characterize the system under test.
While the test matrix characterizes the system based on its performance in
the execution of planned test points, other items are identified during flight test.
Experimental test pilots are trained to find deficiencies in a system. A Part 3 defi-
ciency is considered a nuisance, and is tracked against the system in case there are
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Flight # - Date Size Obst Slope Fouled LZ # Lds # Abt
59F096 - 12/11/2017 P P P P 7 0
59F097 - 12/12/2017 P P P P 6 0
59F098 - 12/13/2017 P P P P 5 0
59F100 - 01/22/2018 P P P P 3 0
59F101 - 01/23/2018 P P P N/A 7 0
59F102 - 01/24/2018 P P P P 5 0
Table 4.1: Completed DT Test Matrix of AACUS/TALOS for the Autonomous
CAL/LZ Mission (P = Pass, F = Fail, N/A = Not Applicable)
resources (both time and money) available to fix in the future. A Part 2 deficiency
is considered an issue with the system that requires human interaction to overcome
(such as pressing extra buttons on a flight management system to accomplish the
mission). As with a Part 3 deficiency, they are normally tracked for possible correc-
tion at a later date. A Part 1 deficiency is one that if not corrected, translates to
the system being unable to accomplish the mission, or may result in a mishap. Part
1 deficiencies are typically addressed prior to the system receiving a OT transition
recommendation.
4.2.3 Summary of Developmental Flight Test Events
DT of the system under test consisted of six test flights. They were flown as
part of the build up to the AACUS/TALOS final demonstration, the demonstration
itself, and follow on technology maturation assessment by ONR. All flights took
place between 11 December 2017 and 24 January 2018 and were choreographed by
the test team to demonstrate the systems mastery of the requirements levied by the
contract. Table 4.1 summarizes the six test flights in the test matrix.
During DT, the test conductors used both movable and stationary obstruc-
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tions to force the system to choose individual LZs that met the requirements of the
CAL/LZ mission. When evaluating a LZ, TALOS used LiDAR to build its percep-
tion of the LZ. As it approaches a LZ more data becomes available to fine tune its
interpretation of the LZ. Figure 4.6 depicts three images showing the perception
model of the LZ building as the test asset approaches. The landing area evaluated
was a 50 meter radius seven sided polygon. Large obstacles were defined as some-
thing with a height of 11 inches. The system would invalidate an area around the
obstacle, though not in a circular shape. The shape is elliptical with the long axis
parallel to the vehicle’s approach path. All images were displayed with north up
and the distance to the proposed LZ listed to the lower right of the image. The
circle in the center of the image is the desired landing spot from the end user. The
colors in the image relate the suitability of the location. Table 4.2 details the color
legend for the TALOS produced interpretation of the LZ.
Figure 4.6: TALOS LZ Interpretation from 410, 220 and 116 Meters During Flight
59F097. As the Vehicle Approaches the LZ its Interpretation Become Clearer. [132]
Figure 4.7 depicts the systems interpretation of the LZ for one of the au-
tonomous landings during Flight 59F098 and a image of the test UH-1 immediately
post landing. The landing spot was in a field with rolling hills. Figure 4.8 also de-
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Color Meaning
Black No evaluation performed in the area, or no data available in the
area
Gray No object seen, not enough data to determine if a large size object
is present
Yellow No object seen, not enough data to determine if a medium size
object is present
Teal No object seen, not enough data to determine if a small size object
s present
Green Area is safe for landing, no object seen
Red Object in this area, not safe for landing
Orange Too close to an object, not safe for landing
Blue/Purple Terrain is too sloped or too rough for safe landing
Table 4.2: Legend for Colors in TALOS LZ Interpretation [132]
picts images relating to an autonomous landings during during Flight 59F098, the
landing spot was in a simulated Forward Operating Base (FOB), and is considered
one of the tougher challenges for the system.
Figure 4.7: Two Images Relating to an Autonomous Landing in a Field During
Flight 59F098 Left: TALOS Interpretation of the LZ [132] Right: Picture of the
Test Vehicle Shortly After Completing an Autonomous Landing in the LZ Pictured
on the Left [141]
To evaluate the system under test’s ability to sense an interloper fouling the
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Figure 4.8: Three Images Relating to an Autonomous Landing in a Simulated FOB
During Flight 59F098 Top Left: TALOS Interpretation of the LZ [132] Top Right:
Picture of the LZ from Ground Level [141] Bottom: AACUS/TALOS Completing
an Autonomous Landing in the Simulated FOB [141]
LZ, the test team would wait until the system under test approached the LZ then
one of the test team will drive a golf cart into its path. Upon sensing the fouled
LZ the system will abort the approach and fly an escape route to the hold point.
Figure 4.9 depicts TALOS’s interpretation of a LZ before (left image) and after
(right image) a golf cart is driven into it. The golf cart is what creates the orange
zone at the bottom of the green zone in the second image. This was done to test
the wave off functionality of the system.
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Figure 4.9: TALOS Interpretation of an LZ Before (Left Image) and After (Right
Image) a Golf Cart if Driven Into it Testing the Wave Off Functionality on Flight
59F096 [132]
In addition to the test matrix, the safety pilot and test team noted several
minor issues during DT. Some of these issues related to the software resiliency, which
was not evaluated for the autonomous CAL/LZ mission. Yet, other issues noted by
the test team directly relate the system performance. On Flight 59F096 the system
selected two landing spots that were not advantageous to the test (one was too close
to a road, and one was too close to ground personnel). Although the selected spots
met all of the requirements for the system, the safety pilot disengaged the system
and selected a more advantageous spot. Also on Flight 59F096 it appeared that
the constantly changing cargo load of the vehicle affected the landing performance
(both skids did not contact at the same time). On Flight 59F097, while performing
an escape route, the vehicle tracked outside of the planned route (yet still safely
executed the route) due to the fact that the selected route was not planned to
properly match the vehicle’s maneuverability. On Flight 59F101 the local wind
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conditions were more extreme than seen during past test events (winds were 14 gust
19 kts). While the winds were well within the limits of the experiment, the vehicle
displayed less than optimal performance (still within prescribed limits).
4.2.4 DT Results and DT/OT Transition Recommendation
Despite the deficiencies noted, the system was able to perform the mission
autonomously under the constraints imposed by the test team. We have determined
that the system was able to accurately complete the SWEEP checks under controlled
conditions and should proceed to OT.
During six DT events the system under test performed 33 autonomous landings
with zero safety of flight issues (or violations of the requirements placed by the
contract). The system also demonstrated the ability to detect if the landing zone
was fouled by an interloper, and execute an escape route to its hold point. However,
several deficiencies were identified in the system:
 First Deficiency: The system lacks the ability to optimize the landing spot
selection (Flight 59F096), once it finds a valid point it for landing it ceased
looking for a more advantageous spot (Part 2 deficiency). We recommend
that future software loads have a cost function embedded to help solve this
problem.
 Second Deficiency: The systems actual performance may not be the same
as programmed (Part 2 deficiency). We recommend that future software loads
have an updated model of the performance of the vehicle.
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 Third Deficiency: The system lacks a dynamic CG sensing capability which
may lead to an unsteady landing (Part 3 deficiency). We recommend that
future software loads have an updated CG sensing capability.
 Fourth Deficiency During high/gusty wind conditions (yet within the limits
of the vehicle/system) the hover and landing performance was safe but not
consistent (Part 3 deficiency). We recommend that future software loads have
improved gust performance.
4.3 Operational Flight Test of AACUS/TALOS
Unlike DT, OT is not as carefully scripted. During DT the test team was
tasked with ensuring the system under test can perform to the requirements that
were detailed in the contract. All of the DT LZs were designed to test the capabilities
of the system under controlled conditions. Unlike DT, OT flight test is designed
to see if the average fleet operator can use the system to perform the mission,
and determine if the system under test can perform in a mission representative
environment. Operational testers are tasked to determine if the system under test
is operationally effective, and suitable for the mission [11]. In Section 4.3 we further
discuss the aspects of OT (Step 6 from Figure 4.1). The goals and expectations of
the system in OT are covered in Section 4.3.1. The various test point that were
tracked during the OT period is outlined in Section 4.3.2. A summary of the OT
program is provided in Section 4.3.3. Finally the AACUS/TALOS system suitability
assessment (results from OT) are presented in Section 4.3.4.
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Late in 2017, AACUS/TALOS showed great promise for autonomy. During
several technology demonstration flights the system impressed senior USMC officers.
They asked if the system can provide similar results in the field resupplying actual
Marine’s. ONR and AFS agreed to allow the system to operate at Twentynine
Palms, a USMC base in California, during a major USMC ITX. In the spring 2018,
AACUS/TALOS flew 15 flights under operationally relevant conditions.
4.3.1 Goals and Expectations of the System in OT
The basic resupply mission is simple: a Marine makes a request for supplies,
the request is filled, and a helicopter delivers the supplies to the Marine in the field.
AACUS/TALOS was programmed to fly from one location to the Marines location,
select a LZ near the Marine, land and allow the Marine to unload the supplies. We
evaluated AACUS/TALOS for the final portion of the resupply mission. We eval-
uated the system under test for its suitability in the autonomous CAL/LZ mission
under mission representative conditions at Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base.
As with DT, we used the SWEEP checklist to determine if the system under
test can perform the same actions a qualified HAC would under mission representa-
tive conditions. However, during OT we did not evaluate it against black and white
requirements. We evaluated it against the safety pilot’s (a trained engineering test
pilot, and fully qualified HAC) opinions to see if the decisions the system under test
made will match that of a fully qualified HAC.
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4.3.2 Operational Flight Test Matrix
During the ITX at Twentynine Palms Marine Base AACUS/TALOS was
tasked with resupplying actual Marines. As with DT we evaluated AACUS/TALOS
for the autonomous CAL/LZ mission (just the landing portion of the resupply mis-
sion). However, unlike DT the LZs the Marines chose were not ideal. The obstacles
in them were not pelican cases placed by the test team to determine if the sys-
tem can distinguish a clear LZ that met the requirements of the system. Instead
the obstacles were whatever was present in the area where the Marine requested
resupply.
For the OT evaluation matrix we once again used the portions of SWEEP
that were programmed into the system under test. However instead of evaluating the
performance against the requirements of the system (as we did in DT), we evaluated
the system against the expert opinion of the safety pilot (a trained engineering test
pilot, and fully qualified HAC) while the system performed the autonomous CAL/LZ
mission in a mission representative environment. Table 4.3 is a flight test matrix that
summarizes operation flight test of AACUS/TALOS for the autonomous CAL/LZ
mission and the columns can be summarized as follows:
 Flight Number - Date: Specifies the flight test date and flight.
 Size: Tracks if the safety pilot agreed with the size of the selected LZ.
 Slope: Tracks if the safety pilot agreed with the slope of the LZ.
 Obstruction: Tracks if the safety pilot agreed that the LZ was clear of ob-
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structions.
 Spot: Tracks if the safety pilot agreed with the landing spot chosen by the
decision engine.
 Wave Off : Tracks if the safety pilot pilot felt the wave off was executed
properly.
 # Landings: Tracks the number of autonomous landings during the test
flight.
 # Aborted: Tracks the number of landing aborted by the safety pilot for
safety of flight reasons.
In order to successfully pass OT and ultimately be given a safety of flight cer-
tification and fielded, the system under test will need to demonstrate under opera-
tionally relevant conditions that it can complete the autonomous CAL/LZ mission.
Unlike DT where the system merely needed to demonstrate that it met the require-
ments set in the contract, in OT the system needed to show that it can perform
as a fully qualified HAC to be effective and suitable for the mission (a subjective
assessment by the OT team).
4.3.3 Summary of Operational Test Events
OT consisted of 15 flights flown between 29 April 2018 and 23 May 2018. They
were flown as part of a major field exercise supporting USMC personnel at Twen-
tynine Palms Marine Base. All test flights were flown under mission representative
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Flight # - Date Size Slope Obst Spot W/O # Lds # Abt
59F111 - 04/29/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 0
59F112 - 05/01/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 2 0
59F113 - 05/03/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 0
59F114 - 05/04/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 7 0
59F115 - 05/06/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 1 0
59F116 - 05/08/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 1 0
59F117 - 05/08/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 2 0
59F118 - 05/12/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 6 0
59F119 - 05/14/2018 Yes Yes No No N/A 6 0
59F120 - 05/15/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 4 0
59F121 - 05/17/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 4 0
59F122 - 05/18/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 2 0
59F123 - 05/21/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 2 0
59F124 - 05/22/2018 No Yes No N/A Yes 2 0
59F126 - 05/23/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 2 0
Table 4.3: Completed OT Flight Test Matrix of AACUS/TALOS for the Au-
tonomous CAL/LZ Mission
conditions and not specifically choreographed by the test team to demonstrate the
systems mastery of the requirements levied by the contract. The first five flights
were system prep flights to understand the new environment. The final 10 were in
direct support of the exercise. Table 4.3 summarizes the 15 test flights in the OT
matrix.
During the first flight in a mission representative environment, some issues
immediately presented themselves. Unlike the LZs of Quantico, those in Twentynine
Palms had not been cleared of brush to maximize Marine training. Vegetation in
the high desert of California ranges from small shrubs or tumble weed, to shoulder
high bushes. The test team used the first flight to judge the effect vegetation has
on the system. During 59F111 the system under test had difficulty, in the opinion
of the safety pilot, finding a LZ that met its criteria for obstacle clearance. While
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evaluating four LZs, only two of them met the requirements for the system under test
to perform a landing. The safety pilot noted that the UH-1 could have performed a
landing, but it would require extensive crew coordination and pilot judgment (these
capabilities were not programmed into the system). Figure 4.10 is the TALOS
interpretation of one of the LZs and a corresponding google earth image prepared
by the test team from Flight 59F111. The safety pilot felt he could land in the LZ,
but TALOS couldn’t find a valid spot based on the extra safety factor programmed
into the system.
Figure 4.10: Two Images Relating to an LZ During Flight 59F111. Left: Google
Earth Image. Right: TALOS Interpretation of the Same Location. TALOS Declared
the Location Unsuitable, the Safety Pilot Disagreed [132].
One of the major concerns from AFS and ONR was how the system under
test would perform under conditions approaching brown out, where the rotor wash
picks up dust when landing in a desert LZ that blocks the aircrew view of the
ground when approaching touch down. Several of the LZs chosen during the first
five flights at Twentynine Palms were chosen to assess the systems performance in
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adverse conditions. The fear was that the installed LiDAR could not penetrate dust
on landing, and initiate a wave off that is not warranted. No issues were found when
operating in near “brown out” conditions. During Flight 59F120 the system was
able to complete the CAL/LZ mission despite encountering what the safety pilot
considered full brown out (Figure 4.11).
Figure 4.11: System Under Test Performing an Autonomous Landing During Full
Brownout Conditions at Twentynine Palms Marine Base During Flight 59F120 [135]
Flight 59F117 was a milestone for the program. It was the first time that
the system was used to perform the resupply mission of Marines in the field. The
system under test was able to complete the entire mission (to include the CAL/LZ
portion of the flight) autonomously.
An issue was found during Fight 59F119. The system under test was to fly to
a remote location (that had a dirt runway) for a resupply mission and vehicle refuel.
The Marines at the LZ had set up sand bags to indicate to the pilot where to land
(a standard operating procedure). However, the system saw the sand bags as an
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obstruction, and chose a different landing spot. The safety pilot took control of the
aircraft and landed on the runway, in the desired location, to facilitate refueling. The
other six landings performed during the flight were all accomplished autonomously
at other locations with no issues.
Another issue was noted on Flight 59F125. The system under test was directed
to resupply Marines in the field with water (mission critical based on the location).
Unfortunately, the location the Marines chose for resupply was sub-optimal. The
foliage in the area made it difficult for the the system to select a landing point that
met the requirements of the programming. The system under test had a requirement
for the size of an obstacle. It was programmed to invalidate the area around detected
obstacles. A trained HAC would have evaluated the foliage in the area and dismissed
some of the foliage as a non factor (yet the system under test identified them as a
hazard). Ultimately the safety pilot had to disengage the system and land manually
to accomplish the resupply (as the LZ was compatible with the UH-1, just not the
requirements programmed into AACUS/TALOS).
4.3.4 AACUS/TALOS System Suitability
The system under test demonstrated that it could complete the autonomous
CAL/LZ mission under favorable conditions (i.e., those that were programed into
the system). During OT, AACUS/TALOS performed 46 autonomous landings. It
also demonstrated extreme promise in controlling a helicopter during brown out con-
ditions. However, under field conditions the experience and training of the safety
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pilot was required to complete the landing when the obstacles in the LZ were chal-
lenging. The system was programmed with a large safety margin, but that margin
negated the ability of the system to perform landings in some of the LZs of Twen-
tynine Palms. In addition, some of the LZs chosen by the system under test were
not ideal. The vegetation in the proposed LZs had not been completely cleared as
it would have been at an aerodrome or helipad, and the safety pilot had to take
control and land at a more advantageous spot (mainly when dealing with LZs that
required interaction with Marines on the ground). The system also had issues when
identifying obstacles that could foul a LZ, as it was programmed to view an 11 in
obstacle as fouling a LZ. In the field many of these objects were small shrubs or
tumbleweeds. A fully qualified HAC would have identified them as no risk (as the
down wash on approach would blow them out of the way). This is also a limitation
of the programming in a system that was designed as a technology demonstration,
not a system for operational use. While all 15 flights were flown by the same exper-
imental test pilot, the conclusions in this research were formed by a committee of
flight test experts who had access to the flight test data.
The results of OT were shared with senior naval officers who currently certify
pilots as HACs. They are tasked with certifying the judgment of the pilot to perform
critical missions when the conditions were sub-optimal. They unanimously agreed
that, as evaluated, the AACUS/TALOS did not meet their threshold as being ca-
pable of making decision currently reserved for qualified pilots. When presented
with a situation that matches the programming, the system under test was able to
complete the mission. However, when presented with a situation that did not fit
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neatly into the programming the system could not complete the mission.
We found that AACUS/TALOS (as programmed and evaluated) was not ef-
fective or suitable for the autonomous CAL/LZ mission. Based on these findings,
NAVAIR would not grant a safety of flight certification for the system to perform
the mission.
4.4 Analysis of the Test Results as it Relates to Certifying Autonomy
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, despite meteoric advances in structures,
aerodynamics, and propulsion, aircraft handling qualities languished under the con-
ception that it would not be feasible to create objective design standards (satis-
fying black and white requirements) to achieve a subjective ends (satisfying pilots
needs) [142]. The advent of autonomous systems has created a similar daunting
task. Currently, certification officials mainly use objective standards to determine
if the system can be used by a fully qualified aircrew to complete a mission prior
to granting a flight clearance. However, the CO of a squadron uses a subjective
measure to determine if a pilot is ready for full qualification. This creates the
same problem aircraft designers had for improving handling qualities. The design-
ers of autonomous systems will be given a set of performance specifications which
are themselves objective ends. However, the quantities prescribed in specifications,
completing a judgment task, requires objective means to an associated subjective
end [143]. This research has shown that accomplishing a judgment task (we evalu-
ated the system under test for the CAL/LZ mission) will require new processes, or
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adjusting current processes to meet the new requirement.
The available flight test data was evaluated under DT like conditions (where
applicable) to determine if the contractor was able to build a system to a specification
of the contract (show that the decision engine would only land in areas that met the
conditions of the contract). It was also evaluated under OT like conditions (where
applicable) to determine if the decision engine could execute the task under mission
representative conditions. The flight test data was also presented to senior officers
who currently certified HACs.
AFS developed the decision engine that enabled the system under test to
accomplish the task under controlled conditions. During the notional DT phase
of this test program the system under test successfully completed its assigned task
33 times with no issues relating to the landing portion of the test flights. We
felt the system under test was able to complete the requirements levied by the
contract (objective requirements), and AACUS/TAOLOS would have passed DT
and transitioned to OT. However, several of the landings were not optimal. In
more than one case, the safety pilot took the controls and delivered the vehicle to
a more favorable location. Once TALOS found a location that met the minimum
requirements it was programmed to execute, it stopped looking for a better solution.
The senior naval officers felt that a HAC needs to use their judgment to pick the
best available location for landing. While the system can accomplish the CAL/LZ
mission by satisfying the SWEEP checklist and executing an autonomous landing,
a more ideal landing point offers an extra buffer of safety. One example was Flight
59F097. During that flight the safety pilot disengaged the system and chose a touch
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down point to maximize the impending static display following shutdown. The
system under test was not aware that a number of high ranking Marine officers
were waiting to see the vehicle. Its only concern was finding a valid landing spot.
The safety pilot knew that the closer he could land to the distinguished visitors
the better. This showed the narrow focus of the decision engine, as changing the
programming for touchdown point was not possible between flights. It was not
possible to add judgment in the current build of the software.
During follow on testing at Twentynine Palms (considered to be OT data) the
system under test was able to complete 46 autonomous landings in mission repre-
sentative environments. However, the decision engine displayed issues with distin-
guishing valid landing zones for the test vehicle. This may have been a byproduct
of the demonstration program requiring a large safety buffer (much larger clear LZ
than required for the platform). The software required a large diameter clear zone
for landing. On more that one flight the safety pilot had to take control of the
aircraft and execute a safe landing in an area that the decision engine eliminated
as a valid LZ. The judgment that senior naval officers rely upon when granting the
HAC qualification on aviators is an intangible that is difficult to quantify or program
into a decision engine. Ultimately, we determined (with coordination with military
certification oficials) the system under test was unsuitable for the CAL/LZ mission
and would not be granted a safety of flight clearance as programmed and evaluated.
AFS was able to develop a decision engine and sensor package that could
perform the CAL/LZ mission autonomously under controlled conditions. However,
when presented with other variables that were not considered, or under field condi-
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tions, the decision engine lacked the judgment that a HAC needs to demonstrate to
their CO before being fully qualified. This highlights a major issue with certifying
autonomous behavior for a safety of flight certification. If requirements are black
and white, a simple decision tree can be generated for a decision engine to follow. It
is when the decision engine faces off nominal conditions, or unplanned circumstances
present themselves, that its actions did not mirror that of a fully qualified HAC.
Academia and industry have proven that they can build aircraft with au-
tonomous functionality. AACUS/TALOS was one such example. However, it was
a technology demonstration and was never intended for use beyond that. It was
given a specific set of requirements to demonstrate, and it was programmed to do
so. This research demonstrated that in order to obtain a safety of flight clearance for
autonomous functionality the vehicle must prove that it can perform similar actions
to those of a qualified pilot under off nominal, or mission representative conditions.
4.4.1 Insufficient SA that May have Led to a Mishap in an Au-
tonomous Vehicle (Outside of the CAL/LZ Mission)
During the period of performance of the technology demonstration contract
AFS demonstrated that the modified UH-1 was capable of accomplishing the as-
signed mission autonomously. The vehicle was able to use its onboard sensors to
build its SA and complete the resupply mission in both controlled and mission rep-
resentative conditions [144]. However, on at least two occasions the safety pilot had
to disengage the autonomous functionality due to SOF concerns when the systems
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SA did not match reality.
On 12 December 2017, the AFS UH-1 was on its final preparatory flight (flight
59F097) before the final demonstration flight for senior Marine and ONR officials.
The demonstration flight was to be a culmination of the ONR contracted flight
test period for the AACUS contract. During one of the flight segments the sys-
tem was operating autonomously. It lifted off from a simulated FOB in Quantico,
VA and proceeded to navigate to its next destination. However, the systems SA
did not match reality as it failed to properly evaluate the height of treas within
its path. When it tracked away from the FOB, the safety pilot had to disengaged
the autonomous functionality as the vehicle was tracking close to some trees (Pilot
Quality Rating (PQR) 5 from Figure 5.3). Once past, he reengaged the autonomous
functionality [132]. While the inadequate SA only lasted for a few seconds, it could
have led to a mishap. Figure 4.12 consists of two images taken at roughly the same
point in the scripted demonstration. The left image shows the vehicle approach-
ing the top of the trees just prior to the safety pilot disengaging the autonomous
functionality to ensure the vehicle would avoid the trees on 12 December 2017. The
right image was taken during the actual demonstration on 13 December 2017 (flight
59F098), and shows the vehicle flying high enough to avoid the trees as the vehicle
SA closely matched reality.
Following the final demonstration flight on 13 December 2017, the system was
approved for follow on T&E in a mission representative environment. Prior to the
follow on T&E, ONR and AFS performed a number of technology maturation flights.
On 23 January 2018 (flight 59F101) the system again demonstrated an issue with
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Figure 4.12: Two Images from the System Under Test Taken at Roughly the Same
Point During the Scripted Demonstration. The Left Image was Taken on 12 Decem-
ber 2017 and Depicts the System Approaching a Position Where the Safety Pilot
Felt May have Been Unsafe (Close to the Trees). The Right Image was Taken on
13 December 2017 at Roughly the Same Place. However, in this Case the SA of the
System Under Test Matched Reality as it had Climbed to a Safe Height to Avoid
the Trees [132].
SA. During its initial takeoff the planned route would have transited through some
trees (PQR 6 from Figure 5.3), depicted in Figure 4.13. The safety pilot disengaged
the autonomous functionality, flew past the trees, and reengaged the autonomous
functionality [132]. Shortly thereafter the system operated autonomously for over
half an hour completing the resupply mission under controlled conditions [132].
Again, the inadequate vehicle SA only lasted for a few seconds, but it would have
led to a mishap if the safety pilot had not intervened.
Post flight analysis of the 12 December 2017 and 23 January 2018 flights dis-
covered a issue within the system architecture. The issue was discovered empirically
during testing. While laser returns came back very quickly and identified a phys-
ical presence to the raw sensor processing software, that information then had to
populate the height map internal to TALOS. Once added to the height map the
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Figure 4.13: Image From the System Under Test During the 23 January 2018 Flight.
At the Depicted Point During the Flight the Systems SA of the Environment Didn’t
Match Reality. The Autonomous Functionality would have Flown Through Some
Trees and Caused a Mishap if the Safety Pilot Didn’t Take Control of the Vehicle
[132].
trajectory planner needed to build a route to bypass the obstacle. This issue was
particularly evident if the aircraft made a turn towards a departure heading once in
a hover, because the obstacle would be initially outside of the LiDAR’s field of view.
The time to sense an obstacle, populate the height map, and plan a clear route
can be measured in seconds (a fully qualified helicopter pilot could complete the
task in a fraction of that time). As the system was preparing to operate in mission
representative environments, the decision was made to simply add an extra time
delay to allow processing to happen on takeoff [132]. The test team felt the extra
delay would help during the upcoming T&E where they anticipated degraded visual
environments under mission representative conditions [144]. AFS determined that
the deficiency was most likely due to the system being designed for experimentation
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at the unit/module level rather than for overall system level performance [132].
Once the delay was added to the system, the issue was not seen again. However
the fact that by simply adding a delay (giving the system more time to process it
sensor data) to the system seemed to correct the inadequate vehicle SA implies that
there may be a relationship between sensor degradation and SA in an autonomous
system.
4.5 Chapter Summary
The existing paradigm for test and evaluation is to define what a system will
do given a set of input parameters. Prior to a safety of flight clearance, certifica-
tion officials currently need to understand how a system will react when used by
a fully qualified pilot/operator when completing a mission (such as the CAL/LZ
mission). By removing the pilot/operator (for autonomous systems) we believe that
we can obtain a flight clearance for autonomy based on what the system will not do.
To define a box where a system can be allowed to exhibit autonomous behavior, we
used the SWEEP checks performed by the USN and USMC helicopter communities.
We were able to evaluate flight test data of an autonomous system (the AFS AA-
CUS/TALOS UH-1) completing the CAL/LZ mission under controlled conditions
(DT) and under mission representative conditions (OT).
Between the AACUS/TALOS final demo (to include the rehearsals) and the
ONR Technology Maturation assessment the decision engine under test demon-
strated 33 autonomous landings, and several wave off approaches based on a fouled
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LZ. These flights could be considered DT events as the conditions were controlled
to demonstrate the objective requirements of the contract for which the system was
acquired under. During these test flights the decision engine was able to define a
safe landing spot that met the constraints of the contract. Therefore, the decision
engine would have met the objective requirements of DT. However, several deficien-
cies were noted with the system. The most troubling was that once the system
picked a landing point that satisfied its programming, it did not continue looking
for a more advantageous spot. Yet, based on the performance of the system under
controlled conditions, it would have passed DT and been recommended for OT (to
be evaluated under mission representative conditions).
During the ITX evaluation period, the AACUS/TALOS system was used in a
mission representative environment (OT), Twentynine Palms Marine Base. During
15 flights, the system under test executed 46 autonomous landings in environments
similar to those that would be needed to execute the CAL/LZ mission to resupply
Marines in the field. However, the OT evaluation is a subjective test. The purpose
of which is to determine, to the subjective opinion of the OT organization, if a
standard fleet user can use the system under test to complete the desired mission
under mission representative conditions. While the vehicle demonstrated the ability
to stay within the clearly defined envelope, several decisions made by the vehicle
were in contrast to what a qualified HAC would have made. None of the decisions
would have resulted in an unsafe condition. However, the results of an OT report
on the data available would have found the system under test unsuitable for the
autonomous CAL/LZ mission as programmed.
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This chapter used legacy test procedures for the evaluation of the system under
test. While the procedures provided data on the system and may be a valid method
to test an autonomous system, they did not provide a method to correct issues early
in the development cycle. Once a system reaches flight test it is extremely difficult
to fix the system and still meet deadlines. If an autonomous system were to be
certified safe for flight, the most important step will be to ensure the requirements
are specified in such a manner that system developers can program in the ability to
cope with off nominal conditions.
Academia and industry have demonstrated that they can develop a system that
can exhibit autonomous behavior while completing a mission normally reserved for
qualified pilots under controlled conditions, AACUS/TALOS is one such system.
However, when confronted with conditions that were not programmed into the de-
cision engine the actions of the autonomous system did not match that of a fully
qualified pilot. By using the SWEEP checklist as a guarantee of what the system will
not do, flight clearance officials can grant a safety of flight clearance for autonomy.
However, prior to authorizing that clearance the software package to complete tasks
that require a pilot’s judgment the system needs to demonstrate it can accomplish
the mission under controlled and off nominal conditions.
The existing data on the AACUS/TALOS system is promising for the future of
unmanned vehicles supporting the CAL/LZ mission. However, the narrowly defined
focus of the current AACUS/TALOS architecture is inadequate for the mission need.
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Chapter 5: Developing a Objective Measure for a Subjective End
Pilots use Situational Awareness (SA) to make appropriate aeronautical deci-
sions. Autonomous vehicles will not have a human pilot, or operator, in the loop
when off nominal conditions present themselves. They will rely on sensors to build
SA on their environment to make sound aeronautical decisions. As their sensors
degrade, we hypothesize a point exists where the SA those decisions are based off
will be inadequate for sound aeronautical decisions. We show that this point can
be identified through Modeling and Simulation (M&S) of a simple sensor network
to complete a task currently reserved for qualified pilots. This chapter highlights
the process of determining an objective measure for this subjective end, and relates
it to a possible Safety of Flight (SOF) certification for an autonomous system to
perform tasks currently reserved for qualified pilots. This chapter and focuses on
the fifth step of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4.
Pilots are trained to use their senses and experience to build their SA while
flying to enable them to safely accomplish their mission and make sound aeronautical
decisions. The future of aviation is unmanned and ultimately autonomous. However,
by eliminating the human pilot (or operator in the case of unmanned aircraft) we
will be eliminating the SA that is currently required to safely accomplish a mission
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when off nominal condition present themselves. This chapter defines an objective
relationship between an autonomous vehicle SA while its sensors degrade and the
ability to accomplish a task currently reserved for qualified pilots.
The first step in evaluating if the choices an autonomous system makes match
that of a qualified pilot is to determine if the SA of the vehicle matches reality for
the environment it is operating in. As both military and civilian pilots use SA, we
elected to study SA of a autonomous vehicle completing a task currently reserved
for qualified military pilots. In prior chapters we examined obtaining a SOF certifi-
cation for a system that displays autonomous behavior. The underlying focus of our
research relates to certifying an autonomous naval system to perform tasks currently
reserved for qualified pilots. However, during our research we determined that in
order for autonomous behavior to be certified it would need to demonstrate that
it can make decisions similar to fully qualified pilots [76, 144], to include situations
where a fully qualified pilot makes decisions based on their SA when encountering off
nominal or unexpected conditions (such as degradation in the quality of information
available to them).
Typically aircraft are designed to objective measures (i.e., maintain a desired
speed at a desired altitude). During the certification process the system under test
will be required to demonstrate it can complete a subjective end (i.e., integrate with
currently fielded systems). It is extremely difficult for designers to build an aero-
nautical system to accomplish a subjective end without an objective measure. This
research focuses on developing a relationship between sensor performance degra-
dation and vehicle SA in an attempt to establish an objective measure that can
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be provided to designers and certification officials for autonomous air vehicles to
complete a task currently reserved for qualified pilots. This will enable certifica-
tion officials to trust that an autonomous system has a clear understanding of the
environment it is currently operating in, and will make appropriate aeronautical
decisions (based off its programming) similar to those of a fully qualified pilot. We
develop an objective relationship between sensor degradation/error and SA withing
a M&S environment. First, we develop a scenario where an autonomous vehicle is
reliant on its sensors to build its SA. The scenario was build in such a way that the
only factors effecting the SA of the vehicle were the accuracy of its sensors. We then
degraded those sensors to a point where the decisions it makes are no longer sound
aeronautical decisions. And as a result of this work, two inequalities (objective mea-
sure) are defined for when an autonomous vehicle has sufficient SA (subjective end)
to make decisions currently reserved for qualified pilots.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.1 we provide an overview
of SA and discuss the issue of defining an objective measure for a subjective end
to aircraft designers. We discuss the evolution of Handling Qualities (HQ) specifi-
cations to include the use of the Cooper-Harper Rating (CHR) scale which enables
an objective value for a subjective task. We also demonstrate how the scale was
modified for the evaluation of a highly automated task and later used during the
Test and Evaluation (T&E) of an autonomous aeronautical system. In Section 5.2
we begin our use of DOE and a M&S environment to develop a quantitative rela-
tionship between sensor degradation and autonomous vehicle SA. In Section 5.3 we
develop an objective measure for an autonomous vehicle’s SA to accomplish a task,
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currently reserved for a qualified pilot, as it’s sensors degrade. In Section 5.4, we
summarize our findings as they relate to certifying autonomous systems to complete
tasks currently reserved for qualified pilots.
The contributions of this chapter include:
 The development of an objective measure for autonomous vehicle SA that
accounts for sensor degradation.
 The development of a scenario, within a Department of Defense (DoD) rec-
ognized M&S environment, that specifically evaluates the effects of sensor
degradation on error distance of a fused track of a threat aircraft.
 The use of Design of Experiments (DOE) to determine the effects of sensor
degradation and produce predictive equations for the error distance of the
fused track.
 Use of Subject Matter Expert (SME) opinion to define the point at which
(within this scenario) the fused error distance is inadequate to make a decision
currently reserved for qualified pilots.
5.1 Overview of SA and Developing a Objective Measure for a Sub-
jective End
This chapter focuses on developing a relationship between sensor performance
degradation and vehicle SA (considered largely a subjective opinion). This is in an
attempt to establish an objective measure that can be provided to designers, and
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certification officials, of an autonomous vehicle to complete a task currently reserved
for qualified pilots. Some related work is mentioned in Section 5.1.1. Translating
a subjective end into objective measures is not a new concept. Section 5.1.2 de-
tails how test pilots translate their opinion of the flying qualities of an aircraft into
measures engineers can use to help improve the performance of the control laws
via established rating scales. Section 5.1.3 details how the rating scales outlined in
Section 5.1.2 have been adapted to allow a test pilot to describe the behavior of an
aircraft during a highly automated task (landing a high performance jet aboard an
aircraft carrier “hands free”), and later for the evaluation of an autonomy demon-
stration vehicle. Similar to the use of ratings scales detailed in Section 5.1, designers
and certification officials will find an objective measures for subjective ends invalu-
able for evaluating the SA on an autonomous system.
5.1.1 Current Methods for Flight Certification and SA
This chapter focuses on the SA of an autonomous system as its sensors degrade.
This will help build trust in autonomy, as without trust certification officials will
be reluctant to grant a SOF certification for a system to operate without a pilot,
or controller, in the loop [95]. Currently a formalized/approved process does not
exist for naval aircraft/systems that exhibit autonomous behavior (the system is
able to respond to situations that were not explicitly pre-programmed) as there has
never been a requirement for one to be developed. Several possible approaches have
been proposed for autonomous control (dealing with type of controller applied to
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the vehicle [110], updated the path planning based on sensor input [92], dynamically
re-plan the flight path via adaptive controllers [43]) but none dealt with sub-optimal
sensor performance or were vetted through naval flight clearance authorities.
An understanding of SA as it relates to aviation is critical to understanding
how it will relate to the certification of autonomy. One of the most commonly
accepted definitions for SA is “the perception of elements in the environment within
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection
of their status in the near future [77]”. During flight school, student naval aviators
(pilots) are taught that SA in aviation is being able to accurately diagnose what is
happening around them and predict what will happen in the immediate future, thus
enabling them to perform the assigned mission safely. Students with high SA are
able to “stay ahead of the aircraft”, while students with low SA tend to seem to be
“holding onto the stab” during flight. From their first flight, aviators learn to use
every available resource to develop their SA (e.g., radio calls, aircraft instruments,
visually scanning outside of the aircraft, onboard radar, Electro-Optical/InfraRed
(EO/IR) sensors and seat of the pants feelings). Prior to obtaining full qualification,
a naval aviator will have proven to their Commanding Officer (CO) that they can
develop their SA to an appropriate level that they can safely complete their assigned
mission during off nominal conditions [10]. The measurement of SA has proven to be
an intangible, and largely subjective. Pilots quickly learn that the only way to know
exactly the level of their current SA is when they realize that they have none. When
a pilot’s SA is high (i.e., they have an accurate understanding of the environment
they are operating in) they can make sound aeronautical decisions. However, when
180
a pilot’s SA is low (which they may or may not know at the time) their aeronautical
decisions may not be sound.
Autonomous vehicles will use their sensors to build SA of their environment.
When sensors are operating at 100% the SA they provide the vehicle should be
adequate to make sound aeronautical decisions. However, at some point of sensor
degradation the SA provided will no longer match reality. The advent of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) has sparked a increase in research within the academic and
flight test communities. When programming UAVs with automation (such as what
actions to take in the case of lost link), or autonomous functionality (allowing the
vehicle to make decisions based off the conditions they sense), it is vital for the
system to be able to safety complete the assigned mission. Sensors are typically
installed to inform the operator, or system, of the conditions the vehicle is operating
in. These systems could be as simple as a camera, or as complicated as a fusion of
multiple sensors. Increases in processing power has enabled these vehicles to perform
simple missions (e.g. collision avoidance and visual navigation), under fairly static
conditions, providing they have access to sensor inputs. However, when a human
pilot realizes that there may be an issue with their SA they have the training and
experience to rely on various inputs to diagnose their current interpretation of reality.
Unless a system is programmed to react to sensor degradation, certification officials
will hesitate to allow the system to make decisions based on the sensor input without
a human in the loop to ultimately shoulder the responsibility for the air vehicle.
For a pilot to make sound decisions, they need to have a clear understanding
of the situation/environment they are operating in [145]. Teaching a prospective
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pilot how to develop their SA and knowing when to question their perception are
critical portions of flight training [10,146]. Researchers have spent decades develop-
ing models and methods for evaluating a pilots SA (highly subjective) during flight
and translating it into an objective measure [145–149]. Two methods that have
provided ample data for research involve freezing a simulation and asking questions
relating to the pilots SA or asking questions of a pilot post mission [146, 148]. Yet,
neither of these methods allow a pilot to rate their SA in real time to determine
when it is lacking. One school of thought was to offer pilots more information to
help build their mental picture. Modern aircraft can present a massive volume of
data to the pilot. However, this overload of information has a tendency to detract
from the pilot’s SA and work has been done to optimize how the information is
presented [150,151].
As UAVs have become commonplace in aviation, the issue of sufficient operator
SA has become a hot button issue. How can an operator maintain appropriate SA
to their air vehicle when they are not actually in the vehicle (as a pilot is for
manned aviation)? Several papers have been published regarding increasing the
SA of a detached operator as to the environment the vehicle/system is currently
operating in (to include the status of the vehicles subsystems) on earth [152–159]
and space [160, 161]. As vehicle based computing power has increased research has
been accomplished to demonstrate that a vehicle can navigate via onboard sensors
(without direct operator direction) [162–167]. It has been proposed that as the level
of autonomy increases, the required level of SA for the human operator will decrease
and the required SA of the air vehicle will increase [168,169]. However, the current
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body of work lacks the ability to demonstrate to SOF clearance officials the ability
of an autonomous system to maintain SA while completing its assigned mission as
sensor performance degrades.
5.1.2 Development of a Objective Measure (Cooper-Harper Scale)
for a Subjective End (Handling Qualities)
This subsection is used to illustrate how an objective measure (the dynamics
of a aircraft, e.g. short period) can be used to accomplish a subjective end (CHR of
the aircraft handling qualities). Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, despite meteoric
advances in structures, aerodynamics, and propulsion, aircraft HQ languished under
the conception that it would not be feasible to create objective design standards
(satisfying black and white requirements) to achieve a subjective ends (satisfying
pilots needs) [142]. Aircraft designers did not have a clear direction for what equated
to positive HQ. By the 1940s the first HQ specifications were established, enabling
aircraft designers to build aircraft that would have satisfactory HQ for pilots. The
specification dealt with both longitudinal and lateral characteristics for the full range
of aircraft configurations. One example of an objective measure that led to favorable
HQ (subjective end) was placing a quantitative upper limit on the absolute value of
the stick-force gradient [142]. For further details on the establishment of objective
measures for subjective ends for the first HQ specifications we refer the reader to
Chapter 3 of reference [142].
Determining an aircraft’s HQ is a daunting task, as different pilots may have
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different opinions on this subjective judgment. During Test Pilot School (TPS),
future test pilots are trained on classical test techniques to evaluate aircraft. One of
the corner stones of this training is the Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating
Scale (Figure 5.1) as it forces a pilot to make a series of relatively unambiguous
decisions to arrive at a rating of the current HQ of the aircraft [170]. CHR is the
basis of the US flying qualities Military Specification (Mil-F-8785B, later superseded
by 8785C [171]), and divides the pilots opinion of the aircraft HQ into four levels.
Level 1 is satisfactory. Level 2 is not satisfactory HQ, but performance is satisfactory.
Level 3 includes maximum workload to get adequate performance (and deals with
aircraft controllability). Level 4 is uncontrollable [170–172]. CHR 1-3 equate to
Level 1 HQ. CHR 4-6 equate to Level 2 HQ. CHR 7-9 equate to Level 3 HQ. CHR
10 equates to Level 4 HQ. Figure 5.2 is from Mil-F-8785C and illustrates how an
objective measure (aircraft characteristics, short period dynamics) can be related
to a subjective measure (flying quality level). For further details on aircraft HQ we
refer the reader to Reference [172].
5.1.3 Cooper-Harper Adjusted for Confidence in Automation
CHR allows the flight test community a method of achieving repeatable results
for HQ evaluations. The scale was later used as the blueprint for a rating scale that
measures a test pilots confidence of a vehicle accomplishing a highly automated task,
landing high performance jet aircraft on the pitching deck of an aircraft carrier with-
out pilot input [2]. The Precision Approach and Landing System (PALS) installed
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Figure 5.1: Cooper-Harper Rating Scale (Card Used by Handling Qualities Engi-
neers and Test Pilots) [170,172]
on United States Navy (USN) aircraft carriers allow a pilot to “couple” with the
ship and land during adverse conditions (e.g., extreme weather, or when the pilot is
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Figure 5.2: Relating Short Period Aircraft Dynamics to Aircraft Handling Qualities
Levels During Nonterminal Flight Phases that are Normally Accomplished Using
Gradual Maneuvers and Without Precision Tracking, From Mil-F-8785C [171]
unable to perform an arrested landing on their own). Figure 5.3 is the PALS/Pilot
Quality Rating (PQR) used during PALS certification testing. PQR allows a test
pilot to put their subjective opinion (confidence in the system at accomplishing a
task) into a objective measure (PQR rating). For certification, a PALS system must
return a PQR of 3 or less. The PQR scale gives PALS engineers an objective mea-
sure (PQR rating) for a subjective end (pilot confidence in the system) to use as
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they adjust the parameters within the system during certification testing [86].
Figure 5.3: PALS/Pilot Quality Rating Scale, Allows Test Pilots to Objectively
Gage their Confidence in the System Under Test. Developed for PALS Testing [2,86],
and it has Been used for Evaluation of Autonomous Systems [136]
PQR was later adopted by a flight test team evaluating an autonomous con-
troller completing the United States Marine Corps (USMC) resupply mission in a
optional piloted UH-1 helicopter during an autonomy demonstration program. The
vehicle was able to use its onboard sensors (Global Positioning System (GPS), Light
Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), EO/IR cameras) to build its SA and complete
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the resupply mission in both controlled and mission representative conditions [144].
However, on at least two occasions the safety pilot had to disengage the autonomous
functionality due to SOF concerns when the systems SA did not match reality (de-
tailed discussion can be found in Section 4.4.1). The first instance required the
safety pilot to take control when the vehicle was tracking dangerously close to trees
(PQR-5). The second instance was on a later test flight and required the safety pilot
to take control to avoid flying into trees (PQR-6). As these events occurred late in
demonstration program, the test team decided to add a delay to the system before it
started moving (to allow the onboard processors to spend extra time building is SA
of the environment). Once the delay was added to the system, further issues with
path planning were not seen [132]. However the fact that by simply adding a delay
(giving the system more time to process it sensor data) to the system seemed to
correct the inadequate vehicle SA implies that there may be a relationship between
sensor degradation and SA in an autonomous system.
5.2 Problem Formation
In Section 5.1.3 we identified a possible relationship between sensor perfor-
mance and vehicle SA in an autonomous system. In Section 5.2 we develop a rela-
tionship between sensor degradation and vehicle SA in a M&S environment through
the use of DOE [173]. DOE has been used in the T&E of naval systems in the past.
In a 2014 paper, McCarley and Jorris used DOE during the investigation of an F/A-
18 E/F strafing anomaly. In their work, DOE was used as a means of gaining the
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most statistical information from the fewest number of test points and ultimately
generated a predictive equation which explained the strafing anomaly [174].
The United States Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS) teaches DOE as part of
its short course, and this section is structured to follow the steps of the process [175].
In section 5.2.1 we detail the M&S environment, give a statement of the problem,
and detail the scenario we will be modeling. In section 5.2.2 we describe the choice
of experimental factors (variables) and detail how we measure them. In section 5.2.3
we discuss the measures of performance (MOP) for our experiment. Section III.D
will detail how we plan to express the fused error distance as a function of the sensor
errors.
5.2.1 M&S Environment and Statement of the Problem
As a truly autonomous system was not available for our evaluation, we elected
to use a M&S environment for our research. Within the M&S environment we
developed a scenario where an autonomous vehicle is reliant on its sensors to build
its SA. The scenario was developed in such a way that the only factors effecting the
SA of the vehicle are the accuracy of its sensors. Within the scenario the vehicle
was required to make a decision, currently reserved for qualified pilots, based only
on its degraded sensors.
For this experiment we used the Advanced Framework for Simulation, Inte-
gration and Modeling (AFSIM) environment. AFSIM is an engagement and mission
level simulation environment written in C++ originally developed by Boeing and
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now managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). AFSIM was developed
to address analysis capability shortcomings in existing legacy simulation environ-
ments as well as to provide an environment built with more modern programming
paradigms in mind. AFSIM can simulate missions from subsurface to space and
across multiple levels of model fidelity [176]. As AFSIM has been used by both the
USN and United States Air Force (USAF) to inform acquisition decisions and model
aircraft system behavior. We elected to use it to generate evidence that may lead
to certification of autonomous systems to make a decision that is currently reserved
for qualified pilot [177].
We proposed the following scenario for analyzing the effects of sensor error
on the SA of an autonomous vehicle (and we programmed it into a M&S environ-
ment): An autonomous UAV (we refer to it as the Bucket Fighter) is operating over
hostile territory. It is in a stationary orbit to provide Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) information to ground forces. The information it provides is
essential for the overall mission to be accomplish. However, the Bucket Fighter can
be considered a High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) that is unable to defend itself.
As the platform is considered HVAA there is a set range it is required to maintain
from threat aircraft. A fully qualified pilot is expected to take in the information
available to them (both from communications with other assets and onboard sys-
tems) to determine when an aircraft reaches one of these pre-briefed limits. When
a threat aircraft reaches a defined range, the Bucket Fighter will be required to
RETROGRADE (withdraw from station in response to a threat, continue mission
as able). Once the threat is no longer a factor, the vehicle can RESET to its orbit.
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During a RETROGRADE, the ISR platform can continue to complete its assigned
mission. When a threat aircraft reaches a defined range, the Bucket Fighter will be
required to SCRAM (egress for defensive or survival reasons). If the UAV were to
execute a SCRAM, it will no longer be able to provide support for ground forces,
as a RESET is not authorized after a SCRAM. A description of these terms, and
others used by the DoD, can be found in Reference [178].
For the sake of this hypothetical scenario we set the RETROGRADE and
SCRAM ranges to 20 and 10 nautical miles (nm). An autonomous UAV’s ability
to accurately identity when a threat aircraft has reached its RETROGRADE and
SCRAM range as critical for it to perform its mission. If it were to RETROGRADE
or SCRAM to early it may lead to a unacceptable degradation to the assigned
mission (ISR support for ground forces). If it were to RETROGRADE or SCRAM
to late it may lead to a situation where a threat aircraft would engage the defenseless
HVAA.
5.2.2 Experiment Factors (Variables)
Within the M&S environment, we installed two sensors on the Bucket Fighter
(a generic InfraRed Search and Track (IRST) and a generic air-to-air radar). Both
sensors were given an unlimited field of view and had the ability to track the threat
aircraft for the duration of the simulation. In the M&S environment, we had the
ability to add errors into each sensor in the form of a σ (Standard Deviation (SD))
value. These errors can be applied to the azimuth, elevation and range of the track.
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Figure 5.4 is a pictorial of these the parameters. It is assumed that the only factors
(environmental, mechanical or other) that can cause degradation to the individual
sensor can be illustrated by the errors detailed above.
Figure 5.4: Graphical Depiction of the the Three Possible Error Parameters of the
Sensors Installed on the Bucket Fighter [179].
During the scenario, the M&S package generates a random number to de-
termine where on the normal distribution to pull the error value for each sensor.
This error shifts each time the individual sensor performs a sweep. The errors are
constant at each point in the simulation of the same scenario to enable repeatable
results.
The Bucket Fighter had the ability to fuse the tracks provided by the IRST
and radar. This fused track is based not only on the raw sensor data, but it uses
velocity measurements and any past detection to build a predictable model for the
track. This enables the autonomous UAV to more accurately track the target the
longer it has been tracked by the sensors. Figure 5.5 contains two screen captures
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from a test run.
Figure 5.5: Two Screen Captures From the M&S Environment Depicting the Threat
Location Based on the IRST (Red), Radar (Green), and Fused Track (White Trian-
gle). The Threat Aircraft is Approximately 20 nm from the Bucket Fighter (UAV
in the East). The Image to the Left is a View From the South and Slightly Elevated
from the Engagement. The Image on the Right Depicts the Engagement From an
Elevated Position in the East. The Error σ Values Were: IRST Azimuth: 9 Degrees,
IRST Elevation: 3 Degrees, IRST Range: 9 nm, Radar Azimuth: 3 Degrees, Radar
Elevation: 3 Degrees, Radar Range: 9 nm [180]
For DOE we chose the factors to be azimuth error, elevation error, and range
error as resident in the radar and the IRST. This will give a total of six factors in
the experiment with one level each (six variables). For each of the six factors, we
use the following null hypothesis: No statistical significance can be found between
the “error value” (IRST/radar azimuth, elevation, range) and the error distance
(distance between the fused track and the threat aircraft).
5.2.3 Measures of Performance (MOP)
We are attempting to measure the SA provided to an autonomous system
during periods of degraded sensor output. Therefore, we elected to use error distance
as the Measures of Performance (MOP) in this research. In particular we measured
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the error distance at 20 and 10 nm (correspond to our hypothetical RETROGRADE
and SCRAM range). Based on the errors inherent in the sensors (the six error σs),
we hypothesized we could provide a predictive equation that would give the error
distance at 20 and 10 nm. We use SME opinion (four senior naval officers who
have extensive experience in dealing with RETROGRADE and SCRAM situations)
to determine what error distance corresponds to inadequate SA to make a decision
normally reserved for qualified pilots.
5.2.4 Fused Error Distance as a Function of Sensor Error
With the assistance of researchers from AFRL (Dayton, Ohio) and analysts
from the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) (Patuxent River,
Maryland) we adjusted a demonstration simulation from the standard unclassified
AFSIM training software to meet the needs of our research. All output data from
AFSIM used in this research was approved for public release [180].
We started with the Bucket Fighter providing ISR information to notional
ground forces from a static location. We then elected to place a threat aircraft
60 nm from the Bucket Fighter. Both platforms were placed at 20,000 ft MSL
and the threat aircraft tracked directly at the Bucket Fighter at 300 kts. For this
hypothetical scenario, it can be assumed that the Bucket Fighter’s only method of
building an air picture (its SA of what is around it while airborne) is through its
onboard sensors (a generic IRST and generic radar). Figure 5.6 is a screen capture
depicting a top view from the start of the scenario with the Bucket Fighter in the
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East, and the threat aircraft tracking inbound from the West. We studied the
effect of sensor error on error distance (distance between the fused track and the
actual location of the threat aircraft) at 20 and 10 nm in an attempt to quantify
the SA level of the Bucket Fighter at critical decision points (RETROGRADE and
SCRAM range) to determine at which point the SA provided to the Bucket Fighter
was sufficient to make a sound aeronautical decision.
Figure 5.6: Screen Capture From the Start of a Test Run. The Threat Aircraft is
in the West and the Bucket Fighter (UAV) is in the East [180].
Equation 5.1 is the multiple regression model that explains the relationship
between Y (error distance/the independent variable) and multipleXX values (the six
error σs/dependent variables): X1 = IRST azimuth σ value, X2 = IRST elevation σ
value, X3 = IRST range σ value, X4 = radar azimuth σ value, X5 = radar elevation
σ value, X6 = radar range σ value. The corresponding βx values are the relative
weights of each variable and β0 is the Y intercept. The ε term represents the error
that exists within the model that cannot be accounted for and will drop out when
we develop our predictive equation (Ŷ ). Table 5.1 summarizes the various terms in
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Term Definition Term Definition
Y Error Delta/Independent Variable β0 Y Intercept
X1 IRST Azimuth σ Value β1 Weight of the X1 Variable
X2 IRST Elevation σ Value β2 Weight of the X2 Variable
X3 IRST Range σ Value β3 Weight of the X3 Variable
X4 Radar Azimuth σ Value β4 Weight of the X4 Variable
X5 Radar Elevation σ Value β5 Weight of the X5 Variable
X6 Radar Range σ Value β6 Weight of the X6 Variable
ε Error Within the Model
Table 5.1: Summary of the Terms in the Multiple Regression Model (Equation 5.1).
Equation 5.1.
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + ε (5.1)
5.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
In Section 5.2 we developed a multiple regression model where we express the
fused error distance as a function of the various sensor errors in the sensor network.
In Section 5.3.1 we describe how we gathered data at various error σ levels to char-
acterize the system. In Section 5.3.2 we then performed multiple variable regression
analysis on the data gathered in the M&S environment to populate the variables in
Equation 5.1 at 20 and 10 nm. In Section 5.2.3 we develop inequalities that define
sufficient SA for an autonomous vehicle to make a decision that is currently reserved
for qualified pilots.
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5.3.1 Conduct of the Experiment
In an attempt to limit the scope of possible errors, and provide useful data to
analyze, we limited the error σ to between three and seven (nm or degrees). We
programmed in the ability to introduce three error variables into each of the sensors
(azimuth (degrees), elevation (degrees) and range (nm)) in the form of defining one
σ for each variable. For this research we varied the six variables between three, five
and seven at the start of each test run and recorded the the observed error distance
(distance between the fused track generated by the autonomous UAV and actual
location of the threat aircraft) within the M&S environment. By manually updating
the six σ values with all 729 combinations between each run, we hoped to provide
enough data to generate predictive equations through multiple variable regression
analysis. Equations 5.2 and 5.3 are the predictive equations (at 20 and 10 nm) we
plan on population with the results of our regression analysis. Table 5.2 summarizes
the various terms in Equations 5.2 and 5.3. The completed equations will be used
to provide a quantitative evaluation of an autonomous systems SA to complete a
task currently reserved for qualified pilots. Table 5.3 is a 10 run subset of the 729
combinations we plan on evaluating.
Ŷ20 = b0−20 + b1−20X1 + b2−20X2 + b3−20X3 + b4−20X4 + b5−20X5 + b6−20X6 (5.2)
Ŷ10 = b0−10 + b1−10X1 + b2−10X2 + b3−10X3 + b4−10X4 + b5−10X5 + b6−10X6 (5.3)
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Term Definition Term Definition
Ŷ20 Predictive Error at 20 nm b0−x Y Int. for the x Equ. (20/10)
Ŷ20 Predictive Error at 10 nm b1−x Weight of X1, Equ. x (20/10)
X1 IRST Azimuth σ Value b2−x Weight of X2, Equ. x (20/10)
X2 IRST Elevation σ Value b3−x Weight of X3, Equ. x (20/10)
X3 IRST Range σ Value b4−x Weight of X4, Equ. x (20/10)
X4 Radar Azimuth σ Value b5−x Weight of X5, Equ. x (20/10)
X5 Radar Elevation σ Value b6−x Weight of X6, Equ. x (20/10)
X6 Radar Range σ Value
Table 5.2: Summary of the Terms in the Predictive Equations (Equation 5.2 and
5.3).
Run # Y20 Y10 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6
50 3 3 5 7 5 5
141 3 5 7 3 5 7
248 5 3 3 3 5 5
339 5 5 3 5 5 7
397 5 5 7 7 3 3
469 5 7 7 5 3 3
554 7 3 7 5 5 5
594 7 5 3 7 7 7
656 7 7 3 3 7 5
723 7 7 7 7 3 7
Table 5.3: 10 of the 729 Data Points. Y20 is the 20 nm Error Distance in Meters.
Y10 is the 10 nm Error Distance in Meters. X1 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST
Azimuth in Degrees. X2 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST Elevation in Degrees.
X3 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST Range in nm. X4 is the Value of One
σ Error in Radar Azimuth in Degrees. X5 is the Value of One σ Error in Radar
Elevation in Degrees. X6 is the Value of One σ Error in Radar Range in nm.
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Run # Y20 Y10 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6
50 467.9 342.9 3 3 5 7 5 5
141 325.8 181.5 3 5 7 3 5 7
248 331.2 243.3 5 3 3 3 5 5
339 496.7 381.7 5 5 3 5 5 7
397 617.9 481.6 5 5 7 7 3 3
469 434.0 320.5 5 7 7 5 3 3
554 567.3 412.1 7 3 7 5 5 5
594 818.1 600.9 7 5 3 7 7 7
656 932.4 765.5 7 7 3 3 7 5
723 813.4 615 7 7 7 7 3 7
Table 5.4: 10 of the 729 Data Points. Y20 is the 20 nm Error Distance in Meters.
Y10 is the 10 nm Error Distance in Meters. X1 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST
Azimuth in Degrees. X2 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST Elevation in Degrees.
X3 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST Range in nm. X4 is the Value of One
σ Error in Radar Azimuth in Degrees. X5 is the Value of One σ Error in Radar
Elevation in Degrees. X6 is the Value of One σ Error in Radar Range in nm.
5.3.2 Analysis of the Data
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, we planned on evaluating 729 different combi-
nations of the six variables (error σs). Table 5.4 is a subset of 10 (the same 10 as
Table 5.3) of the runs with the observed error distance (measured in meters) at 20
and 10 nm. All 729 simulations can be found in Table A.2.
We then used multiple variable regression analysis resident in Microsoft Ex-
cel to preform regression analysis on the 729 data points to determine the effects
each independent variable (the six σ values) had on the two dependent variables
(error distance at 20 and 10 nm). The 20 nm data adjusted R-Squared Value (indi-
cates the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable that the independent
variables explain collectively) was 0.822, and the 10 nm adjusted R-Squared Value
was 0.818. R-Squared describes levels of predictive accuracy with 0.75, 0.50, 0.25,
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20 Mile Regression Data 10 Mile Regression Data
Ŷ20 b Term Coefficient P-Value Ŷ10 b Term Coefficient P-Value
b0−20 -528.337 4.02E-80 b0−10 -441.693 5.90E-73
b1−20 57.427 3.80E-123 b1−10 49.665 9.80E-119
b2−20 54.105 2.31E-113 b2−10 46.854 2.10E-109
b3−20 4.653 1.91E-02 b3−10 -4.607 9.01E-03
b4−20 54.649 5.75E-115 b4−10 47.578 8.30E-112
b5−20 61.384 9.58E-135 b5−10 53.085 4.70E-130
b6−20 -10.208 3.31E-07 b6−10 -15.638 4.84E-18
Table 5.5: 20 and 10 nm Regression Data Obtained Through Microsoft Excel Mul-
tiple Regression Analysis.
respectively, describing substantial, moderate, or weak [181]. The Analysis of Vari-
ation (ANOVA) Significance F value was 6.831E-267 for 20, and 8.674E-263 for 10
nm (both of which show an extremely high statistical significance for the respective
model). Table 5.5 details the relative coefficients for the predictive equation and the
individual P-Values. All of the P-values are well below 0.05. Therefore, we must
reject the 6 null hypotheses as there is a significant relationship between each sensor
error value and the fused track error distance.
Equations 5.4 and 5.5 are predictive equations (Ŷ ) that depict an anticipated
fused error distance (dependent variable) based on the the various error σs (inde-
pendent variables) internal to the system at 20 and 10 nm respectively (X1 = IRST
azimuth σ value, X2 = IRST elevation σ value, X3 = IRST range σ value, X4 =
radar azimuth σ value, X5 = radar elevation σ value, X6 = radar range σ value).
The corresponding bX values are the relative weights of each variable and b0 is the






Next, we used a random number generator (integers between three and seven)
to populated 25 test points for the evaluation of the predictive equations. We elected
to limit out evaluation of the regression analysis to σs between three and seven,
as that was the population of the data that we used for the regression analysis.
Table 5.6 details these test points and their error observed distances at 20 and
10 nm. Table 5.7 then compares the predicted error distance and observed error
distance from the M&S environment. We elected to use the absolute error vice
the actual error as the actual error has a tendency to reduce the average error
across multiple data points. The predicative equations generated error distances
across the 25 points with less then a 10% average error at both 20 and 10 nm
(distance between the observed range and fused track). While some of the errors
seem extreme (in excess of 20% in some cases, these are the result of σ errors
in the range of the sensor in excess of 5 nm. Under normal operations, errors
of this magnitude would be highly unlikely in a fielded system. In addition, all
of the deltas that were in excess of 10% were reflective of values that had the
predictive equation necessitating a RETROGRADE or SCRAM before the threat
aircraft actually reached the RETROGRADE or SCRAM range. Therefore, while
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the SA provided by the system would cause the Bucket Fighter to depart station
prior to its requirement, the decision would be safer than if error were in the opposite
direction (having the Bucket Fighter remain on station past RETROGRADE or
SCRAM range).
5.3.3 DOE Conclusions
Based on this output and SME (four senior naval officers who have extensive
experience in dealing with RETROGRADE and SCRAM situations) opinion, we
determined that if the system could generate a error distance less than 800 meters
at 20 nm, and 400 meters at 10 nm, then the SA provided by its sensors is accurate
enough for it to make the RETROGRADE or SCRAM decision normally reserved
for qualified pilots. As the error distance from the predictive equation is within 10%
of the observed error distance we used 727 m for 20 nm (worst case: 727+(727∗.1) =
799.6), and 363 for 10 nm (worst case: 363 + (363 ∗ .1) = 399.3). Equations 5.4 and
5.5 where then translated to be inequalities, Equations 5.6 and 5.7. When Equation
5.6 is true, the SA provided by the onboard sensors is sufficient to make a sound
RETROGRADE decision at 20 nm. When Equation 5.7 is true, the SA provided
by the onboard sensors is sufficient to make a sound SCRAM decision at 10 nm. If
Equation 5.6 or 5.7 were to be false, the SA provided by the onboard sensors is not
adequate for making a sound RETROGRADE or SCRAM decision.
202
Test Run # Y20 Y10 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6
T - 1 476.5 362.9 7 5 4 3 3 4
T - 2 588.5 458.0 5 6 4 6 4 5
T - 3 537.4 411.0 5 5 4 6 5 6
T - 4 307.0 195.0 3 5 5 4 4 6
T - 5 451.1 338.6 4 5 4 6 4 5
T - 6 396.5 271.7 7 3 6 3 4 5
T - 7 517.5 384.6 3 5 5 4 7 5
T - 8 481.0 367.9 5 5 3 4 5 7
T - 9 291.6 210.8 5 3 4 3 4 3
T - 10 493.6 387.0 6 6 4 4 4 3
T - 11 394.0 291.6 6 4 4 3 4 4
T - 12 859.2 687.7 6 7 5 5 7 4
T - 13 750.7 571.3 3 7 7 5 7 5
T - 14 824.5 645.3 7 7 6 5 6 5
T - 15 628.6 463.5 7 3 6 5 6 6
T - 16 470.0 345.3 4 5 5 6 4 5
T - 17 425.8 289.8 5 3 7 6 3 5
T - 18 463.8 322.0 5 3 5 6 6 7
T - 19 742.9 586.2 4 7 7 4 7 3
T - 20 571.8 400.6 7 3 6 4 6 7
T - 21 874.1 710.4 7 6 3 7 5 7
T - 22 394.7 279.7 3 6 4 5 3 7
T - 23 540.5 418.4 7 4 5 6 3 3
T - 24 471.1 345.9 5 6 5 4 4 5
T - 25 384.8 262.7 5 5 5 3 4 6
Table 5.6: Results From 25 Test Runs of Randomly Generated σ Values. Y20 is the
20 nm Error Distance in Meters. Y10 is the 10 mn Error Distance in Meters. X1 is
the Value of One σ Error in IRST Azimuth in Degrees. X2 is the Value of One σ
Error in IRST Elevation in Degrees. X3 is the Value of One σ Error in IRST Range
in nm. X4 is the Value of One σ Error in Radar Azimuth in Degrees. X5 is the
Value of One σ Error in Radar Elevation in Degrees. X6 is the Value of One σ Error
in Radar Range in nm.
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Run # Y20 Ŷ20 Delta (m/%) Run # Y10 Ŷ10 Delta (m/%)
T - 1 476.5 460.1 16.4/3.44% T - 1 362.9 361.2 1.7/0.46%
T - 2 588.5 614.5 26.0/4.41% T - 2 458.0 488.9 30.9/6.76%
T - 3 537.4 611.5 74.1/13.80% T - 3 411.0 479.5 68.5/16.68%
T - 4 307.0 327.0 20.0/6.52% T - 4 195.0 227.4 32.4/16.60%
T - 5 451.1 502.9 51.8/11.49% T - 5 338.6 392.4 53.8/15.90%
T - 6 396.5 405.1 8.6/2.16% T - 6 271.7 295.8 24.1/8.86%
T - 7 517.5 521.4 3.9/0.75% T - 7 384.6 402.3 17.7/4.59%
T - 8 481.0 491.0 10.0/2.09% T - 8 367.9 373.4 5.5/1.48%
T - 9 291.6 308.6 17.0/5.84% T - 9 210.8 236.9 26.1/12.39%
T - 10 493.6 583.0 89.4/18.11% T - 10 387.0 474.7 87.7/22.67%
T - 11 394.0 409.9 15.9/4.05% T - 11 291.6 317.8 26.2/8.99%
T - 12 859.2 866.7 7.5/0.87% T - 12 687.7 708.2 20.5/2.98%
T - 13 750.7 686.2 64.5/8.59% T - 13 571.3 534.3 37.0/6.47%
T - 14 824.5 853.5 29.0/3.52% T - 14 645.3 684.5 39.2/6.08%
T - 15 628.6 626.9 1.7/0.27% T - 15 463.5 481.5 18.0/3.87%
T - 16 470.0 503.9 33.9/7.22% T - 16 345.3 387.8 42.5/12.31%
T - 17 425.8 393.8 32.0/7.52% T - 17 289.8 281.5 8.3/2.87%
T - 18 463.8 555.5 91.7/19.77% T - 18 322.0 418.7 96.7/30.02%
T - 19 742.9 709.4 33.5/4.51% T - 19 586.2 567.7 18.5/3.16%
T - 20 571.8 562.1 9.7/1.70% T - 20 400.6 418.2 17.6/4.40%
T - 21 874.1 823.9 50.2/5.74% T - 21 710.4 662.3 48.1/6.78%
T - 22 394.7 363.2 31.5/7.99% T - 22 279.7 257.7 22.0/7.87%
T - 23 540.5 581.1 40.6/7.52% T - 23 418.4 468.1 49.7/11.89%
T - 24 471.1 506.2 35.1/7.44% T - 24 345.9 389.2 43.3/12.51%
T - 25 384.8 387.2 2.4/0.63% T - 25 262.7 279.1 16.4/6.25%
Average Error 6.24% Average Error 9.31%
Table 5.7: Results From 25 Test Runs Yx, the Corresponding Results From of Pre-
dictive Equations Ŷx, the Absolute Distance Between the Two in Meters and Per-







In this chapter, we demonstrated that a relationship (objective measure) can
be defined for autonomous vehicle SA (subjective end) and sensor degradation.
Section 5.1 details how defining a objective measure for a subjective end is not a
new idea within the flight test community and highlighted inadequate vehicle SA
in an autonomous technology demonstration vehicle. Section 5.2 and 5.3 dealt with
M&S of a hypothetical simplified sensor network to define the relationship. Future
work that focused on defining this relationship on a mature system during flight
test would give vehicle designers the ability to program a vehicle to complete tasks
currently reserved for qualified pilots under off nominal conditions and eventually




This dissertation was prepared in close coordination with naval SOF clearance
officials to determine a path forward for certifying autonomy in naval aircraft. A
method for certifying a vehicle to make decisions when a qualified pilot/operator
is not in the loop does not currently exist. We proposed, and certification officials
concurred, the following methodology as a possible avenue for certifying autonomy
in the hopes that lessons learned from its exercise will help develop an approved
process before the first autonomous system is acquired by the Navy:
1. Define the requirements (normally reserved for a pilot) to execute autonomous
behavior. These requirements must be developed through coordination with
SOF certification officials, the naval T&E community, and fleet officials who
currently certify pilots as fully qualified. A specification will then be devel-
oped that can be used to verify the requirements have been completely and
accurately specified.
2. Develop the clearance envelope where the system will be allowed to exhibit
non-deterministic behavior (the exact behavior of the system cannot be de-
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termined based upon the input conditions). If the system were to encounter
the edge of this envelope it would revert to deterministic behavior (based on
known input conditions, the vehicle will exhibit a known behavior).
3. Analyze the specification to ensure the requirements of the system are met.
4. Develop a protocol/set of control laws with traceability to the verified specifi-
cation. This way formal methods will satisfy the requirements of the system,
as the protocol/control laws will have formally verified properties.
5. Limited M&S of the algorithms/control laws as a risk reduction tool prior to
flight test. This will attempt to show the system will display non-deterministic
behavior only while it is within the clearance envelope.
6. Design the process for flight test. Most conventional flight test techniques
are designed for a pilot to test an unproven system. In this case, test points
will need to be developed that demonstrate under controlled (DT) and op-
erationally relevant conditions (OT) the system under test can complete the
assigned mission.
7. Execute DT and OT on the autonomous system under test.
8. Full report of the tests conducted on the system under test.
Chapter 3 (which was derived from Reference [76]) details the execution of the
first 4 steps of the proposed methodology. First, we defined the requirements for an
autonomous vehicle to land a large rotercraft in an unprepared LZ and developed
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a specification. Then, we developed a clearance envelope by using an established
procedure pilots currently execute to accomplish the mission. Next, we verified
the specification. Finally a proposed protocol was developed based on the verified
specification. Naval SOF certification officials were satisfied, and requested that
the research continue. They requested an evaluation of the methodology using the
technology demonstration vehicle developed by AFS.
Chapter 4 (which was derived from Reference [144]) covered the final three
steps of the proposed methodology (the missing step was performed by AFS prior to
flight test [132]). The system under test was able to demonstrate it could accomplish
the CAL/LZ mission under controlled conditions. However, as outlined in Section
4.4, the system lacked the required SA of its environment to complete the task
currently reserved for qualified pilots under mission relevant conditions when off
nominal conditions were encountered.
AFS demonstrated that an autonomous vehicle was capable of sensing its
environment, using that information to build onboard SA, and making appropriate
aeronautical decisions (for a task currently reserved for fully qualified pilots) based
on that SA. As the demonstrator was between a TRL 4 and 5, it was never designed
to gain a SOF certification when operated autonomously. The obstacle threshold
is just one example that would prevent the vehicle from advancing beyond TRL 7.
AFS was given a requirement to avoid obstacles that would cause a hazard during
landing. It defined an 11 in obstacle as a hazard, vice identifying what that obstacle
was, then it ensured the vehicle would not land near the 11 in hazard. This gave
the vehicle inadequate SA in mission representative environments.
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However, evaluating the methodology highlighted a major issue. If a vehicle
uses its sensors to build its SA, there should be a point where the vehicle SA will
drop to an unsatisfactory level for making sound aeronautical decisions as the sensor
output degrades. If that point can be defined objectively it could be given to
vehicle designers, and certification officials, to be programmed into the clearance
envelope outlined in step 2 of the methodology. Chapter 5 (which was derived
from Reference [182]) focused on defining this point in a M&S environment through
modeling errors within a simple sensor network and can be seen as exercising step
5 of the proposed methodology. Despite being TRL 3 or 4, Sections 5.2 and 5.3
demonstrated that there could be a relationship between sensor degradation and
obtaining adequate vehicle SA to complete a task currently reserved for qualified
pilots. Before a SOF clearance would be granted, both OT and DT would be
required to ensure that M&S findings translated to real world results.
6.2 Original Contributions
As I am currently a senior naval officer with contacts and established rela-
tionships within the naval acquisitions community (to include T&E Community
Leadership, SOF certification officials, and the NAWCAD center for autonomy) this
research was given many unique opportunities not normally afforded to University
studies. These opportunities included access to senior officials for interviews and
guidance, access to existing data sets within the Navy, and access to DoD approved
M&S environments.
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The original contribution to knowledge contained in this dissertation include:
 Proposed methodology for obtaining a naval aviation SOF certification allow-
ing a decision engine to complete a task currently reserved for a qualified pilot.
Then the exercise of the methodology to help build a path forward for cer-
tifying autonomy. Currently the United States Navy (USN) does not have a
path forward for certifying autonomy. This contribution will influence future
certification standards and procedures for this emerging requirement.
 Definition of the requirements a decision engine must complete if it were to be
approved to complete the CAL/LZ mission autonomously (a task currently re-
served for a qualified pilot). Then use of a formal methods approach to ensure
the actions taken by a developed protocol will satisfy the requirements defined.
This contribution exercised the first four steps of the methodology proposed
in Section 1.4 and provide artifacts to certification officials for a possible SOF
clearance allowing a decision engine to complete a mission currently reserved
for a qualified pilot.
 Development of flight test matrices (one for DT and one for OT) for an au-
tonomous vehicle to complete the CAL/LZ mission. Followed by analysis of
both DT and OT flight test data of an autonomous vehicle completing a task
currently reserved for a qualified pilot (CAL/LZ mission). This contribution
exercised the last three steps of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4 and
provided artifacts to certification officials for a possible SOF clearance allow-
ing a decision engine to complete a mission currently reserved for a qualified
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pilot.
 Development of an objective measure for autonomous vehicle SA that ac-
counted for sensor degradation within a Department of Defense (DoD) rec-
ognized M&S environment. The measure specifically evaluated the effects of
sensor degradation on error distance of a fused track of a threat aircraft. We
used Design of Experiments (DOE) to determine the effects of sensor degra-
dation and produce a set of predictive equations for the error distance of the
fused track. Then used Subject Matter Expert (SME) opinion to define the
point at which (within this scenario) the fused error distance was inadequate
to make a decision currently reserved for a qualified pilot. This contribution
exercised the fifth step of the methodology proposed in Section 1.4 and pro-
vided results that if confirmed during flight test could have lead to a SOF
clearance allowing a decision engine to complete a mission currently reserved
for a qualified pilot.
6.3 Outlook for Future Work
This subject area offers multiple avenues for future work. The formal methods
approach outlined in Chapter 3 would require an extensive amount of research to
fully flush out the possible scenarios an autonomous vehicle would need to negotiate
before a SOF certification could be obtained.
Flight test has been identified as one of the major issues in the V&V process
for autonomy. The current paradigm is to test all scenarios to see how software will
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react. Without a human in the loop, there are a limitless number of test points
for full, comprehensive test. Defining the cut off line within the decision space is
a risk decision that will need to be made in the near future if we are to have true
autonomy in aviation (military or civilian).
M&S has been a benchmark of research for decades. However, unless the
model has the fidelity required by the DoD it will have limited use in the acquisition
process. Future work in M&S in support of autonomy in military systems will
most likely be classified based on the environments used. While they may lead to
autonomous systems certifications within the DoD, there will be limited publishable
material.
The proposed methodology developed for this dissertation is just one possible
path for certifying autonomy. It was developed in coordination with naval flight
clearance officials. Future work that develops possible paths forward for certifying
autonomy should include the involvement of certification officials. In this work, we
exercised each step of our proposed methodology (but not with the same system un-
der test). Future work that uses this process with different autonomous systems, or
uses this process from the beginning through certification of one system, would de-
velop more lessons learned for certifying autonomy. Ultimately an approved process
needs to be in place before we can certify an autonomous system to make decisions
currently reserved for qualified pilots.
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Appendix A: Experimental Results
The appendix contains the complete data sets that were summarized in various
Chapters of this dissertation. Section A.1 contains the 256 possible outcomes of the
8 protocol assessments truncated in 3.2. Section Table A.2 contains the results of
the 729 AFSIM simulation runs truncated in Table 5.4.
A.1 All Possible Outcomes of the Eight Protocol Assessments Trun-
cated in Table 3.2
Table A.1 contains the 256 possible outcomes of the eight protocol assessments
truncated in Table 3.2.
Table A.1: 256 Possible Outcomes of the 8 Protocol As-
sessments Truncated in Table 3.2
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
11 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
12 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
13 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
15 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
16 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
17 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
19 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
20 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
21 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
22 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
23 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
24 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
25 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
27 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
28 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
29 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
30 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
31 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
32 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
33 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
34 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
35 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
36 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
37 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
38 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
39 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
40 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
41 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
42 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
43 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
44 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
45 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
46 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
47 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
48 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
49 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
51 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
52 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
53 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
54 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
55 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
56 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
57 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
58 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
59 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
60 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
61 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
62 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
63 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
64 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
65 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
66 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
67 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
68 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
69 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
70 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
71 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
72 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
73 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
74 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
75 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
76 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
77 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
78 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
79 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
80 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
81 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
82 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
83 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
84 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
85 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
86 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
87 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
88 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
89 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
90 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
91 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
92 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
93 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
94 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
95 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
96 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
97 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
98 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
99 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
100 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
101 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
102 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
103 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
104 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
105 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
106 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
107 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
108 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
109 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
110 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
111 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
112 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
113 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
114 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
115 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
116 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
117 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
118 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
119 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
120 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
121 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
122 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
123 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
124 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
125 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
126 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
127 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
128 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
129 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
130 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
131 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
132 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
133 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
134 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
135 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
136 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
137 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
138 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
139 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
140 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
141 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
142 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
143 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
144 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
145 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
146 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
147 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
148 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
149 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
150 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
151 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
152 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
153 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
154 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
155 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
156 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
157 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
158 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
159 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
160 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
161 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
162 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
163 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
164 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
165 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
166 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
167 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
168 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
169 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
170 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
171 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
172 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
173 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
174 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
175 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
176 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
177 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
178 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
179 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
180 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
181 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
182 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
183 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
184 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
185 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
186 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
187 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
188 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
189 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
190 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
191 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
192 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
193 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
195 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
196 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
197 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
198 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
199 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
200 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
201 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
202 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
203 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
204 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
205 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
206 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
207 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
208 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
209 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
210 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
211 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
212 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
213 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
214 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
215 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
216 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
217 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
218 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
219 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
220 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
221 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
222 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
223 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
224 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
225 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
226 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
227 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
228 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
229 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
230 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
231 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
232 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
233 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
234 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
235 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
236 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
237 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
238 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
239 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
240 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
241 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
242 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
243 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
244 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
245 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
246 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
247 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
248 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
249 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Outcome # # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
250 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
251 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
252 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
253 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
254 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
255 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
256 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A.2 All 729 Combinations of the Six Variables (error σs) Truncated
in Table 5.4
Table A.2 contains the 729 combinations of the six variables (error σs) trun-
cated in Table 5.4.
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Table A.2: Results of the 729 Simulations Truncated in
Table 5.4. Y20 is the 20 nm Error Distance in Meters. Y10
is the 10 nm Error Distance in Meters. X1 is the Value
of One σ Error in IRST Azimuth in Degrees. X2 is the
Value of One σ Error in IRST Elevation in Degrees. X3
is the Value of One σ Error in IRST Range in nm. X4 is
the Value of One σ Error in Radar Azimuth in Degrees.
X5 is the Value of One σ error in Radar Elevation in
Degrees. X6 is the Value of One σ Error in Radar Range
in nm [180].
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
1 164.5 108.1 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 143.2 82.5 3 3 3 3 3 5
3 134.4 66.1 3 3 3 3 3 7
4 206.8 186.6 3 3 3 3 5 3
5 194.4 126.5 3 3 3 3 5 5
6 164.8 92.1 3 3 3 3 5 7
7 405 309 3 3 3 3 7 3
8 271 191.9 3 3 3 3 7 5
9 1096.6 896.2 3 3 3 3 7 7
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
10 253 182.3 3 3 3 5 3 3
11 190.4 123.6 3 3 3 5 3 5
12 161.8 90.5 3 3 3 5 3 7
13 349.1 262.9 3 3 3 5 5 3
14 241.5 167.6 3 3 3 5 5 5
15 192.2 116.5 3 3 3 5 5 7
16 493.1 385.8 3 3 3 5 7 3
17 317.9 233 3 3 3 5 7 5
18 236.6 155.2 3 3 3 5 7 7
19 385.4 295 3 3 3 7 3 3
20 261.1 184.9 3 3 3 7 3 5
21 203 126.6 3 3 3 7 3 7
22 481.2 376.8 3 3 3 7 5 3
23 312 228.8 3 3 3 7 5 5
24 233.2 152.6 3 3 3 7 5 7
25 624.6 500 3 3 3 7 7 3
26 388.1 294.2 3 3 3 7 7 5
27 277.6 191.3 3 3 3 7 7 7
28 176.6 100.9 3 3 5 3 3 3
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
29 148.2 63.6 3 3 5 3 3 5
30 129.1 28.3 3 3 5 3 3 7
31 319.2 224.2 3 3 5 3 5 3
32 245.5 147.4 3 3 5 3 5 5
33 194.9 84.7 3 3 5 3 5 7
34 532.1 408.6 3 3 5 3 7 3
35 390.5 273.2 3 3 5 3 7 5
36 291.6 169.8 3 3 5 3 7 7
37 307.3 215.1 3 3 5 5 3 3
38 237.6 142.1 3 3 5 5 3 5
39 188.6 82.1 3 3 5 5 3 7
40 449.4 338.1 3 3 5 5 5 3
41 334.6 225.8 3 3 5 5 5 5
42 254.5 138.4 3 3 5 5 5 7
43 561.8 522 3 3 5 5 7 3
44 479.3 351.3 3 3 5 5 7 5
45 351.5 233.2 3 3 5 5 7 7
46 502.5 386.1 3 3 5 7 3 3
47 371.3 259.7 3 3 5 7 3 5
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
48 278.4 162.2 3 3 5 7 3 7
49 644.1 508.6 3 3 5 7 5 3
50 467.9 342.9 3 3 5 7 5 5
51 344.1 218.3 3 3 5 7 5 7
52 855.6 691.8 3 3 5 7 7 3
53 612.1 468 3 3 5 7 7 5
54 441.2 302.8 3 3 5 7 7 7
55 188 104.3 3 3 7 3 3 3
56 162.7 58.8 3 3 7 3 3 5
57 139.8 20.7 3 3 7 3 3 7
58 352.3 246.2 3 3 7 3 5 3
59 291.8 170.2 3 3 7 3 5 5
60 236.6 104.3 3 3 7 3 5 7
61 596.7 458.4 3 3 7 3 7 3
62 483.3 337.1 3 3 7 3 7 5
63 379.4 230.4 3 3 7 3 7 7
64 337.6 235.9 3 3 7 5 3 3
65 280.3 163.1 3 3 7 5 3 5
66 226.7 100.1 3 3 7 5 3 7
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
67 501.5 377.5 3 3 7 5 5 3
68 409.2 274.2 3 3 7 5 5 5
69 324.3 183.6 3 3 7 5 5 7
70 745.5 589.1 3 3 7 5 7 3
71 600.6 440.7 3 3 7 5 7 5
72 467.8 309.3 3 3 7 5 7 7
73 561.8 432.7 3 3 7 7 3 3
74 457 319 3 3 7 7 3 5
75 359.4 218.6 3 3 7 7 3 7
76 724.9 573.7 3 3 7 7 5 3
77 585.3 429.7 3 3 7 7 5 5
78 456.8 301.8 3 3 7 7 5 7
79 968.1 784.6 3 3 7 7 7 3
80 776.3 595.6 3 3 7 7 7 5
81 600.5 427.1 3 3 7 7 7 7
82 252.3 181 3 5 3 3 3 3
83 272 192.4 3 5 3 3 3 5
84 291.1 194.7 3 5 3 3 3 7
85 348.4 261.8 3 5 3 3 5 3
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
86 323 237.4 3 5 3 3 5 5
87 312.5 220.8 3 5 3 3 5 7
88 492.5 384.7 3 5 3 3 7 3
89 399.7 304 3 5 3 3 7 5
90 357.9 259.8 3 5 3 3 7 7
91 340.7 257 3 5 3 5 3 3
92 319.3 234.1 3 5 3 5 3 5
93 308.9 219.3 3 5 3 5 3 7
94 436.7 338.5 3 5 3 5 5 3
95 370.2 278.7 3 5 3 5 5 5
96 340.1 245.4 3 5 3 5 5 7
97 580.4 461.5 3 5 3 5 7 3
98 446.6 345.1 3 5 3 5 7 5
99 385.4 284.2 3 5 3 5 7 7
100 473 370.1 3 5 3 7 3 3
101 389.9 295.9 3 5 3 7 3 5
102 350.5 255.7 3 5 3 7 3 7
103 568.7 452.8 3 5 3 7 5 3
104 440.7 340.3 3 5 3 7 5 5
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
105 381.4 281.7 3 5 3 7 5 7
106 712 575.7 3 5 3 7 7 3
107 516.9 406.4 3 5 3 7 7 5
108 426.5 320.4 3 5 3 7 7 7
109 223.2 141.5 3 5 5 3 3 3
110 235.8 140.8 3 5 5 3 3 5
111 243.5 130.4 3 5 5 3 3 7
112 365.4 264.8 3 5 5 3 5 3
113 333.1 224.6 3 5 5 3 5 5
114 311.4 186.8 3 5 5 3 5 7
115 578.5 499.2 3 5 5 3 7 3
116 478.6 350.4 3 5 5 3 7 5
117 410.1 271.9 3 5 5 3 7 7
118 353.8 255.7 3 5 5 5 3 3
119 325.4 219.3 3 5 5 5 3 5
120 304.1 184.2 3 5 5 5 3 7
121 495.7 378.7 3 5 5 5 5 3
122 422.4 301.9 3 5 5 5 5 5
123 371.5 240.5 3 5 5 5 5 7
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
124 708.2 562.7 3 5 5 5 7 3
125 567.5 428.4 3 5 5 5 7 5
126 469.9 325.3 3 5 5 5 7 7
127 549.1 426.7 3 5 5 7 3 3
128 459.3 336.8 3 5 5 7 3 5
129 394.6 264.3 3 5 5 7 3 7
130 690.5 549.2 3 5 5 7 5 3
131 555.9 420.1 3 5 5 7 5 5
132 461.4 320.4 3 5 5 7 5 7
133 902.1 732.5 3 5 5 7 7 3
134 700.3 545.2 3 5 5 7 7 5
135 559.6 404.9 3 5 5 7 7 7
136 214.2 128.2 3 5 7 3 3 3
137 220.7 111.1 3 5 7 3 3 5
138 224.7 97.8 3 5 7 3 3 7
139 379.3 270.1 3 5 7 3 5 3
140 351.2 222.4 3 5 7 3 5 5
141 325.8 181.5 3 5 7 3 5 7
142 624.7 482.3 3 5 7 3 7 3
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
143 544.2 389.4 3 5 7 3 7 5
144 471.5 307.6 3 5 7 3 7 7
145 364.4 259.8 3 5 7 5 3 3
146 339.2 215.4 3 5 7 5 3 5
147 313.7 177.3 3 5 7 5 3 7
148 528.6 401.3 3 5 7 5 5 3
149 468.9 326.5 3 5 7 5 5 5
150 413.9 260.8 3 5 7 5 5 7
151 773.4 613 3 5 7 5 7 3
152 661.5 493 3 5 7 5 7 5
153 559.7 386.5 3 5 7 5 7 7
154 588.8 456.5 3 5 7 7 3 3
155 516.4 371.3 3 5 7 7 3 5
156 447.3 295.9 3 5 7 7 3 7
157 752.2 597.6 3 5 7 7 5 3
158 645.2 482 3 5 7 7 5 5
159 546.6 379 3 5 7 7 5 7
160 996 808.4 3 5 7 7 7 3
161 837.1 647.9 3 5 7 7 7 5
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
162 692 504.3 3 5 7 7 7 7
163 393.1 292.6 3 7 3 3 3 3
164 464.7 359.8 3 7 3 3 3 5
165 502 388.1 3 7 3 3 3 7
166 479.4 375.2 3 7 3 3 5 3
167 515.7 404.5 3 7 3 3 5 5
168 533.2 414.2 3 7 3 3 5 7
169 623.4 498.5 3 7 3 3 7 3
170 592.3 471.3 3 7 3 3 7 5
171 579 453.2 3 7 3 3 7 7
172 471.5 369.5 3 7 3 5 3 3
173 511.9 401.3 3 7 3 5 3 5
174 529.9 412.7 3 7 3 5 3 7
175 567.6 452 3 7 3 5 5 3
176 562.9 445.9 3 7 3 5 5 5
177 561 438.7 3 7 3 5 5 7
178 711.3 575.3 3 7 3 5 7 3
179 639.3 512.4 3 7 3 5 7 5
180 606.7 477.6 3 7 3 5 7 7
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
181 603.8 484 3 7 3 7 3 3
182 582.6 463.3 3 7 3 7 3 5
183 571.6 449.2 3 7 3 7 3 7
184 699.6 566.5 3 7 3 7 5 3
185 633.4 507.6 3 7 3 7 5 5
186 602.4 475.1 3 7 3 7 5 7
187 842.8 689.6 3 7 3 7 7 3
188 709.5 573.9 3 7 3 7 7 5
189 647.9 513.8 3 7 3 7 7 7
190 293.1 202.3 3 7 5 3 3 3
191 367.6 256.1 3 7 5 3 3 5
192 417.1 283.3 3 7 5 3 3 7
193 435 325.5 3 7 5 3 5 3
194 464.6 340 3 7 5 3 5 5
195 484.7 339.8 3 7 5 3 5 7
196 647.9 509.9 3 7 5 3 7 3
197 610.1 465.8 3 7 5 3 7 5
198 584.5 424.8 3 7 5 3 7 7
199 423.6 316.5 3 7 5 5 3 3
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
200 457.2 334.7 3 7 5 5 3 5
201 477.9 337.2 3 7 5 5 3 7
202 565.3 439.5 3 7 5 5 5 3
203 554 418.3 3 7 5 5 5 5
204 545.2 393.4 3 7 5 5 5 7
205 777.6 623.4 3 7 5 5 7 3
206 699.1 543.8 3 7 5 5 7 5
207 644.6 478.2 3 7 5 5 7 7
208 618.9 487.5 3 7 5 7 3 3
209 591.2 452.2 3 7 5 7 3 5
210 568.8 417.3 3 7 5 7 3 7
211 760.1 610 3 7 5 7 5 3
212 687.5 535.5 3 7 5 7 5 5
213 635.6 473.3 3 7 5 7 5 7
214 971.6 793.2 3 7 5 7 7 3
215 832 660.6 3 7 5 7 7 5
216 734.5 557.8 3 7 5 7 7 7
217 254.9 163.9 3 7 7 3 3 3
218 309.4 189.3 3 7 7 3 3 5
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
219 354.9 213.8 3 7 7 3 3 7
220 419.3 305.9 3 7 7 3 5 3
221 439.4 300.7 3 7 7 3 5 5
222 456.1 291.4 3 7 7 3 5 7
223 665.2 518.1 3 7 7 3 7 3
224 633.2 467.7 3 7 7 3 7 5
225 604.1 423.5 3 7 7 3 7 7
226 405.2 295.5 3 7 7 5 3 3
227 428.2 293.7 3 7 7 5 3 5
228 444.7 293.2 3 7 7 5 3 7
229 568.9 437.1 3 7 7 5 5 3
230 557.5 404.8 3 7 7 5 5 5
231 545.1 376.7 3 7 7 5 5 7
232 814 648.8 3 7 7 5 7 3
233 750.7 571.3 3 7 7 5 7 5
234 692.5 502.4 3 7 7 5 7 7
235 629.7 492.3 3 7 7 7 3 3
236 605.6 449.6 3 7 7 7 3 5
237 579.1 411.8 3 7 7 7 3 7
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
238 792.7 633.3 3 7 7 7 5 3
239 734.1 560.2 3 7 7 7 5 5
240 678.4 494.9 3 7 7 7 5 7
241 1036.7 844.2 3 7 7 7 7 3
242 926.4 726.1 3 7 7 7 7 5
243 825.1 620.2 3 7 7 7 7 7
244 257.4 187.2 5 3 3 3 3 3
245 280 198.7 5 3 3 3 3 5
246 290.3 202.1 5 3 3 3 3 7
247 353.7 267.6 5 3 3 3 5 3
248 331.2 243.3 5 3 3 3 5 5
249 320.8 228.2 5 3 3 3 5 7
250 498 390.3 5 3 3 3 7 3
251 407.9 309.4 5 3 3 3 7 5
252 365.6 267.2 5 3 3 3 7 7
253 345.9 266.5 5 3 3 5 3 3
254 327.3 240.5 5 3 3 5 3 5
255 318.4 226.7 5 3 3 5 3 7
256 442 346.8 5 3 3 5 5 3
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
257 378.4 284.9 5 3 3 5 5 5
258 348.7 252.8 5 3 3 5 5 7
259 586 469 5 3 3 5 7 3
260 454.9 350.8 5 3 3 5 7 5
261 393.5 291.6 5 3 3 5 7 7
262 478.3 380.2 5 3 3 7 3 3
263 398 302.8 5 3 3 7 3 5
264 360.1 263.2 5 3 3 7 3 7
265 574.1 461.2 5 3 3 7 5 3
266 448.9 346.9 5 3 3 7 5 5
267 390.2 289.1 5 3 3 7 5 7
268 717.5 583.5 5 3 3 7 7 3
269 525.1 412.5 5 3 3 7 7 5
270 434.8 327.8 5 3 3 7 7 7
271 225.9 143.8 5 3 5 3 3 3
272 241.4 145.1 5 3 5 3 3 5
273 250.7 136.4 5 3 5 3 3 7
274 368.6 267.1 5 3 5 3 5 3
275 338.8 229 5 3 5 3 5 5
Continued on next page
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
276 316.9 192.9 5 3 5 3 5 7
277 581.5 451.5 5 3 5 3 7 3
278 484 354.8 5 3 5 3 7 5
279 414.6 277.9 5 3 5 3 7 7
280 356.6 258.1 5 3 5 5 3 3
281 331.1 223.7 5 3 5 5 3 5
282 311.7 190.2 5 3 5 5 3 7
283 498.8 381 5 3 5 5 5 3
284 428.1 307.3 5 3 5 5 5 5
285 377.6 246.5 5 3 5 5 5 7
286 711.2 565 5 3 5 5 7 3
287 572.9 432.8 5 3 5 5 7 5
288 475.1 331.3 5 3 5 5 7 7
289 552 429 5 3 5 7 3 3
290 465 341.2 5 3 5 7 3 5
291 402.4 270.3 5 3 5 7 3 7
292 693.5 551.5 5 3 5 7 5 3
293 561.6 424.5 5 3 5 7 5 5
294 468 326.4 5 3 5 7 5 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
295 905.1 734.8 5 3 5 7 7 3
296 705.8 549.6 5 3 5 7 7 5
297 565.3 410.9 5 3 5 7 7 7
298 216.6 129.5 5 3 7 3 3 3
299 225.1 113.9 5 3 7 3 3 5
300 230.1 102.2 5 3 7 3 3 7
301 381.1 271.4 5 3 7 3 5 3
302 354.5 225.3 5 3 7 3 5 5
303 328.2 186 5 3 7 3 5 7
304 625.6 483.6 5 3 7 3 7 3
305 546.4 392.2 5 3 7 3 7 5
306 472.2 312.1 5 3 7 3 7 7
307 336.5 261.1 5 3 7 5 3 3
308 343.5 218.2 5 3 7 5 3 5
309 319.7 181.7 5 3 7 5 3 7
310 530.4 402.6 5 3 7 5 5 3
311 472.4 329.3 5 3 7 5 5 5
312 417.4 265.2 5 3 7 5 5 7
313 774.5 614.3 5 3 7 5 7 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
314 664 495.9 5 3 7 5 7 5
315 561.4 391 5 3 7 5 7 7
316 590.9 457.8 5 3 7 7 3 3
317 520.7 374.1 5 3 7 7 3 5
318 453.6 300.3 5 3 7 7 3 7
319 754 598.9 5 3 7 7 5 3
320 648.9 484.8 5 3 7 7 5 5
321 500.8 383.5 5 3 7 7 5 7
322 997.3 809.7 5 3 7 7 7 3
323 839.9 650.7 5 3 7 7 7 5
324 694.7 508.8 5 3 7 7 7 7
325 344.8 261.3 5 5 3 3 3 3
326 408.6 310.3 5 5 3 3 3 5
327 437.8 331 5 5 3 3 3 7
328 441 342.7 5 5 3 3 5 3
329 459.7 335.1 5 5 3 3 5 5
330 468.7 357.1 5 5 3 3 5 7
331 585.2 465.7 5 5 3 3 7 3
332 536.3 421.7 5 5 3 3 7 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
333 514.1 396.1 5 5 3 3 7 7
334 433.3 340.6 5 5 3 5 3 3
335 455.9 352 5 5 3 5 3 5
336 465.9 355.7 5 5 3 5 3 7
337 429.3 421.7 5 5 3 5 5 3
338 506.9 396.6 5 5 3 5 5 5
339 496.7 381.7 5 5 3 5 5 7
340 673.1 544.2 5 5 3 5 7 3
341 583.3 463 5 5 3 5 7 5
342 541.9 420.6 5 5 3 5 7 7
343 565.6 455 5 5 3 7 3 3
344 526.6 414.3 5 5 3 7 3 5
345 507.6 392.2 5 5 3 7 3 7
346 661.3 536.5 5 5 3 7 5 3
347 577.4 458.6 5 5 3 7 5 5
348 538.2 418.1 5 5 3 7 5 7
349 804.6 658.9 5 5 3 7 7 3
350 653.5 524.6 5 5 3 7 7 5
351 583.3 456.8 5 5 3 7 7 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
352 272.4 184.4 5 5 5 3 3 3
353 329.1 222.1 5 5 5 3 3 5
354 336.5 238.3 5 5 5 3 3 7
355 414.7 307.6 5 5 5 3 5 3
356 426.4 305.9 5 5 5 3 5 5
357 433.9 294.7 5 5 5 3 5 7
358 627.8 492 5 5 5 3 7 3
359 572 431.8 5 5 5 3 7 5
360 532.7 379.7 5 5 5 3 7 7
361 403.1 298.6 5 5 5 5 3 3
362 418.8 300.7 5 5 5 5 3 5
363 427.6 292.1 5 5 5 5 3 7
364 545 421.6 5 5 5 5 5 3
365 515.8 384.3 5 5 5 5 5 5
366 494.6 348.4 5 5 5 5 5 7
367 757.5 605.5 5 5 5 5 7 3
368 660.9 509.8 5 5 5 5 7 5
369 593.1 433.2 5 5 5 5 7 7
370 598.4 469.6 5 5 5 7 3 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
371 552.8 418.2 5 5 5 7 3 5
372 518.6 372.2 5 5 5 7 3 7
373 739.8 592.1 5 5 5 7 5 3
374 649.4 501.5 5 5 5 7 5 5
375 585.1 428.3 5 5 5 7 5 7
376 951.5 775.3 5 5 5 7 7 3
377 793.8 626.5 5 5 5 7 7 5
378 683.2 512.7 5 5 5 7 7 7
379 243 153.3 5 5 7 3 3 3
380 283.6 166.1 5 5 7 3 3 5
381 317 179.3 5 5 7 3 3 7
382 408 295.2 5 5 7 3 5 3
383 414 277.4 5 5 7 3 5 5
384 417.6 263 5 5 7 3 5 7
385 653.6 507.4 5 5 7 3 7 3
386 607.2 444.4 5 5 7 3 7 5
387 563.8 389 5 5 7 3 7 7
388 393.3 284.9 5 5 7 5 3 3
389 402.5 270.4 5 5 7 5 3 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
390 407.1 258.8 5 5 7 5 3 7
391 557.5 426.4 5 5 7 5 5 3
392 532.1 381.5 5 5 7 5 5 5
393 506.9 342.2 5 5 7 5 5 7
394 802.4 638.1 5 5 7 5 7 3
395 724.7 548 5 5 7 5 7 5
396 652.7 468 5 5 7 5 7 7
397 617.9 481.6 5 5 7 7 3 3
398 579.9 426.3 5 5 7 7 3 5
399 541.5 377.4 5 5 7 7 3 7
400 781.2 622.7 5 5 7 7 5 3
401 708.7 537 5 5 7 7 5 5
402 640.3 460.5 5 5 7 7 5 7
403 1025.1 833.6 5 5 7 7 7 3
404 900.5 702.9 5 5 7 7 7 5
405 785.6 585.8 5 5 7 7 7 7
406 475.3 373.1 5 7 3 3 3 3
407 600.8 477.7 5 7 3 3 3 5
408 658.5 524.1 5 7 3 3 3 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
409 571.6 455.7 5 7 3 3 5 3
410 651.9 522.4 5 7 3 3 5 5
411 689.4 550.1 5 7 3 3 5 7
412 715.7 579 5 7 3 3 7 3
413 728.5 589.1 5 7 3 3 7 5
414 735.1 589.1 5 7 3 3 7 7
415 563.7 452.1 5 7 3 5 3 3
416 648.1 519.4 5 7 3 5 3 5
417 686.6 548.7 5 7 3 5 3 7
418 659.9 534.3 5 7 3 5 5 3
419 699.1 563.8 5 7 3 5 5 5
420 717.4 574.7 5 7 3 5 5 7
421 803.6 657.2 5 7 3 5 7 3
422 775.5 630.3 5 7 3 5 7 5
423 762.9 613.6 5 7 3 5 7 7
424 696.1 597.2 5 7 3 7 3 3
425 718.8 581.5 5 7 3 7 3 5
426 728.3 585.2 5 7 3 7 3 7
427 791.9 649.3 5 7 3 7 5 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
428 769.6 625.8 5 7 3 7 5 5
429 759 611.1 5 7 3 7 5 7
430 935.1 772 5 7 3 7 7 3
431 845.7 691.9 5 7 3 7 7 5
432 804.3 649.8 5 7 3 7 7 7
433 342.1 245 5 7 5 3 3 3
434 460.7 337.2 5 7 5 3 3 5
435 560.3 390.9 5 7 5 3 3 7
436 484.1 368.2 5 7 5 3 5 3
437 557.7 421.1 5 7 5 3 5 5
438 607.6 447.3 5 7 5 3 5 7
439 697.1 552.6 5 7 5 3 7 3
440 703.2 546.9 5 7 5 3 7 5
441 707.1 532.3 5 7 5 3 7 7
442 472.7 359.2 5 7 5 5 3 3
443 550.4 415.8 5 7 5 5 3 5
444 601.4 444.7 5 7 5 5 3 7
445 614.4 482.2 5 7 5 5 5 3
446 647.2 488.4 5 7 5 5 5 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
447 668.4 500.9 5 7 5 5 5 7
448 826.8 666.1 5 7 5 5 7 3
449 729.2 624.9 5 7 5 5 7 5
450 767.6 585.7 5 7 5 5 7 7
451 668 530.2 5 7 5 7 3 3
452 684.4 533.3 5 7 5 7 3 5
453 692.5 524.8 5 7 5 7 3 7
454 809.2 652.7 5 7 5 7 5 3
455 780.8 616.6 5 7 5 7 5 5
456 759.1 580.8 5 7 5 7 5 7
457 1020.8 835.9 5 7 5 7 7 3
458 925.2 741.7 5 7 5 7 7 5
459 857.7 665.3 5 7 5 7 7 7
460 283.6 189 5 7 7 3 3 3
461 372.4 244.1 5 7 7 3 3 5
462 447.8 294.9 5 7 7 3 3 7
463 448 330.9 5 7 7 3 5 3
464 502.2 355.5 5 7 7 3 5 5
465 548.5 378.6 5 7 7 3 5 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
466 693.9 543.1 5 7 7 3 7 3
467 696.1 522.5 5 7 7 3 7 5
468 696.4 504.7 5 7 7 3 7 7
469 434 320.5 5 7 7 5 3 3
470 491.4 348.5 5 7 7 5 3 5
471 538.3 374.4 5 7 7 5 3 7
472 597.8 462.1 5 7 7 5 5 3
473 620.6 459.6 5 7 7 5 5 5
474 638.1 457.9 5 7 7 5 5 7
475 842.9 673.8 5 7 7 5 7 3
476 813.7 826.1 5 7 7 5 7 5
477 785.4 583.6 5 7 7 5 7 7
478 658.7 517.3 5 7 7 7 3 3
479 669 504.4 5 7 7 7 3 5
480 673 493 5 7 7 7 3 7
481 821.7 658.3 5 7 7 7 5 3
482 797.5 315 5 7 7 7 5 5
483 772 576.1 5 7 7 7 5 7
484 1065.7 869.2 5 7 7 7 7 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
485 989.7 781 5 7 7 7 7 5
486 918.5 701.4 5 7 7 7 7 7
487 396.4 304.7 7 3 3 3 3 3
488 485 375.7 7 3 3 3 3 5
489 525.5 406.5 7 3 3 3 3 7
490 492.8 386.5 7 3 3 3 5 3
491 536.3 420.2 7 3 3 3 5 5
492 555.8 432.6 7 3 3 3 5 7
493 637.1 510 7 3 3 3 7 3
494 612.9 486.5 7 3 3 3 7 5
495 600.8 471.6 7 3 3 3 7 7
496 484.9 386.4 7 3 3 5 3 3
497 532.3 417.4 7 3 3 5 3 5
498 553.7 431.2 7 3 3 5 3 7
499 581.1 467.5 7 3 3 5 5 3
500 583.4 461.7 7 3 3 5 5 5
501 583.9 457.2 7 3 3 5 5 7
502 725.1 589.9 7 3 3 5 7 3
503 659.9 527.8 7 3 3 5 7 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
504 628.7 496.1 7 3 3 5 7 7
505 617.4 502.7 7 3 3 7 3 3
506 603.1 479.7 7 3 3 7 3 5
507 595.6 467.7 7 3 3 7 3 7
508 713.2 583.8 7 3 3 7 5 3
509 654 523.8 7 3 3 7 5 5
510 625.6 493.6 7 3 3 7 5 7
511 856.6 705.9 7 3 3 7 7 3
512 730.1 589.6 7 3 3 7 7 5
513 670.2 532.3 7 3 3 7 7 7
514 300.1 208.1 7 3 5 3 3 3
515 381.6 267.2 7 3 5 3 3 5
516 435.6 298.3 7 3 5 3 3 7
517 442.7 331.4 7 3 5 3 5 3
518 478.9 351.1 7 3 5 3 5 5
519 501.7 354.7 7 3 5 3 5 7
520 655.6 515.8 7 3 5 3 7 3
521 624.2 476.9 7 3 5 3 7 5
522 599.8 439.8 7 3 5 3 7 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
523 430.7 322.3 7 3 5 5 3 3
524 472.3 345.8 7 3 5 5 3 5
525 496.8 352.1 7 3 5 5 3 7
526 572.8 445.3 7 3 5 5 5 3
527 568.3 429.4 7 3 5 5 5 5
528 562.7 408.4 7 3 5 5 5 7
529 785.3 629.2 7 3 5 5 7 3
530 713.1 554.9 7 3 5 5 7 5
531 660.5 493.2 7 3 5 5 7 7
532 626 493.3 7 3 5 7 3 3
533 605.3 463.3 7 3 5 7 3 5
534 588.1 432.2 7 3 5 7 3 7
535 767.6 615.8 7 3 5 7 5 3
536 701.9 546.6 7 3 5 7 5 5
537 653.6 488.3 7 3 5 7 5 7
538 979.2 799 7 3 5 7 7 3
539 846.1 671.6 7 3 5 7 7 5
540 751 572.8 7 3 5 7 7 7
541 260 167.3 7 3 7 3 3 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
542 319.7 196.7 7 3 7 3 3 5
543 369.1 224.9 7 3 7 3 3 7
544 424.6 309.2 7 3 7 3 5 3
545 449.1 308.1 7 3 7 3 5 5
546 467.3 308.7 7 3 7 3 5 7
547 669.2 521.5 7 3 7 3 7 3
548 641.3 475.1 7 3 7 3 7 5
549 612.2 434.7 7 3 7 3 7 7
550 409.9 298.9 7 3 7 5 3 3
551 438.4 301.1 7 3 7 5 3 5
552 459.6 304.4 7 3 7 5 3 7
553 573.9 440.5 7 3 7 5 5 3
554 567.3 412.1 7 3 7 5 5 5
555 557.3 387.9 7 3 7 5 5 7
556 818.1 652.1 7 3 7 5 7 3
557 759.1 578.7 7 3 7 5 7 5
558 701.8 513.7 7 3 7 5 7 7
559 634.5 495.7 7 3 7 7 3 3
560 615.9 457 7 3 7 7 3 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
561 594.4 423 7 3 7 7 3 7
562 797.6 616.7 7 3 7 7 5 3
563 744.1 567.6 7 3 7 7 5 5
564 691.5 506.2 7 3 7 7 5 7
565 1040.9 847.6 7 3 7 7 7 3
566 935.2 733.5 7 3 7 7 7 5
567 835.6 631.5 7 3 7 7 7 7
568 483.5 379.6 7 5 3 3 3 3
569 613.1 487.3 7 5 3 3 3 5
570 672.7 535.1 7 5 3 3 3 7
571 579.7 461.8 7 5 3 3 5 3
572 664.3 531.9 7 5 3 3 5 5
573 703.4 561.1 7 5 3 3 5 7
574 723.9 585.3 7 5 3 3 7 3
575 740.9 598.5 7 5 3 3 7 5
576 748.7 600 7 5 3 3 7 7
577 571.2 460.7 7 5 3 5 3 3
578 660.4 528.9 7 5 3 5 3 5
579 700.8 559.8 7 5 3 5 3 7
Continued on next page
258
Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
580 668 542.3 7 5 3 5 5 3
581 711.4 573.4 7 5 3 5 5 5
582 731.4 585.8 7 5 3 5 5 7
583 811.9 664.9 7 5 3 5 7 3
584 787.9 639.7 7 5 3 5 7 5
585 776.6 624.6 7 5 3 5 7 7
586 704.3 577.2 7 5 3 7 3 3
587 731.2 591.2 7 5 3 7 3 5
588 742.7 596.3 7 5 3 7 3 7
589 800.1 658.6 7 5 3 7 5 3
590 782 635.4 7 5 3 7 5 5
591 773.1 622.2 7 5 3 7 5 7
592 943.4 780.9 7 5 3 7 7 3
593 858.1 701.4 7 5 3 7 7 5
594 818.1 600.9 7 5 3 7 7 7
595 346.4 248.5 7 5 5 3 3 3
596 469.1 343.9 7 5 5 3 3 5
597 551.5 399.8 7 5 5 3 3 7
598 488.7 371.8 7 5 5 3 5 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
599 566.4 427.8 7 5 5 3 5 5
600 618.5 456.2 7 5 5 3 5 7
601 701.8 556.2 7 5 5 3 7 3
602 711.9 553.6 7 5 5 3 7 5
603 717.3 541.3 7 5 5 3 7 7
604 477 362.7 7 5 5 5 3 3
605 558.8 422.5 7 5 5 5 3 5
606 612.8 453.6 7 5 5 5 3 7
607 618.9 485.7 7 5 5 5 5 3
608 655.8 506.1 7 5 5 5 5 5
609 679.4 509.9 7 5 5 5 5 7
610 831.4 669.6 7 5 5 5 7 3
611 800.8 631.6 7 5 5 5 7 5
612 777.9 594.7 7 5 5 5 7 7
613 672.3 533.7 7 5 5 7 3 3
614 692.9 540 7 5 5 7 3 5
615 704.1 533.7 7 5 5 7 3 7
616 813.7 656.2 7 5 5 7 5 3
617 789.4 623.3 7 5 5 7 5 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
618 770.3 589.8 7 5 5 7 5 7
619 1025.4 839.4 7 5 5 7 7 3
620 933.9 748.3 7 5 5 7 7 5
621 868.3 674.3 7 5 5 7 7 7
622 286.4 191 7 5 7 3 3 3
623 378.4 248.7 7 5 7 3 3 5
624 456.6 301.7 7 5 7 3 3 7
625 451.4 333 7 5 7 3 5 3
626 508.5 360.1 7 5 7 3 5 5
627 556.6 385.4 7 5 7 3 5 7
628 697 545.2 7 5 7 3 7 3
629 701.8 527 7 5 7 3 7 5
630 703 511.5 7 5 7 3 7 7
631 436.7 322.6 7 5 7 5 3 3
632 498.3 353 7 5 7 5 3 5
633 547.2 381.2 7 5 7 5 3 7
634 600.9 464.2 7 5 7 5 5 3
635 626.8 464.1 7 5 7 5 5 5
636 646.4 464.6 7 5 7 5 5 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
637 845.8 675.9 7 5 7 5 7 3
638 819.4 630.6 7 5 7 5 7 5
639 792.4 590.4 7 5 7 5 7 7
640 661.4 519.4 7 5 7 7 3 3
641 675 508.9 7 5 7 7 3 5
642 682.1 499.8 7 5 7 7 3 7
643 824.7 660.4 7 5 7 7 5 3
644 803.6 619.6 7 5 7 7 5 5
645 780.6 582.9 7 5 7 7 5 7
646 1068.6 871.3 7 5 7 7 7 3
647 995.5 785.5 7 5 7 7 7 5
648 925.9 708.2 7 5 7 7 7 7
649 613.5 491.8 7 7 3 3 3 3
650 804.7 654.3 7 7 3 3 3 5
651 892.8 727.5 7 7 3 3 3 7
652 709.9 574.7 7 7 3 3 5 3
653 855.8 698.9 7 7 3 3 5 5
654 923.5 753.5 7 7 3 3 5 7
655 854 698.4 7 7 3 3 7 3
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
656 932.4 765.5 7 7 3 3 7 5
657 969.1 792.5 7 7 3 3 7 7
658 701.9 572.2 7 7 3 5 3 3
659 852 695.9 7 7 3 5 3 5
660 920.9 752.2 7 7 3 5 3 7
661 798.1 654.5 7 7 3 5 5 3
662 903 740.3 7 7 3 5 5 5
663 951.5 778.1 7 7 3 5 5 7
664 941.9 777.5 7 7 3 5 7 3
665 979.4 806.7 7 7 3 5 7 5
666 996.9 817 7 7 3 5 7 7
667 834.3 688.8 7 7 3 7 3 3
668 922.7 758.1 7 7 3 7 3 5
669 962.8 788.7 7 7 3 7 3 7
670 930.1 770.8 7 7 3 7 5 3
671 973.5 802.3 7 7 3 7 5 5
672 993.2 814.6 7 7 3 7 5 7
673 1073.4 893.4 7 7 3 7 7 3
674 1049.7 868.4 7 7 3 7 7 5
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
675 1038.5 853.3 7 7 3 7 7 7
676 415.8 308.9 7 7 5 3 3 3
677 600.3 458.6 7 7 5 3 3 5
678 725 551.8 7 7 5 3 3 7
679 557.8 432.1 7 7 5 3 5 3
680 697.3 542.5 7 7 5 3 5 5
681 791.9 608.2 7 7 5 3 5 7
682 770.8 616.5 7 7 5 3 7 3
683 842.8 668.3 7 7 5 3 7 5
684 891.3 693.3 7 7 5 3 7 7
685 546.3 423.1 7 7 5 5 3 3
686 689.9 537.2 7 7 5 5 3 5
687 786.2 605.6 7 7 5 5 3 7
688 688.1 546.1 7 7 5 5 5 3
689 786.7 620.8 7 7 5 5 5 5
690 852.9 661.9 7 7 5 5 5 7
691 900.5 730 7 7 5 5 7 3
692 931.8 746.3 7 7 5 5 7 5
693 951.9 746.7 7 7 5 5 7 7
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
694 741.7 594.1 7 7 5 7 3 3
695 824 654.7 7 7 5 7 3 5
696 877.6 685.8 7 7 5 7 3 7
697 882.9 716.6 7 7 5 7 5 3
698 920.4 738 7 7 5 7 5 5
699 943.8 741.8 7 7 5 7 5 7
700 1094.5 899.8 7 7 5 7 7 3
701 1064.8 863.1 7 7 5 7 7 5
702 1042.4 826.3 7 7 5 7 7 7
703 326.9 226.6 7 7 7 3 3 3
704 467 326.5 7 7 7 3 3 5
705 587.6 416.9 7 7 7 3 3 7
706 491.3 368.5 7 7 7 3 5 3
707 596.7 437.9 7 7 7 3 5 5
708 687.7 500.6 7 7 7 3 5 7
709 737.2 580.7 7 7 7 3 7 3
710 790.5 604.8 7 7 7 3 7 5
711 835.4 626.7 7 7 7 3 7 7
712 477.3 358.2 7 7 7 5 3 3
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Run # Y20 (m) Y10 (m) X1 (deg) X2 (deg) X3 (nm) X4 (deg) X5 (deg) X6 (nm)
713 586 430.8 7 7 7 5 3 5
714 678.3 496.4 7 7 7 5 3 7
715 641 499.7 7 7 7 5 5 3
716 715.1 541.9 7 7 7 5 5 5
717 777.7 579.9 7 7 7 5 5 7
718 886.2 711.4 7 7 7 5 7 3
719 908.2 708.4 7 7 7 5 7 5
720 924.8 705.6 7 7 7 5 7 7
721 702.1 554.9 7 7 7 7 3 3
722 763.8 586.7 7 7 7 7 3 5
723 813.4 615 7 7 7 7 3 7
724 865 696 7 7 7 7 5 3
725 892.2 697.4 7 7 7 7 5 5
726 912 698.1 7 7 7 7 5 7
727 1109.1 906.8 7 7 7 7 7 3
728 1184.3 863.3 7 7 7 7 7 5
729 1058.3 823.4 7 7 7 7 7 7
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[57] César Muñoz, Aaron Dutle, Anthony Narkawicz, and Jason Upchurch. Un-
manned aircraft aystems in the national airspace system: A formal methods
perspective. ACM SIGLOG News, 3(3):67–76, 2016.
271
[58] Alwyn Goodloe, Carl Gunter, and Mark-Oliver Stehr. Formal prototyping in
early stages of protocol design. In Proceedings of the 2005 Workshop on Issues
in the Theory of Scurity, 2005.
[59] Ying Jiang, Jian Liu, Gilles Dowek, and Kailiang Ji. Sctl: Towards combining
model checking and proof checking, 2016.
[60] S. Asokan, G. S. Kumar, and N. J. Lal. Modeling of alfa programs using pvs
theorem prover. pages 373–375. IEEE, 2009.
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